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Since the beginning of the 21st century, the fundamental concepts of group reporting have been 
revised substantially by the International Accounting Standards Board. Until now, International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) which were introduced with the aim to increase the trans-
parency and comparability of consolidated financial statements have been applied mandatorily 
for about ten years in the European Union. These important developments frame the research 
context of this dissertation. Based on a comprehensive introduction into the conceptual funda-
mentals of group reporting under IFRS, the first part of the dissertation deals with the standards 
IFRS 10, IFRS 11 and, in particular, IAS 28 (revised 2011) which have recently been issued. Besi-
des, the first part contributes to the ongoing debate on the subsequent accounting for goodwill 
acquired in a business combination. The second part of the dissertation examines issues related 
to the comparability and transparency of financial reporting under IFRS. In particular, compa-
rability is assessed by analyzing classification choices in the statement of cash flows. Finally, the 
effects of the IFRS adoption on two dimensions of financial reporting transparency, earnings 
management and disclosure quality, are examined. In summary, the dissertation aims to further 
our understanding regarding recent conceptual developments as well as the achievement of 
comparability and transparency of group reporting under IFRS.
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1 Introduction to the Research Context 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)1 are continuously on the rise. 
To date, IFRS are to be applied mandatorily by firms in more than 100 jurisdic-
tions (IFRS Foundation, 2015a).2 A major milestone of the success of IFRS was 
achieved in 2002 when the so-called “IAS-Regulation” (Regulation (EC) 
No. 1606/2002) was issued. This regulation generally requires European firms 
that are listed on a regulated market in the EU to prepare their consolidated finan-
cial statements according to IFRS for financial years starting on or after January 
1, 2005.3 The introduction of IFRS for group reporting purposes is based on the 
following goal as stated in the IAS-Regulation: 
“This Regulation has as its objective the adoption and use of in-
ternational accounting standards in the Community with a view 
to harmonising the financial information presented by the com-
panies referred to in Article 4 in order to ensure a high degree 
of transparency and comparability of financial statements and 
hence an efficient functioning of the Community capital market 
and of the Internal Market.” (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, 
Article 1). 
Accordingly, two goals have been formulated which are directly related to finan-
cial reporting; higher transparency and comparability. Achieving them should 
improve the functioning of capital markets and, thereby, foster macroeconomic 
                                                 
1  In this chapter, the abbreviation IFRS refers to the accounting standards developed by the In-
ternational Accounting Standards Board (IASB) or its predecessor, the International Account-
ing Standards Committee (IASC) as well as the related SIC/IFRIC interpretations. Accounting 
standards that were issued by the IASC are called International Accounting Standards (IAS). 
2  For information about specific countries see IFRS Foundation (2015b). 
3  See Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, Article 4.  
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developments (Brüggemann et al., 2013). The adoption of IFRS around the world 
has stimulated a large body of literature examining the effects of the regulatory 
change with regard to the quality of financial reporting.4 However, important 
questions are not yet conclusively answered (Singleton-Green, 2015). One factor 
which contributes to the continuing demand for research on the effects of the 
adoption of IFRS is time. In particular, as pointed out by Barth (2008, p. 1174), 
“[b]ecause application of IFRS became widespread only beginning in 2005, it is 
possible that any assessment of its quality could be affected by transition or learn-
ing effects.”5 In many cases, prior research inevitably had to focus on relatively 
short periods after the introduction of IFRS. Thus, more research regarding the 
longer-term effects of IFRS adoption is needed (Callao and Jarne, 2010; Single-
ton-Green, 2015). 
IFRS is intended to be a set of high quality accounting standards with the poten-
tial to be applied consistently around the globe (IFRS Foundation, 2015a). There-
fore, it is not surprising that IFRS have been subject to ongoing change intended 
to improve financial reporting quality. The last decade has seen several major 
changes with regard to group reporting. First, the accounting for business combi-
nations has been addressed with the issuance and amendment of IFRS 3 Business 
Combinations in 2004 and 2008, respectively. Important and contentious changes 
include the abolishment of the pooling of interests method and the introduction of 
the so-called impairment-only approach for the subsequent accounting for good-
                                                 
4  See, for example, Soderstrom and Sun (2007) and Brüggemann et al. (2013) for reviews of the 
literature related to voluntary and mandatory adoption of IFRS, respectively, as well as Single-
ton-Green (2015) for an extensive up-to-date review of the empirical research on the effects of 
mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU. 
5  In a similar vein, Brüggemann et al. (2013, p. 22) state that the results of research related to 
IFRS adoption “could simply be artefacts of the short history of mandatory IFRS adoption, re-
flecting a combination of idiosyncratic, transitory effects of first-time adoption and low statis-
tical power due to relatively short analysis periods.” 
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will. Under this approach, acquired goodwill is not amortized over its useful life 
but rather tested (at least) annually for impairment. 
In 2013, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) started to assess 
the effects of the application of the new standard on business combinations during 
its Post-implementation Review (PIR) on IFRS 3. As a result of the PIR, the 
IASB identified two areas of all business combinations issues discussed as being 
of higher significance (IASB, 2015a): (1) the ineffectiveness and complexity of 
goodwill impairment tests and (2) the subsequent accounting for goodwill, i.e. the 
benefits of the impairment-only approach compared to regular amortization plus 
impairment tests when there are indicators that goodwill might be impaired. Con-
sequently, in February 2015, the IASB decided to add research projects on these 
issues to its research agenda (IASB, 2015b). 
Fundamental to the definition of a business combination6 as well as to the defini-
tion of the group and, thus, consolidated financial statements7 is the principle of 
control which has also been revised recently. In May 2011, the IASB issued a 
package of new standards with revised fundamental concepts regarding the ac-
counting for investments. In particular, IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial State-
ments introduced a new approach to determining a parent-subsidiary relationship 
which is solely based on the principle of control. Additionally, IFRS 11 Joint Ar-
rangements sets out new principles for the identification of and accounting for 
joint arrangements. At the same time, the IASB issued a revised version of IAS 28 
Accounting for Associates and Joint Ventures as well as a standard containing the 
                                                 
6  A business combination is “[a] transaction or other event in which an acquirer obtains control 
of one or more businesses” (IFRS 3, Appendix A). 
7  Consolidated financial statements are “[t]he financial statements of a group in which the assets, 
liabilities, equity, income, expenses and cash flows of the parent and its subsidiaries are pre-
sented as those of a single economic entity” (IFRS 10, Appendix A). IFRS 10, Appendix A fur-
ther defines a parent as an entity which controls at least one entity and a subsidiary as an entity 
being controlled by another entity. 
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disclosure requirements with regard to the parent company’s investments 
(IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in other Entities). 
In summary, in the last decade, the fundamental concepts of group reporting, 
namely the accounting for the parent company’s investments including acquisi-
tion accounting, have been revised substantially. Furthermore, being introduced 
with the aim to increase the transparency and comparability of consolidated fi-
nancial statements, IFRS have now been applied mandatorily for about ten years 
in the EU. These important developments frame the research context of this dis-
sertation under the title Current Conceptual and Empirical Issues in Group Re-
porting under IFRS. 
The dissertation is based on five manuscripts that aim to further our understanding 
regarding the conceptual developments described above as well as the achieve-
ment of comparability and transparency of group reporting under IFRS. Accord-
ingly, the dissertation is divided into two major parts (see Figure 1). In a first part, 
the manuscripts A, B, and C (Chapters II to IV) focus on current conceptual issues 
in group reporting under IFRS: the newly issued standards IFRS 10, IFRS 11, and 
IAS 28 (revised) as well as the subsequent accounting for goodwill which is going 
to be reconsidered as a result of the recent PIR on IFRS 3. In the second part of 
this dissertation, issues related to the comparability (Manuscript D, Chapter V) 
and transparency (Manuscript E, Chapter VI) of financial reporting under IFRS 
are examined empirically. 
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Figure 1: Organization of dissertation 
As a foundation to this dissertation, Manuscript A “The Success Story of Inter-
national Additives Producer AG – A Case Study on Categorization of In-
vestments under IFRS” provides a comprehensive introduction into the concep-
tual fundamentals of group reporting under IFRS. In particular, the categorization 
of investments on the basis of the degree of the investor’s influence over the in-
vestee according to the recently issued standards IFRS 10, IFRS 11 and IAS 28 
(revised 2011) is explained. Subsequently, the application of the new standards is 
illustrated. Moreover, the manuscript highlights the consequences of investment 
categorization with regard to the accounting treatment to be applied in the inves-
tor’s consolidated financial statements as well as related managerial incentives 
and disclosure requirements. This case study makes a contribution to the literature 
in the field of accounting education. 
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Manuscript B “Die Bilanzierung von Beteiligungen an assoziierten Unterneh-
men sowie Gemeinschaftsunternehmen auf der Basis des überarbeiteten 
IAS 28 – Implikationen der Neuerungen für die Bilanzierungspraxis” further 
explores the revised version of IAS 28 Accounting for Associates and Joint Ven-
tures (revised 2011). Unlike the new standards IFRS 10, IFRS 11 and IFRS 12 
that have been issued at the same time, the changes made to IAS 28 (revised 
2011) received relatively little attention in the literature. This is especially re-
markable in light of the extent to which recent exposure drafts8 which contained 
amendments to this standard have been discussed in the literature (e.g. Fischer 
and Pronobis, 2013; Stibi, 2013; Hayn and Hayn, 2013; Schmidt, 2013; 
Holzwarth, 2013). Therefore, the comprehensive review of the revisions to 
IAS 28 (revised 2011) provided by manuscript B adds to the literature on the ac-
counting for associates and joint ventures. The analysis shows that the amend-
ments to IAS 28 go beyond editorial changes and have the potential to materially 
affect the accounting for associates and joint ventures. The manuscript further 
highlights ongoing discussions about the further development of IAS 28 at the 
time of publication of this paper. 
Besides the conceptual issues examined in the first two manuscripts, the third 
manuscript focuses on one of the most widely debated issues in group reporting; 
the subsequent accounting for goodwill acquired in a business combination. 
About ten years after the introduction of the impairment-only approach in 2004, 
the IASB conducted its PIR on IFRS 3 Business Combinations and, thereby, re-
opened the debate on goodwill accounting. As described above, during the PIR, 
                                                 
8  For the two exposure drafts regarding amendments to IAS 28 (revised 2011) which have been 
issued a short time after the issuance of the standard and have also been presented in manu-
script B see IASB (2012a) and IASB (2012b). 
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the subsequent accounting for goodwill as well as the impairment test have been 
found to be the most significant issues in accounting for business combinations. 
Manuscript C “10 Years Impairment-only Approach – Stakeholder Percep-
tions and Research Findings” contributes to the current debate on goodwill ac-
counting by assessing the effects of the introduction of the impairment-only ap-
proach from two perspectives. First, the perceptions of various stakeholders are 
examined by analyzing comment letters received by the IASB in response to the 
formal Request for Information during the recent PIR. Second, a systematic re-
view of related academic literature is provided. Importantly, the paper provides an 
analysis which is not subject to self-evaluation concerns.9 The paper finds that 
stakeholders’ views about the usefulness of the information provided by the im-
pairment test are mixed, while they share concerns about the cost-benefit relation 
and the degree of discretion involved in the tests. Academic research tends to 
support the conjecture that the impairment-only approach increases the usefulness 
of financial reporting. However, the concerns expressed about subjectivity and 
managerial discretion are supported by a number of academic studies. On this 
basis, the manuscript derives some suggestions for the further development of 
subsequent goodwill accounting. 
The second part of the dissertation covers issues related to the comparability and 
transparency of financial reporting under IFRS. With regard to comparability of 
IFRS financial statements, a number of studies examined accounting policy 
choices of firms from various countries (e.g. Kvaal and Nobes, 2010; Kvaal and 
Nobes, 2012; Haller and Wehrfritz, 2013; Nobes and Stadler, 2013). In general, 
                                                 
9  Ewert and Wagenhofer (2012) encourage academics to contribute to standard setting and, in 
particular, to a PIR. They further emphasize that a PIR should be conducted by an institution 
which is independent from the standard setter in order to avoid self-evaluation concerns. 
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the studies document substantial cross-country differences in the application of 
IFRS which may especially reflect national pre-IFRS accounting practices. How-
ever, heterogeneous financial reporting, which potentially limits comparability 
across firms, can also be observed within countries. Manuscript D “Comparabil-
ity of reported cash flows under IFRS – Evidence from Germany” examines 
the comparability of cash flows reported under IAS 7 Statement of Cash Flows. In 
particular, the classification choices with regard to interest and dividends are ana-
lyzed for a sample of German listed firms from 2005 to 2012. Documenting di-
versity in practice, the manuscript further sheds light on the determinants of 
firms’ classification choices beyond the dominant country factors. Thereby, the 
paper adds to the literature on comparability of financial reporting under IFRS as 
well as on reporting incentives with regard to the statement of cash flows, in par-
ticular (Zhang, 2009; Lee, 2012; Gordon et al., 2014). Moreover, it contributes to 
the long-lasting debate about the appropriate conceptual classification of interest 
and dividends (e.g. Nurnberg and Largay, 1998). 
The effects of the IFRS adoption on the transparency of financial reporting have 
often been evaluated by measures of the properties of earnings (“earnings trans-
parency”)10 and, in particular, the effects on the degree of earnings management. 
However, evidence for a decrease of the degree of earnings management, and thus 
an increase in financial reporting transparency,11 is not yet conclusive. However, 
users of financial reports are interested beyond such aggregate measures of earn-
ings quality (Brüggemann et al., 2013). Therefore, academics have also examined 
                                                 
10  For example, Brüggemann et al. (2013) observe that IFRS adoption studies mostly use ‘earn-
ings quality’ metrics. 
11  Although earnings management can also be used to signal private information, in this disserta-
tion, earnings management is interpreted opportunistically which is in line with the majority of 
earnings management studies regarding IFRS adoption. For example, Barth et al. (2008) expect 
companies with higher quality earnings to exhibit a lower degree of earnings management and 
state that this prediction is consistent with prior research. 
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the effects of IFRS adoption on the quantity and the quality of disclosures which 
usually accompany the primary financial statements (hereafter: disclosure quali-
ty), a different dimension of transparency. In contrast to the results regarding 
earnings management, research examining disclosure quality provides unanimous 
support for an increase in transparency as a result of the switch to international 
accounting standards (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Daske and Gebhardt, 2006; 
Glaum et al., 2013). Since enhanced disclosures under IFRS have been brought 
forward as one argument to expect a decrease in earnings management as a result 
of the adoption of IFRS (see Doukakis, 2014), the different effects documented in 
the literature as well as the association between these dimensions of transparency 
around the regulatory change are a matter of great interest which has not been 
addressed by prior research. 
Manuscript E “Short-term and long-term effects of IFRS adoption on disclo-
sure quality and earnings management” investigates the effects of IFRS adop-
tion on the transparency of financial reporting in Germany. First, the manuscript 
analyzes separately the development of the degree of earnings management and 
the quality of disclosures. Since prior research was inevitably limited to studying 
a few years around the adoption of IFRS and because the need to examine longer 
time horizons has been emphasized (e.g. Callao and Jarne, 2010), the paper ana-
lyzes the development of transparency from the first few years, the ‘early’ phase 
of IFRS accounting, to the ‘mature’ phase. In addition, the nature of the relation-
ship between disclosure quality and the degree of earnings management is exam-
ined. The paper contributes to the widespread debate on the effects of IFRS adop-
tion and highlights the importance of studying time horizons beyond the first few 
years after the regulatory change. Considering the scale of the introduction of 
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IFRS in the EU, financial reporting stakeholders should clearly be interested in 
the long-term results rather than focusing on short-term outcomes. 
 
2 Overview and Findings of the Manuscripts 
Manuscript A “The Success Story of International Additives Producer AG – A 
Case Study on Categorization of Investments under IFRS” lays the foundation 
for this dissertation. As such, it provides a comprehensive introduction into the 
conceptual fundamentals of group reporting under IFRS and, in particular, the 
categorization of investments according to the recently issued standards IFRS 10, 
IFRS 11 and IAS 28 (revised 2011). The manuscript is constituted of a teaching 
case study and hence, is attributable to the field of accounting education. The 
learning objectives of the teaching case cover technical aspects of the relevant 
accounting provisions related to the categorization of investments under IFRS as 
well as the development of an understanding of the consequences of investment 
categorization. This does not only comprise the consequences regarding the ac-
counting methods to be applied, but rather includes related disclosure require-
ments and, importantly, managerial incentives arising from compensation con-
tracts or capital market expectations. By embedding the role and effects of mana-
gerial incentives, the case study addresses the proclaimed need to enhance an un-
derstanding of the economic concepts and theories that underlie financial report-
ing (see Barth, 2008). 
To date, the case study has been implemented twice by the author of this disserta-
tion at HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management both in the M.Sc. and in the 
MBA program. Moreover, the manuscript has been submitted to the Journal of 
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Accounting Education (ISSN 0748-5751) (VHB-Jourqual 3: “C”). Having re-
ceived a “revise and resubmit” decision, the manuscript has been amended and 
will be resubmitted to the Journal of Accounting Education soon. The manuscript 
is co-authored with Henning Zülch and Daniel Voll. The development of the re-
search question as well as the design and preparation of the manuscript, including 
the case study, teaching notes as well as recommended solutions, has been con-
ducted equally by Daniel Voll and the author of this dissertation in collaboration. 
Henning Zülch was constantly supervising and mentoring throughout the process 
of developing the manuscript. 
Manuscript B “Die Bilanzierung von Beteiligungen an assoziierten Unterneh-
men sowie Gemeinschaftsunternehmen auf der Basis des überarbeiteten 
IAS 28 – Implikationen der Neuerungen für die Bilanzierungspraxis” pro-
vides a comprehensive analysis of the changes made to IAS 28 Accounting for 
Associates and Joint Ventures (revised 2011) which has been issued contempora-
neously with the new standards IFRS 10, IFRS 11, and IFRS 12. However, in 
contrast to these standards, the revised version of IAS 28 has received relatively 
little attention in the literature. The manuscript contains the results of a systemat-
ic, in-depth analysis of the new version of IAS 28 issued in May 2011 in compari-
son to its predecessor. The changes made to IAS 28 (revised 2011) are assessed 
with regard to their potential impact on the accounting for associates and joint 
ventures. Besides editorial and minor changes, e.g. changes to definitions con-
tained in the standard, IAS 28 (revised 2011) experienced several major revisions 
of high practical relevance. In particular, material changes have been made with 
regard to the exemptions from applying the equity method, the classification of an 
investment, or a portion of an investment, in an associate or joint venture as held 
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for sale in accordance with the provisions of IFRS 5 Non-current Assets Held for 
Sale and Discontinued Operations, and the discontinuing of the use of the equity 
method as well as changes in ownership interest. The presentation and discussion 
of the changes made to IAS 28 (revised 2011) is complemented by an overview of 
ongoing discussions about the further development of IAS 28 at the time of publi-
cation of this paper. 
Manuscript B has been published in the German journal Die Wirtschaftsprüfung 
(ISSN 0340-9031) (VHB-Jourqual 3: “C”) in January 2014. The manuscript is co-
authored with Henning Zülch and Marco Popp. The development of the research 
question, the analysis of the revised IAS 28 Investments in Associates and Joint 
Ventures (rev. 2011) as well as the preparation of the manuscript has been con-
ducted equally by Marco Popp and the author of this dissertation in collaboration. 
Henning Zülch was constantly supervising and mentoring throughout the process 
of developing the manuscript. 
Manuscript C “10 Years Impairment-only Approach – Stakeholder Percep-
tions and Research Findings” examines the perceptions and experiences of 
stakeholders as well as the findings of academic research with regard to the ac-
counting for goodwill under the impairment-only approach in the last decade. 
Thereby, the paper contributes to the current debate on subsequent goodwill ac-
counting and the impairment test that has been re-opened by the IASB during the 
PIR on IFRS 3. In a first step, the stakeholder perceptions are analyzed by means 
of a content analysis of comment letters that have been sent to the IASB in re-
sponse to a formal Request for Information issued in the second phase of the PIR. 
Altogether, 97 individual comment letters were analyzed with a focus on the per-
ceptions regarding the questions whether more useful information are provided 
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under the impairment-only approach compared to regular amortization, whether 
the impairment test is ‘rigorous and operational’ devised, and which arguments 
are used to support either the impairment-only approach or amortization. In a sec-
ond step, a systematic review of related academic research is provided to assess 
the usefulness of the impairment-only approach as well as the rigorousness and 
operability of the impairment test from a second perspective. The two-pronged 
approach enables a comparison of the two perspectives to analyze whether the 
perceptions of stakeholders, mainly from practice, are supported by the findings 
of empirical academic research as well as how relevant current accounting re-
search is from a standard setting and practice perspective. The aim of the paper is 
to contribute to the debate by providing a neutral assessment of stakeholder per-
ceptions and research findings, i.e. an assessment which is not subject to self-
evaluation concerns. Moreover, novel insights into the stakeholder perceptions 
regarding the impairment-only approach, especially with regard to the classifica-
tion of stakeholders according to the background of their accounting systems, are 
provided. 
The paper shows that, on the one hand, stakeholders’ views about the usefulness 
of the information provided by the impairment-only approach are mixed, while 
they share widespread concerns about the cost-benefit relation as well as the com-
plexity and discretion involved in the impairment test procedures. On the other 
hand, academic research tends to support the former assumption that the impair-
ment-only approach increases the usefulness of financial reporting in comparison 
to amortization. However, the concerns expressed about subjectivity and manage-
rial discretion are confirmed by a number of studies that provide evidence for 
earnings management behavior through impairment decisions. Importantly, the 
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findings point to differences between stakeholders from countries with different 
accounting backgrounds. Throughout the analyses, stakeholders from countries 
with a British-American accounting system provide much more support for the 
impairment-only approach and the impairment test provisions than those with a 
Continental (European) accounting background.12 The former group provides 
more arguments in favor and fewer arguments against the impairment-only ap-
proach than the latter and advocates a return to regular amortization relatively 
rarely, whereas more than half of the stakeholders with a Continental accounting 
background explicitly recommend a return to regular amortization. This finding 
complements research that indicates that different groups of accounting systems 
persist even under a shared accounting regime such as IFRS (e.g. Nobes, 2011; 
Nobes and Stadler, 2013). It also supports doubts on whether a set of international 
standards can be developed that finds an equal level of acceptance around the 
globe. On the basis of the analyses, the measures planned by the IASB, i.e. re-
search projects on the subsequent accounting for goodwill as well as the impair-
ment test procedures, are assessed to be appropriate. Furthermore, the paper de-
rives some suggestions for improvements to the impairment-only approach that 
could help to address some of the concerns noted in the short-term. 
The manuscript is intended for publication in a scientific accounting journal such 
as Accounting in Europe (ISSN 1744-9480) (VHB-Jourqual 3: “C”). The submis-
sion is planned soon after completion of this dissertation. An earlier version of 
this manuscript has been published as HHL Working Paper No. 144 available 
online at HHL’s website (www.hhl.de) as well as at the Social Science Research 
Network (www.ssrn.com). That version has also been presented by Tobias Stork 
                                                 
12  The classification of countries according to their accounting systems follows Mueller et al. 
(1997). 
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genannt Wersborg and the author of this dissertation in a workshop at Pricewater-
houseCoopers in Frankfurt am Main in September 2014. In addition, the author of 
this dissertation presented earlier versions of the paper at the 6th Doctoral Seminar 
on Accounting at HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Leipzig, in Oc-
tober 2014, the 38th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association in 
Glasgow, Scotland, in April 2015, and at the 77th Annual Meeting of the German 
Academic Association for Business Research (VHB) in Vienna, Austria, in May 
2015. With regard to the intended contribution of the initial version of the paper, 
it is noteworthy that the results of the study have been cited by the staff of the 
IFRS Foundation in its analyses during the PIR on IFRS 3 (see IASB, 2014). The 
manuscript is co-authored with Henning Zülch and Tobias Stork genannt Wers-
borg. The development of the research question, the design of the study as well as 
the preparation of the manuscript has been conducted equally by Tobias Stork 
genannt Wersborg and the author of this dissertation. Moreover, the author of this 
dissertation conducted the content analysis of the comment letters. In addition, the 
author of this dissertation revised the manuscript to incorporate comments re-
ceived from reviewers. Henning Zülch was constantly supervising and mentoring 
throughout the process of developing the manuscript. 
Manuscript D “Comparability of reported cash flows under IFRS – Evidence 
from Germany” examines the comparability of cash flows reported under IAS 7 
Statement of Cash Flows. Traditionally, the statement of cash flows has been re-
garded as relatively well comparable across firms and time due to its focus on 
changes in cash and cash equivalents and the absence of discretion with regard to 
recognition and measurement.13 However, IFRS offer considerable flexibility re-
                                                 
13  See e.g. ADS International (2002), Chapter 23 “Cash Flow-Rechnung” [Cash Flow Statement], 
par. 3. 
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garding the classification of certain cash flow items which potentially impedes 
comparability. This manuscript examines the classification choices regarding in-
terest and dividends under IFRS. Unlike US GAAP, IAS 7 allows firms to report 
such cash flows either within or outside operating cash flow. 
Documenting reporting practice for a sample of 1,064 firm-year observations 
from 2005 to 2012, the paper finds substantial diversity with regard to the classi-
fication of cash flows which reduces comparability among German non-financial 
firms. The dominant classification under IFRS reflects the concurrent German 
GAAP guidance: Throughout the sample period, more than two thirds of the 
companies classify interest paid (70%), interest received (71%), and dividends 
received (69%) as operating, while dividends paid are included in financing cash 
flow almost without exception. Importantly, operating cash flow as reported under 
IFRS significantly exceeds the amount that would have been reported without 
these IFRS-specific classification choices (see also Gordon et al., 2014). 
In addition, the manuscript applies multivariate analyses to provide further in-
sights into the drivers of classification choices that generally increase operating 
cash flow. Thereby, it complements prior research by Gordon et al. (2014)14 by 
examining several additional corporate governance and management-related fac-
tors. The findings support prior research in that highly-leveraged and less profita-
ble firms use discretion over cash flow reporting in response to contracting con-
cerns (Gordon et al., 2014) or to augment reported financial information (Adhika-
ri and Duru, 2006). Moreover, the paper provides evidence for the relevance of 
industry practice for the policy choices of listed firms. Further, the results suggest 
                                                 
14  Gordon et al. (2014) document the classification choices regarding interest and dividends of 
firms from 13 European countries and provide initial evidence on the determinants of classifi-
cation choices that aim to increase operating cash flow. 
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that mandatory adopters of IFRS as well as firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors 
are less likely to make use of IFRS-specific classification options. This is con-
sistent with the conjectures that national pre-IFRS practices persist (e.g. Kvaal 
and Nobes, 2010; Nobes and Stadler, 2013) and that big international (Big 4) au-
ditors do not only serve as a constraint but rather as an advisor on international 
accounting issues (Cole et al., 2013). The findings also indicate that firms using 
cash flow measures for internal control purposes tend to increase operating cash 
flow by means of classification. Overall, the findings of manuscript D indicate 
that the heterogeneous classification of interest and dividends does not only re-
flect different underlying economics but is associated with several firm-specific 
factors and incentives. Therefore, the manuscript casts doubt on whether the ad-
vantages of the flexibility offered under IFRS outweigh the disadvantages of re-
duced comparability. 
This manuscript has been submitted for publication to Corporate Ownership and 
Control (ISSN 1727-9232) (VHB-Jourqual 3: “C”). An earlier version of this 
manuscript has been presented by Christian Kretzmann and the author of this dis-
sertation at the 5th Doctoral Seminar on Accounting at HHL Leipzig Graduate 
School of Management, Leipzig, in October 2013. Furthermore, the paper has 
been presented by Christian Kretzmann at the international conference on “Corpo-
rate and Institutional Innovations in Finance and Governance” in Paris, France, in 
May 2015. The manuscript is co-authored with Henning Zülch and Christian 
Kretzmann. The development of the research question, the collection of data, the 
design of the study including the theoretical basis and empirical analysis as well 
as the preparation of the manuscript has been conducted by Christian Kretzmann 
and the author of this dissertation in collaboration. In this cooperation, Christian 
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Kretzmann was mainly involved in the collection of data from databases and the 
execution of the empirical analyses. The author of this dissertation contributed 
mainly to the development of the research question, the theoretical background 
and the literature review as well as the preparation of the manuscript. Henning 
Zülch was constantly supervising and mentoring throughout the process of devel-
oping the manuscript. 
Finally, Manuscript E “Short-term and long-term effects of IFRS adoption on 
disclosure quality and earnings management” examines the effects of IFRS 
adoption on earnings management as well as disclosure quality which are consid-
ered as different but related dimensions of transparency. The study focuses on 
Germany which allows using a specific proxy for disclosure quality, namely the 
disclosure scores of the “Best Annual Report” ‘beauty contest’ of the German 
business journal manager magazin, which are publicly available from 1995 to 
2012. With regard to earnings management, the study employs discretionary ac-
cruals in its main analyses as well as an alternative earnings management diagnos-
tic developed by Jansen et al. (2012) as a robustness check. The sample of firms 
as well as the study period from 1995 to 2012 were determined by the availability 
of the disclosure scores. In a first step, the effects of the IFRS adoption on earn-
ings management and disclosure quality are analysed separately. In a second step, 
the paper addresses the demand for long-term studies of effects of IFRS adoption 
and examines whether there are differences regarding the dimensions of transpar-
ency between the early and mature phase of reporting under IFRS. Therefore, the 
first four years of the individual firms’ IFRS reporting are defined as ‘early’ irre-
spective of whether the adoption was voluntary or mandatory. All subsequent 
years are defined as ‘mature’ IFRS reporting years. In addition to these separate 
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analyses on the effects of IFRS adoption on disclosure quality and earnings man-
agement, the paper examines the nature of the relationship between these dimen-
sions of transparency. 
Consistent with prior research findings, the paper documents an increase in dis-
closure quality accompanying the transition from German GAAP to IFRS. Con-
trarily, the level of earnings management is significantly higher under IFRS com-
pared to German GAAP. However, this result seems to be driven by observations 
from the first few years of IFRS reporting, since the findings indicate a significant 
decrease in the extent of earnings management from the ‘early’ phase of IFRS 
reporting to the ‘mature’ phase. Comparing the extent of earnings management 
under German GAAP to observations from the ‘mature’ phase of IFRS reporting, 
the study does not report a significant difference which indicates that the extent of 
earnings management does not increase under IFRS compared to German GAAP 
in the longer run. This is interpreted as an improvement in transparency over time 
attributable to learning effects of preparers, users, and auditors, developing en-
forcement, diminishing effects resulting from the application of IFRS 1 (First-
time Adoption of IFRS), and the development of common guidelines and interpre-
tations which foster consistent application of the new standards. Thus, the results 
may mitigate concerns raised by earlier ‘short horizon’ studies documenting an 
increase in earnings management behavior under IFRS (e.g. Callao and Jarne, 
2010). Finally, the study provides evidence of a negative association between 
disclosure quality and earnings management which indicates that disclosures have 
the potential to constrain earnings management. This relationship holds especially 
when accounting standards require relatively few disclosures and/or when com-
mon guidelines and interpretations are not yet developed and financial statements 
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are influenced by low compliance, little experience or weak enforcement as in the 
‘early’ phase of IFRS reporting. Besides the literature on the interplay between 
disclosures and earnings management/quality (e.g. Lobo and Zhou, 2001; Francis 
et al., 2008; Iatridis, 2011; Mouselli et al., 2012; Blanco et al., 2014), the results 
regarding the relationship between disclosures and earnings management are of 
potential interest to both standard setters and users of financial reporting. The 
former should feel encouraged to demand high quality disclosures, particularly 
regarding the estimates and assumptions used by preparers, while the latter should 
be aware of the use of discretion in the absence of disclosures. 
The manuscript has been submitted for publication to Accounting in Europe 
(ISSN 1744-9480) (VHB-Jourqual 3: “C”). Having received a “revise and resub-
mit” decision the manuscript will be resubmitted to Accounting in Europe soon 
after it underwent further revisions by the authors. An earlier version of this paper 
has been published as a working paper available online at the Social Science Re-
search Network (www.ssrn.com) and it was presented by Marcus Salewski and 
the author of this dissertation at the 5th Doctoral Seminar on Accounting at HHL 
Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Leipzig, in October 2013. Moreover, 
the author of this dissertation presented the paper at the 37th Annual Congress of 
the European Accounting Association in Tallinn, Estonia, in May 2014, as well as 
the 10th Workshop on European Financial Reporting in Regensburg in September 
2014 (EUFIN 2014). Furthermore, the findings of the study have been cited in a 
recent literature review on the effects of IFRS adoption in the EU by Singleton-
Green (2015, pp. 48 and 52). The manuscript is co-authored with Henning Zülch 
and Marcus Salewski. The development of the research question, the design of the 
study including the theoretical basis and empirical analysis as well as the prepara-
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tion of the manuscript has been conducted equally by Marcus Salewski and the 
author of this dissertation in collaboration. In this cooperation, the empirical anal-
yses have been processed by Marcus Salewski. Additionally, the author of this 
dissertation revised earlier versions of the manuscript to incorporate comments 
from reviewers and participants of the conference presentations. Henning Zülch 
was constantly supervising and mentoring throughout the process of developing 
the manuscript. 
In summary, this dissertation covers important current conceptual and empirical 
issues in group reporting under IFRS. The individual manuscripts contribute to 
the literature in several ways. Firstly, manuscript A introduces the fundamental 
concepts of group reporting under IFRS with an emphasis on the newly issued 
standards IFRS 10, IFRS 11, and IAS 28 (revised 2011) and the consequences of 
investment categorization. In addition, the case study embeds the role and effects 
of managerial incentives thereby contributing to the literature in the field of ac-
counting education. Secondly, manuscript B provides an analysis of the changes 
made to the revised IAS 28 issued in 2011 which have rarely been covered in the 
literature before, especially in comparison to other group reporting standards is-
sued contemporaneously. Thirdly, manuscript C contributes to the debate on sub-
sequent goodwill accounting by providing an assessment of the impairment-only 
approach which is independent from the standard setter and, thus, not subject to 
self-evaluation concerns. It provides insights into the views and arguments of 
stakeholders as well as findings of the related literature. It highlights the different 
perceptions from stakeholders with a British-American accounting background as 
opposed to those with a Continental (European) accounting background. Fourthly, 
manuscript D documents the diverse classification of interest and dividends in the 
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statement of cash flows by German firms for the period from 2005 to 2012. Im-
portantly, it sheds light on potential determinants of classification choices that 
increase operating cash flow and finds that classification choices are not only re-
flecting different underlying economics but rather, are associated with firm-
specific factors and incentives. Concluding, manuscript E provides initial insights 
into the long-term effects of IFRS adoption on transparency and suggests that 
financial reporting quality increases under IFRS over time. In addition, the manu-
script provides evidence for a negative association between disclosures and earn-
ings management. Figure 2 provides an overview of the results of the dissertation. 
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10 YEARS IMPAIRMENT-ONLY APPROACH –  




This paper contributes to the current debate on goodwill accounting under IFRS. 
Ten years after the introduction of the so-called impairment-only approach (IoA), 
we assess the effects of the implementation of this methodology from two per-
spectives. Firstly, we examine the perceptions of various stakeholders by analyz-
ing comment letters received by the IASB during the Post-implementation Review 
on IFRS 3 Business Combinations. Secondly, we systematically review related 
academic literature. Our findings show that stakeholders’ views about the useful-
ness of the information provided by the impairment test are mixed, while they 
share widespread concerns about the cost-benefit relation and the extent of discre-
tion involved in impairment testing. Moreover, perceptions differ depending on 
stakeholders’ backgrounds, i.e. stakeholders from British-American accounting 
systems are more positive about the IoA than those from Continental systems. 
Academic research tends to support the assumption that the IoA increases the use-
fulness of financial reporting. However, the concerns expressed by stakeholders 
about managerial discretion are supported by empirical studies. Our analysis pro-
vides support for the measures taken by the IASB as well as suggestions for the 
further development of goodwill accounting. 
 
Keywords:  Post-implementation Review, Business Combinations, Goodwill, 
Impairment, IFRS 3, IAS 36  




“No one can afford to be dogmatic about the treatment of goodwill. So many 
excellent authorities disagree absolutely as to the treatment of goodwill that it 
would seem as if almost any of the methods discussed would be justifiable.”1 
The subsequent treatment of goodwill acquired in a business combination has 
long been one of the most intensely debated accounting issues. A variety of meth-
ods, including charging the residual directly to the acquirer’s equity or amortiza-
tion with and without a limit to goodwill’s useful life, has been discussed and ap-
plied in several jurisdictions as well as internationally. The current stage has been 
entered into in the early 21st century, when the two most important accounting 
systems, US GAAP and IFRS2, moved to the so-called impairment-only approach 
(IoA), i.e. to non-amortization with annual and indicator-based impairment tests. 
Following the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board (IASB) abolished the amortization of goodwill 
in the first stage of its business combinations project in 2004. Ten years later, the 
IASB conducted its Post-implementation Review (PIR) on IFRS 3 Business Com-
binations, the result of the two phases of the project on business combinations that 
were completed in 2004 and 2008, respectively. Since a PIR is intended to assess 
the effects of the new accounting provisions on the financial reporting community 
and has to address the important or contentious issues during the development of 
the standard (IFRS Foundation, 2013, par. 6.55), a reconsideration of the account-
ing for goodwill during the PIR on IFRS 3 was just consequential. Hence, the 
                                                 
1  Gilman (1916, p. 195), quoted from Hughes (1982, p. 1). 
2  Unless specifically addressed, we generally use the term IFRS (International Financial Report-
ing Standards) in this paper when referring to both, accounting standards approved by the 
IASB or its predecessor, the IASC. Standards originally issued by the latter are called Interna-
tional Accounting Standards (IAS). 
10 Years Impairment-only Approach – Stakeholder Perceptions and Research Findings 
173 
 
IASB’s formal Request for Information (RfI)3 which encouraged the stakeholders 
within the IFRS community to express their views on a range of business combi-
nations topics also explicitly addressed the usefulness of the IoA and the related 
practical experiences.4 
As a result of the PIR, the IASB identified two areas out of all business combina-
tions issues discussed as being of higher significance (IASB, 2015a): (1) the inef-
fectiveness and complexity of testing goodwill for impairment and (2) the subse-
quent accounting for goodwill, i.e. the benefits of the IoA compared to amortiza-
tion complemented by indicator-based impairment tests. Consequently, in Febru-
ary 2015, the IASB decided to add research projects on these two issues on its 
research agenda (IASB, 2015b). 
The IASB nowadays emphasizes the need for academic research in the standard 
setting process including the PIR.5 With regard to PIRs, Ewert and Wagenhofer 
(2012) emphasize the potential contribution of academics6 and stress that a PIR 
should be conducted by an institution which is independent from the standard set-
ter in order to avoid self-evaluation problems. With this paper, we follow these 
requests and contribute to the current standard setting debate on subsequent 
                                                 
3  RfIs are defined as “formal requests by the IASB for information or feedback on a matter relat-
ed to technical projects or broader consultations” (IFRS Foundation, 2013, par. 4.15). 
4  While the preceding PIR on the respective US GAAP standard, FASB Statement No. 141 (re-
vised 2007) Business Combinations (Statement 141R), did not address the accounting for 
goodwill, the FASB recently began to reconsider the issue, too. Having at first allowed private 
companies to amortize goodwill, the FASB also started a project on Accounting for Goodwill 
for Public Business Entities and Not-for-Profits. However, further activities were postponed 
until the findings of the PIR on IFRS 3 were issued (see FASB, 2014). 
5  For example, having reviewed academic research during the PIR on IFRS 8 Operating Seg-
ments, the IASB is convinced that a review of related research forms “an essential part of the 
PIR process” (IASB, 2014a, p. 5). 
6  Ewert and Wagenhofer (2012) point out that an ex post assessment of the consequences of new 
standards on financial reporting quality is a core competency of accounting scholars. Moreo-
ver, besides their independence from standard setting, the reliability of academics’ results due 
to rigorous methods as well as their being more neutral regarding possible outcomes of the re-
search are advantages which make them able to make a valuable contribution to a PIR. Similar-
ly, Fülbier et al. (2009, p. 484) stress researchers’ “neutrality, their analytical thinking and their 
detached reasoning.” 
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goodwill accounting and the upcoming related IASB projects. In particular, we 
assess the effects of the introduction of the IoA from two perspectives. Firstly, we 
analyze the comment letters submitted in response to the RfI during the PIR to 
examine the perceptions of various stakeholders regarding the IoA ten years after 
its introduction. Secondly, we systematically review related academic literature 
providing evidence for or against different aspects of the IoA. The twofold ap-
proach enables a comparison of the two perspectives to analyze whether the per-
ceptions of stakeholders, mainly from practice, are supported by the findings of 
empirical research as well as how relevant current accounting research is from a 
standard setting and practice perspective. Our aim is to contribute to the debate by 
providing a neutral assessment of stakeholder perceptions and research findings, 
i.e. an assessment which is not subject to self-evaluation concerns. This is espe-
cially important since, in line with the requirement of the Due Process Handbook 
(IFRS Foundation, 2013, par. 6.52), the IASB has conducted the PIR on IFRS 3 
itself. 
Our research shows that, on the one hand, stakeholders’ views about the useful-
ness of the information provided by the IoA are mixed, while they share wide-
spread concerns about the cost-benefit relation as well as the complexity and dis-
cretion involved in impairment tests. On the other hand, academic research tends 
to support the former assumption that the IoA increases the usefulness of financial 
reporting in comparison to amortization. However, the concerns about subjectivity 
and managerial discretion are confirmed by a number of studies that provide evi-
dence for earnings management behavior through impairment decisions. 
Importantly, we provide novel insights into the perceptions of stakeholders from 
countries with different accounting systems. Throughout our analyses, stakehold-
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ers from countries with a British-American accounting system provide more sup-
port for the IoA and the impairment test than those with a Continental (European) 
background. The former group provides more arguments in favor and fewer ar-
guments against the IoA than the latter. Remarkably, more than half of the stake-
holders with a Continental accounting background explicitly recommend a return 
to regular amortization. This finding complements research that observes that dif-
ferent groups of accounting systems persist even under a shared accounting re-
gime such as IFRS (Nobes, 2011). It also supports doubts on whether a set of in-
ternational standards can be developed that is equally accepted around the globe. 
Our analyses provide support for the measures taken by the IASB, i.e. the imple-
mentation of research projects with regard to the impairment test as well as the 
subsequent accounting for goodwill. While, in the light of the research evidence, a 
withdrawal of the IoA does not seem advisable in the short-term, we derive some 
implications for the further development of the impairment test under IFRS. Pos-
sible improvements include a qualitative assessment that could be performed first 
to evaluate whether an impairment test needs to be conducted and the abolishment 
of the concept of value in use (ViU). Additionally, a comprehensive review of 
related disclosure requirements and further guidance regarding difficult aspects, 
e.g. the treatment of non-controlling interests or corporate assets, seem to be nec-
essary. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the de-
velopment of goodwill accounting under IFRS until the recent PIR on IFRS 3. 
The stakeholder perceptions regarding the IoA are examined in section 3 on the 
basis of a content analysis of comment letters. Section 4 presents our review of 
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related literature. Section 5 discusses our findings and derives implications for the 
further development of goodwill accounting. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Institutional Background 
2.1 Development of Goodwill Accounting under IFRS 
Overviews of the historical development of goodwill accounting have been pro-
vided for various jurisdictions and accounting regimes.7 Hence, we limit our re-
marks to the most fundamental milestones of accounting for goodwill under IFRS 
to highlight that goodwill accounting has been one of the important and conten-
tious issues in the past. The International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC), the predecessor of the IASB, initially approached this issue when a pro-
ject on business combinations was included on its agenda in 1978. Besides the 
contentious topic of the acceptability of the pooling-of-interests method8, the sec-
ond main issue in this project was the subsequent accounting for goodwill capital-
ized under acquisition accounting (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007). 
The first outcome of this project, the exposure draft E22, contained not less than 
three different approaches to account for a business combination9 and offered 
three alternatives for the treatment of arising goodwill: Immediate expensing, 
amortization or charging the residual to the acquirer’s equity. Camfferman and 
Zeff (2007, p. 137) ascertain that the accounting for goodwill was the most widely 
discussed issue by respondents to E22 who advocated “[a]lmost every conceivable 
                                                 
7  Examples include Ding et al. (2008) for the UK, the US, Germany and France, Camfferman 
and Zeff (2007) and Kirsch (2006) for IFRS, and Boennen and Glaum (2014) for US GAAP 
and the recent IFRS history. 
8  Under the pooling-of-interests method, the assets and liabilities of both of the combined enti-
ties are accounted for in the consolidated financial statements at their respective pre-acquisition 
book values. 
9  In addition to purchase and pooling, E22 proposed to allow the so-called new entity accounting 
(“fresh start method”), where the assets and liabilities of all combining entities are revalued at 
fair value (Kirsch, 2006). 
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position on capitalization, amortization periods, and charging to equity […] force-
fully.” The final standard IAS 22 Accounting for Business Combinations, issued 
in 1983, allowed only purchase accounting and pooling with tightened conditions 
for the use of the latter. Moreover, with regard to the accounting for goodwill, 
IAS 22 allowed systematic amortization over its useful life or to charge goodwill 
directly to equity (Kirsch, 2006). 
In the late 1980s, the IASC aimed to increase the comparability of financial 
statements. Therefore, exposure draft E32 Comparability of Financial Statements, 
published in 1989, proposed reducing the number of options within twelve stand-
ards. One of the options that were suggested for elimination was the alternative to 
write-off goodwill immediately to equity. With regard to the amortization of ac-
quired goodwill, E32 further proposed a mandatory amortization period of five 
years, unless a longer period, up to 20 years, could be justified. Although this pro-
posal was highly controversial, the position was maintained and finally incorpo-
rated in IAS 22 Business Combinations (revised 1993).10 
In the 1990s, when the IASC worked on the accounting for intangible assets, the 
importance of a standard on asset impairment became obvious. Accordingly, 
IAS 36 Impairment of Assets was approved in April 1998 which can be seen as 
the major step in introducing a sophisticated impairment test procedure under 
IFRS. Shortly afterwards, in July 1998, the Board approved IAS 38 Intangible 
Assets as well as a revised version of IAS 22. With these standards the amortiza-
tion periods of goodwill and other intangible assets were aligned. Both standards 
required goodwill and intangibles, respectively, to have a finite useful life and 
contained a rebuttable presumption that the useful life does not exceed 20 years. If 
                                                 
10  See IAS 22 (1993) and Camfferman and Zeff (2007) for this paragraph. 
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this presumption was rebutted, goodwill had to be amortized systematically over 
the best estimate of its useful life and, additionally, to be tested (at least) annually 
for impairment in accordance with IAS 36.11 
The current stage of goodwill accounting was entered into in the beginning of the 
21st century. After succeeding the IASC, the IASB followed the FASB12 and start-
ed a project on business combinations in 2001 seeking to improve the quality of 
business combinations accounting as well as enhanced international convergence. 
The first phase of the project was concluded in March 2004 with the issuing of 
IFRS 3 Business Combinations as well as revised versions of IAS 36 and IAS 38 
(IFRS 3.BC – Background information). In addition to the elimination of the pool-
ing-of-interests method and, thus, requiring the use of the acquisition method for 
all business combinations, the IASB abolished the amortization of acquired 
goodwill. The non-amortization goes hand-in-hand with the requirement to test 
goodwill at least annually for impairment in accordance with the provisions of 
IAS 36. About ten years later, the IASB started its PIR on IFRS 3 which, again, 
addresses the subsequent accounting for goodwill. Figure 1 summarizes the his-
torical developments outlined above. 
                                                 
11  See IAS 22 (1998), Kirsch (2006), and Camfferman and Zeff (2007) for this paragraph. 
12  In September 1999, the FASB issued Exposure Draft 201 (ED 201) on business combinations 
and intangible assets. The intention was to eliminate the pooling method and allow only the 
purchase method for business combinations accounting. In addition, it was proposed that 
goodwill should be amortized over 20 instead of 40 years. However, the proposal faced strong 
opposition and finally reached the US Congress which urged the FASB to consider alternative 
ways for the treatment of goodwill. Subsequently, the FASB followed the idea of performing 
an annual impairment test for goodwill instead of regular amortization and issued a revised 
ED 201 in February 2001 which included the IoA for goodwill as the only allowable subse-
quent measurement method. This proposal was received much more favorably so that the 
FASB finally issued SFAS 141 and 142 which required the purchase method for business 
combinations and the IoA for subsequent goodwill accounting in June 2001. See Ramanna 
(2008) for a comprehensive description of the introduction of the IoA under US GAAP. 




Figure 1: The history of goodwill accounting under IFRS until the PIR on IFRS 3 
2.2 The Post-implementation Review on IFRS 3 
Following the PIR on IFRS 8 Operating Segments that was completed in 2013, 
the PIR on IFRS 3 was the second in the history of the IASB.13 According to the 
Due Process Handbook of the IFRS Foundation, a PIR has to be conducted for 
every new standard or major amendment and begins normally two years after the 
new standard is internationally applied.14 The aim of a PIR is to assess the effects 
of the new accounting provisions on financial reporting from the perspective of 
various stakeholders in the IFRS community, such as auditors, preparers, and us-
ers of financial statements. Issues to be considered are those that have been im-
portant or contentious in the development of the standard under review as well as 
(unexpected) costs or implementation problems. 
                                                 
13  For this section of the paper and comprehensive information on the PIR on IFRS 3 see IASB 
(2014b). 
14  For general information about the PIR process of the IASB given in this section see the respec-
tive parts of the Due Process Handbook (IFRS Foundation, 2013, par. 6.52-6.63). 
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The IASB started its PIR on IFRS 3 in June 2013. In the first phase, the standard 
setter sought input from different parties that had gained experience with IFRS 3 
through a variety of channels (IASB, 2014b). Following this process of identifica-
tion of potential matters to be covered during the PIR, the IASB issued a formal 
RfI on January 30, 2014, that has been open for public comment until May 30, 
2014. The RfI contained ten explicit questions on business combinations issues, 
such as the definition of a business, fair value measurement, and unexpected costs 
or implementation problems of the new provisions. With regard to the subsequent 
accounting treatment of goodwill acquired in a business combination, the IASB 
explicitly asked about (1) the usefulness of the non-amortization approach for 
goodwill and the related reasons for the respondent’s assessment, (2) whether and 
how the information provided by the impairment test needs to be improved, and 
(3) the main implementation, auditing and enforcement challenges in testing 
goodwill for impairment (IASB, 2014c). 
After the comment period, the IASB considered the responses received together 
with other information and evidence, especially from further outreach activities 
with stakeholders and a review of academic research. Finally, two areas of all 
business combinations issues discussed have been assessed as being of higher 
significance (IASB, 2015a): (1) the ineffectiveness and complexity of testing 
goodwill for impairment and (2) the subsequent accounting for goodwill.15 Ac-
cordingly, in February 2015, the IASB decided to add to its research agenda pro-
jects on the improvement of the impairment test provisions as well as on the sub-
                                                 
15  See the comment letter summary, the academic literature review, the discussion of constituent 
feedback and academic research as well as the Report and Feedback Statement for detailed in-
formation about the results of the PIR conducted by the standard setter available at IASB 
(2014b). 
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sequent accounting for goodwill including the relative merits of the IoA versus 
amortization plus indicator-based impairment tests (IASB, 2015b). 
3 Stakeholder Perceptions of the Impairment-only Ap-
proach 
3.1 Research Approach: Content Analysis of Comment Letters 
Goodwill accounting and especially the IoA have been widely discussed in recent 
years. The PIR process offers a good opportunity to analyze up-to-date feedback 
about the views of various parties. In particular, the comment letters received by 
the IASB in response to its RfI are publicly available and allow for a systematic 
content analysis. Thus, we focus on these comment letters to assess the stakehold-
er perceptions. In the following, we describe our classification of stakeholders, 
our research questions according to which we analyze the comment letters as well 
as our content analysis approach which largely follows Chatham et al. (2010). 
To assess the acceptance of accounting provisions, it is vital to understand the 
views of stakeholders with different backgrounds and the diverse arguments they 
present. Therefore, the IASB emphasizes the importance to assess the effects of 
IFRS 3 from the perspectives of various parties (IASB, 2014c). In particular, the 
consideration of the types of respondents and their geographical origin may be 
insightful when analyzing comment letters (IFRS Foundation, 2013, par. 3.66). 
Accordingly, we classify stakeholders in two different ways: 
Interest Groups 
Following prior literature, we divided the stakeholders into nine different interest 
groups: Accounting profession (i.e. professional accountancy bodies and public 
accounting firms), accounting standard setters, regulators (and other government-
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related entities), non-financial corporations, non-financial corporations’ trade as-
sociations, financial analysts, financial institutions (including their trade associa-
tions), academics, and others (Wallace, 1990; Kenny and Larson, 1995; Kwok, 
1999; Larson, 2002 and 2007; Chatham et al., 2010). 
Country and Background of Accounting System 
The success of a global reporting regime depends on its worldwide acceptance 
(Schaub, 2005; Tweedie and Seidenstein, 2005). Accordingly, the IASB aims to 
develop high quality accounting standards that are accepted globally (Preface to 
IFRSs, par. 6(a)). However, prior research shows that the response level and sup-
port of accounting standards deviate between regions and countries (e.g. Kenny 
and Larson, 1995; MacArthur, 1996 and 1999; Larson, 2002 and 2007). In addi-
tion, IFRS reporting practices differ across countries and are influenced by na-
tional pre-IFRS accounting provisions (e.g. Kvaal and Nobes, 2010 and 2012). 
Nobes (2011) finds that differences in reporting practice between groups of coun-
tries persist under the shared IFRS reporting regime and reflect traditional group-
ings, i.e. Anglo and continental European countries. Hence, in addition to analyz-
ing differences between stakeholder types, we group the stakeholders by country 
which also allows for a differentiation with regard to the origin of the stakehold-
ers’ accounting system. Following the classification of Mueller et al. (1997), we 
are particularly interested in a comparison of the views of stakeholders from coun-
tries with a British-American accounting background to those of stakeholders with 
a Continental accounting background. Traditionally, British-American accounting 
systems were oriented towards the information needs of capital providers and 
were found in countries with large and developed capital markets, e.g. the UK or 
the US. Contrary, in countries with a Continental accounting system including 
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most continental European countries and Japan, firms typically had close relation-
ships to banks which provided most of their capital. Accounting practices were 
conservative and the main purpose of accounting was not to serve the decision-
making needs of investors and creditors but to satisfy requirements imposed by 
the government, e.g. the computation of income taxes (Mueller et al., 1997). 
Development of Research Questions 
In the course of the introduction of the IoA, the IASB argued that an amortization 
expense is at best an arbitrary estimate of the consumption of acquired goodwill 
(IFRS 3 (2004).BC140). According to the IASB, non-amortization of goodwill 
coupled with annual or, in case of indicators that goodwill might be impaired, 
more frequent impairment tests would provide users with more useful information 
(IFRS 3 (2004).BC142). Our first research question (RQ1) relates to the opinion 
of stakeholders about whether, ten years after the introduction of the IoA, this 
method in fact provides more useful information than amortization. Thus, RQ1 is 
not only in line with the aim of the PIR to assess whether “IFRS 3 provides in-
formation that is useful to users of financial statements” (IASB, 2014c, p. 4) but 
contributes to the current debate as well as the upcoming IASB research project 
on subsequent goodwill accounting which includes a relative assessment between 
the IoA and amortization. 
RQ1: Does the IoA provide more useful information than amortization? 
The IASB further noted that a necessary condition for providing more useful in-
formation via the IoA is that “a rigorous and operational impairment test could be 
devised” (IFRS 3 (2004).BC142). Hence, our second research question (RQ2) 
focuses on this aspect in order to analyze how stakeholders perceive the impair-
ment test according to IAS 36. For this purpose, we understand a “rigorous and 
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operational” impairment test as a means which is practically feasible and func-
tions effectively, i.e. detects impairments when they economically occur. RQ2 
therefore also addresses aspects of the PIR which aim to identify “areas of IFRS 3 
that represent implementation challenges and, as a result, impair the consistent 
implementation of the requirements” (IASB, 2014c, p. 4) and contributes to the 
current debates on goodwill accounting and the impairment test in particular. 
RQ2: Is the impairment test rigorous and operational devised? 
Additionally, we are interested in the arguments used by supporters and opponents 
of the IoA and the alternative, i.e. regular amortization (plus indicator-based im-
pairment tests), because these are important to better understand their positions 
and to identify areas for potential improvement. Our comparison of the IoA and 
amortization accounts for the fact that the IoA has been introduced on the basis of 
the relative reasoning that it works better than amortization. Thus, we expect 
stakeholders to (explicitly or implicitly) benchmark the IoA to the former amorti-
zation approach in their comment letters. Moreover, a detailed analysis of the ar-
guments regarding these two methods contributes particularly to the upcoming 
IASB project on subsequent goodwill accounting which includes this comparison. 
Accordingly, we analyze the comment letters with regard to the following re-
search question 3: 
RQ3: What are the arguments for and against the IoA in comparison to the 
amortization of goodwill? 
Sample and Content Analysis of Comment Letters 
From the 100 submissions that have been publicly available on the IASB’s web-
site on August 27, 2014, we have eliminated 3 submissions of respondents that 
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submitted two identical letters.16 Consequently, 97 submissions have been treated 
as separate comment letters in our analyses.17 Content analysis was employed to 
analyze the 97 responses. Although question 5 of the RfI explicitly addressed the 
subsequent accounting for goodwill, we analyzed the comment letters in their en-
tirety to find all relevant arguments. This is because some questions are inevitably 
intertwined. For example, question 4 covered the separate recognition of intangi-
ble assets from goodwill as well as the treatment of negative goodwill. Moreover, 
some respondents provided overall responses without referring to specific ques-
tions. 
To address the first two research questions, RQ1 and RQ2, we identified the posi-
tion of each stakeholder (Yes, Neutral, or No). Responses have only been evaluat-
ed as “Yes” or “No”, if the opinion of the respondent was relatively unambiguous. 
In all remaining cases “Neutral” has been assigned to the respective comment 
letter. This also applies to respondents that gathered views of various stakeholders 
and did not express a clear preference which views they themselves would sup-
port. 
For RQ3, the arguments that were used by the respondents were coded according 
to a list of arguments which were initially based on the discussion upon the intro-
duction of the IoA in 2004 and complemented by additional reasons identified 
during our initial analysis of the responses using an inductive approach. We ar-
ranged all arguments – divided into those that are used in favor of the IoA (contra 
amortization) and those that are brought forward against the IoA (pro amortiza-
                                                 
16  We found two identical submissions on the IASB’s website from Henderson Global Investors, 
the European Federation of Financial Analysts (EFFAS) and IBM, respectively. 
17  One submission as listed on the IASB’s website has been treated as one comment letter. Thus, 
submissions summarizing views of respondents to outreach activities of the submitter or deliv-
ering comment letters on behalf of other constituents have been treated as one comment letter. 
Submissions prepared in collaboration with other constituents and submitted equally by more 
than one constituent have been treated separately. 
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tion) – around the fundamental elements of the Conceptual Framework for Finan-
cial Reporting of the IASB. The first category (Usefulness Criteria) consists of 
arguments that target the overall goal of financial reporting which is to provide 
information that is useful to capital providers of the reporting firm (Conceptual 
Framework, OB2). The question addressed with these arguments is whether the 
IoA leads to more useful information in comparison to amortization (see also RQ1 
above). In accordance with the fundamental qualitative characteristics of useful 
financial reporting (see Conceptual Framework, QC5-QC18), we further subdi-
vide the Usefulness Criteria into Relevance Criteria and Faithful Representation 
Criteria in order to gain deeper insights into the sources of respondents’ satisfac-
tion or dissatisfaction with the provisions under review. For both subcategories, 
Relevance and Faithful Representation, we further separate arguments that relate 
to Disclosures. Within the Faithful Representation Criteria, we additionally form 
a subgroup of arguments that are related to the question whether the current im-
pairment test is rigorous and operational devised (Operational and rigour). The 
arguments of this category provide insights into the reasons for stakeholders’ as-
sessments regarding RQ2. 
Besides the Usefulness Criteria, we distinguish arguments that are relevant to the 
stewardship function of financial reporting (Stewardship/Accountability), relate to 
the Cost Constraint on Useful Financial Reporting and arguments that are not 
related to the categories above (Other Criteria). Starting from the arguments that 
have already been addressed during the debate on the introduction of the IoA, we 
identified 35 arguments that have been used in the responses (see Appendix 1 and 
Table 3 for the list of arguments and our framework of categories). 
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After testing the robustness of our categorization for a random sample of 15 
comment letters, two of the authors analyzed and coded all of the remaining 
comment letters independently to figure out the most cited arguments (RQ3) as 
well as the position of the stakeholders regarding RQ1 and RQ2. The results have 
been largely consistent, especially regarding the overall assessment required to 
answer RQ1 and RQ2.18 The rate of agreement was between 85% and 95% with 
the lowest rate achieved regarding the coding of the 35 different arguments used 
(85.2%). Any difference has been discussed until consensus was reached. 
3.2 Results of Comment Letter Analysis 
3.2.1 Profiles of Respondents 
Altogether, 97 interested parties from more than 25 countries responded to the 
IASB’s RfI via official comment letters. Thus, in the light of the only previous 
PIR of the IASB which related to IFRS 8 and attracted 62 comment letter re-
sponses (IASB, 2013), participation can be regarded as relatively high. Around 
half of the comment letters (49 responses) were submitted by respondents from 
Europe (EU countries: 37), especially from the UK (14), Germany (9), France (7), 
and Switzerland (6). Australian constituents were the most active group outside 
Europe (5). US stakeholders, having recently conducted a PIR on the US GAAP 
business combinations standard, were comparatively silent (3). While there were 
letters from Latin America (5), Asia (16), and Africa (4), no single comment letter 
has been received from Eastern Europe and Russia pointing out further potential 
for the IFRS reporting regime to gain broader international acceptance. Organiza-
                                                 
18  The rates of agreement were 91.5% (RQ1) and 93.9% (RQ2), respectively. Using the Kappa 
statistic for inter-annotator agreement (following the suggestion of Cohen, 1960, and Giner and 
Arce, 2012), we control for subjectivity obtaining no significant differences between the results 
of the two authors who analyzed RQ1 and RQ2 (Kappa values: RQ1 = 0.886, RQ2 = 0.919, 
both significant at 1%). 
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tions, particularly international public accounting firms, that are present around 
the globe and therefore not assigned to specific countries (“International”) account 
for 10% of total respondents. Differentiating the constituents according to the 
origin of their accounting system, it becomes evident that participation was almost 
balanced between stakeholders from countries with a British-American account-
ing system (38 responses) and from countries with a Continental accounting sys-
tem (33).19 
The analysis by interest groups shows that non-financial corporations including 
their trade associations sent the most comment letters to the IASB (31 responses). 
The accounting profession submitted 21 responses which makes the representation 
of this stakeholder group comparable to the group of accounting standard setters 
(18). The remaining stakeholder groups are represented comparatively weakly 
with regulators submitting 8 responses followed by academics (5), financial ana-
lysts (4), financial institutions (4), and others (6). 
Irrespective of whether financial institutions are seen as preparers or, because of 
their investment-related activities, as users of financial reporting, it is obvious that 
users are not well-represented in the overall response to the RfI. Although this 
observation is consistent with prior research (e.g. Durocher et al., 2007; Chatham 
et al., 2010), this is still remarkable considering that financial reporting under 
IFRS intends to satisfy the needs of this stakeholder group. Moreover, the strong 
commitment to the PIR by preparers from non-financial industries has to be modi-
fied in respect of the much higher number of companies preparing IFRS financial 
                                                 
19  Since the number of respondents from countries with a South American Model is low and the 
respondents that cannot be categorized into the Mueller et al. (1997) model include organiza-
tions that have been regarded as “International” or “European” that can represent views from 
various accounting systems, we only refer to the British-American and the Continental ac-
counting systems in our analyses. 
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statements forming the preparers’ total population. However, the fact that “for 
every non-financial corporation that provided a letter, there are literally hundreds 
if not thousands of firms that did not respond” (Chatham et al., 2010, p. 100) is 
not unique to this PIR. Prior research attributed the non-participation of firms to 
reasons such as insufficient awareness about the project, no or limited economic 
effects of the proposals, alternative ways to influence the standard setter, costs of 
the comment letter response, or agreement with the standard setter.20 Finally, it is 
noteworthy that only a limited number of respondents stem from academia (5).21 
Table 1 provides a summary of respondents by country and interest group. 
  
                                                 
20  See Chatham et al. (2010) including further references. 
21  We note, however, that some other respondents that gathered input from various parties in their 
jurisdiction before drafting their response also considered the views of academics. Examples 
include the comment letters from the Institute of Singapore Chartered Accountants (ISCA) and 
the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA). In none of such cases, we ob-
serve indications that the views from academics had a major impact on the final comment let-
ter. 
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3.2.2 Usefulness of IoA in Comparison to Amortization 
Our first research question, RQ1, considers whether the IoA provides more useful 
information than amortization as expected by the IASB in 2004. Having about ten 
years of experience with the current provisions, stakeholders’ views about the 
usefulness of the IoA compared to amortization are balanced between the two 
models. 27% of the comment letters have been identified as expressing the opin-
ion that the IoA provides more useful information than amortization, while 26% 
have been interpreted as negating the IoA to lead to more useful information. The 
remaining comment letters (47%) did not take a clear position towards our ques-
tion. This overall result about the perceptions of stakeholders shows that we still 
seem to be far from consensus about the preferable method for subsequent good-
will accounting and that much work may still be required to achieve global ac-
ceptance of the method. 
Table 2, Panel A shows the support of the IoA in terms of usefulness by interest 
groups. Most interest groups contain heterogeneous opinions on the matter and 
reflect the balanced views that are found in the overall analysis. However, some 
differences regarding the support of the IoA can be observed. In particular, 75% 
of the financial institutions express strong concerns about the usefulness of the 
IoA. Furthermore, there are more non-financial corporations against (40%) the 
IoA than in favor (25%), while their trade associations provide the IASB with 
balanced feedback (Yes = 27%, No = 27%). While the accounting profession 
shows a similarly balanced pattern (24%, 19%), standard setters perceive the IoA 
as comparatively useful (39%, 22%) and, thereby, provide support for the position 
taken by the IASB in 2004. Using the Kruskal-Wallis test to analyze whether the 
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opinions of interest groups differ with regard to RQ1 does not reveal statistically 
significant differences between the groups. 
The analysis by country and accounting system provides insightful results (see 
Table 2, Panel B). While respondents from Europe tend to negate the higher use-
fulness of the IoA (Yes = 24%, No = 43%), only 8% of non-European stakehold-
ers were of the view that the IoA does not lead to higher usefulness compared to 
amortization. Correspondingly, 29% of non-European respondents were support-
ive of the IoA and 63% did not express a clear view. At the country level, re-
spondents from the UK, the most active single country, sent the highest number of 
supportive comment letters (6), while only two respondents were against the IoA. 
Conversely, German respondents show strong disagreement with the assumption 
of a higher usefulness of the IoA. Only one respondent supported the IoA, while 6 
out of the 9 responses from Germany clearly opposed to this accounting treatment. 
These contrary findings regarding the perceptions of British and German stake-
holders are also reflected in a broader analysis with regard to the stakeholders’ 
accounting system (see Table 2, Panel C). Respondents from countries with ac-
counting systems that are considered as belonging to the group of British-
American accounting models are much more positive about the usefulness of the 
IoA (Yes = 34%, No = 8%) than respondents from countries with a Continental 
accounting system (18%, 58%). This observation is also evident from a statistical 
perspective. The Kruskal-Wallis test finds highly significant differences between 
these two groups of accounting systems (p < 0.01). 
3.2.3 Is the Impairment Test Rigorous and Operational? 
Our second research question, RQ2, addresses the stated condition for the provi-
sion of useful information by the IoA, i.e. the question whether stakeholders view 
10 Years Impairment-only Approach – Stakeholder Perceptions and Research Findings 
193 
 
the impairment test as rigorous and operational devised. Overall, the results are 
less positive for the impairment regime than those with regard to RQ1. 40% of the 
stakeholders express serious concerns about the design of the current impairment 
test provisions, while only 18% of the comment letters have been rated as as-
sessing the impairment test as rigor and operational. Again, the remaining 42% 
either did not address the questions regarding subsequent goodwill accounting at 
all or did not take a clear position towards the research question. 
Similar to our results regarding RQ1, our analysis shows only slight differences 
between interest groups (see Table 2, Panel A). Among members of the account-
ing profession, standard setters, regulators, financial analysts, and financial insti-
tutions the view that the impairment test is not operational and rigorous devised 
outweighs the opposite opinion relative strongly. Only non-financial corporations 
including their trade associations (Yes = 32%, No = 35%) provide a balanced 
view with support and criticism almost equally represented. Again, no statistically 
significant differences were found between interest groups. 
With regard to the geographic differentiation (see Table 2, Panel B), differences 
between European and non-European stakeholders are less pronounced than was 
the case for the assessment of usefulness (RQ1). Respondents from European 
countries (Yes = 24%, No = 49%) as well as those from countries outside Europe 
including global organizations (10%, 31%) share concerns about the test being 
rigorous and operational. Again, at the country-level, UK respondents are most 
positive with six comment letters indicating that the impairment test is rigorous 
and operational and only three responses claiming the opposite. Contrary, six 
stakeholders from Germany are not convinced of the test, while only one German 
respondent shows clear support. Similarly, constituents from countries with a Brit-
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ish-American accounting system are complaining far less about the impairment 
test (Yes = 24%, No = 18%) compared to those from countries with a Continental 
system (18%, 64%). Again, the differences between these two groups are statisti-
cally significant (p < 0.01). 
Taken together with the results regarding RQ1, this indicates that the background 
of stakeholders and, in particular, the resemblance of their national accounting 
systems to the issue under consideration is of importance for the perceptions of 
respondents. As described above, British-American accounting systems were tra-
ditionally aiming to provide decision-useful information to providers of capital, 
while Continental systems were inclined to be conservative. Thus, the rationale 
underlying the introduction of the IoA, the provision of more useful information, 
corresponds to the main purpose of British-American accounting systems, while 
the elimination of regular depreciation and the reliance on an impairment test that 
necessarily involves managerial judgment may not lead to conservative account-
ing practice which was a main characteristic of Continental accounting systems. 




Table 2: Support of IoA and impairment test by stakeholders 
3.2.4 Arguments used by Stakeholders 
The analyses regarding the usefulness of the IoA and the impairment test provide 
insights into the overall perceptions of stakeholders. However, in order to further 
develop the subsequent accounting for goodwill, it is important to understand the 
reasons behind the overall attitudes of stakeholders. As expected, since the ra-
Is IoA more useful? Is impairment test rigorous/operational?
Yes Neutral No Yes Neutral No
Panel A: Stakeholders by Interest Group
Accounting Profession 5 12 4 2 12 7
Standard Setters 7 7 4 3 8 7
Regulators 2 5 1 1 3 4
Non-Finl Corporations 5 7 8 7 6 7
Non-Finl Corp Trade Assns 3 5 3 3 4 4
Financial Analysts 2 1 1 1 3
Financial Institutions 1 3 1 3
Academics 4 1 4 1
Others 2 4 3 3
Total 26 46 25 17 41 39
Percentage 27% 47% 26% 18% 42% 40%
Panel B: Stakeholders by Country and Region
France 3 4 3 4
Germany 1 2 6 1 2 6
Switzerland 1 1 4 1 1 4
United Kingdom 6 6 2 6 5 3
Total European 12 16 21 12 13 24
Total non-European 14 30 4 5 28 15
Total 26 46 25 17 41 39
Percentage 27% 47% 26% 18% 42% 40%
Panel C: Stakeholders by Accounting System
British-American Model 13 22 3 9 22 7
Continental Model 6 8 19 6 6 21
South American Model 2 1 1 2
Others 5 15 3 1 11 11
Total 26 46 25 17 41 39
Percentage 27% 47% 26% 18% 42% 40%
Panel B shows results for countries with more than five respondents.
Panel C:






European, China/Hongkong, Mauritius, South Korea, Asia-Oceania, Latin-America, International
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, South 
Africa, United States
Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Japan
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tionale underlying the introduction of the IoA was its assumed superiority over 
amortization, respondents typically used amortization as a benchmark when 
commenting on the IoA. Therefore, in the following, we analyze the arguments 
used by supporters and opponents of the IoA viz-a-viz this alternative (RQ3). This 
is also in line with our intention to contribute to the upcoming IASB project on 
subsequent goodwill accounting which explicitly includes assessing the relative 
merits of the IoA and regular amortization (see section 2.2). Table 3 provides an 
overview of our framework of categories and arguments as well as the overall 
frequencies with which the arguments have been mentioned by respondents to the 
RfI. Table 4 provides an overview of the type of arguments used in favor of and 
against the IoA and their relative frequency by stakeholder interest groups as well 
as by country and accounting system. 
  




Table 3: Overview of arguments used by stakeholders regarding the IoA 
  
Usefulness Criteria  (Does the impairment-only approach lead to more useful information compared to amortization?)
No. Pro impairment-only approach Frequency No. Contra impairment-only approach Frequency
Relevance Criteria Relevance Criteria
1 Information provided by IoA is relevant/has 
confirmatory value
16 11 IoA leads to recognition of internally generated 
goodwill
42
2 IoA provides more useful information than 
Amortization
14 12 IoA does not provide useful information - impairment 
charges come too late
23
3 Amortization is not of significant value to users 4 13 No impairment losses are recognized because of test 
on high CGU-level
15
4 Information provided by IoA has predictive value 3 14 Information of IoA is not used by users 14
15 Goodwill is tested on CGUs that are subject to 
restructuring - Disconnection between what has been 
bought and what is tested
10
Relevance: Disclosures Relevance: Disclosures
5 Disclosures provide useful additional information 9 16 Insufficient/Inappropriate/non-entity-
specific/redundant/unnecessary disclosures
29
Faithful Respresentation Criteria Faithful Respresentation Criteria
6 Amortization is an arbitrary estimate of consumption 
of goodwill
20 17 Amortization over useful life reflects consumption of 
goodwill more representationally faithful than IoA
26
18 Goodwill is an asset with limited useful life 22
19 Amortization is well-understood and well-established 
in practice and leads to consistent application
10
20 IoA reduces comparability between organically and 
anorganically grown companies
8
Faithful Representation: Operational and rigour
21 High judgment and managerial discretion regarding 
estimates and assumptions
53
22 Managerial discretion in identification and restructuring 
of and goodwill allocation to CGUs
36
23 Impairment testing is a complex exercise 33
24 Valuation concept value in use has shortcomings 26
25 Goodwill impairment is difficult in presence of non-
controlling interests
11
26 Valuation concept fair value less costs of disposal has 
shortcomings
7
Faithful Representation: Disclosures Faithful Representation: Disclosures




8 Impairment testing ensures accountability for 
investments made and provides insights into 
management views
15 28 Amortisation means greater accountability 9
Cost Constraint on Useful Financial Reporting
9 Amortization does not remove need to conduct 
impairment tests
4 29 Impairment test is costly and time-consuming 48
Other Criteria
10 Other 10 30 Information of IoA is not used by the preparer's 
management
15
31 Amortization reduces pressure on identification of 
intangibles in PPA and determination between asset 
acquisitions and business
12
32 IoA is pro-cyclical when performance is low 9
33 IoA increases volatility of profit and loss 9
34 Other reporting regimes allow amortization 4
35 Other 23
Overview of Arguments used by Stakeholders regarding the Impairment-only Approach
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Arguments in favor of the IoA in Comparison to Amortization 
All in all, 10 different arguments have been used 105 times by the respondents as 
arguments in favor of the IoA. The most arguments have been provided by mem-
bers of the accounting profession and standard setters (58 arguments) which re-
flects not only their high representation, but also their expertise as well as their 
contribution to standard setting. On the contrary, preparers and users of financial 
reporting together only mentioned 26 arguments in favor of the IoA. From a geo-
graphical standpoint, the only single country with respondents mentioning a con-
siderable number of reasons for the IoA is the UK (20). Importantly, respondents 
from countries with a British-American accounting system (46) provided twice as 
many arguments in favor of the IoA than respondents with a Continental account-
ing background (23) reflecting the oppositional positions of these two groups 
identified above. 
To support the IoA, respondents mostly used arguments assigned to Relevance 
Criteria emphasizing the higher usefulness of impairment information compared 
to amortization which has also been the assumption by the IASB in 2004. The 
general statements that the IoA would provide more useful information than amor-
tization or that the IoA provides relevant information or has confirmatory value 
account for almost one third of all arguments used in favor of the IoA (30 argu-
ments). Noticeably, especially standard setters argue that the IoA provides rele-
vant information and cited relevance arguments 15 times. While only three com-
ment letters claim impairment information to be a signal to the market and/or hav-
ing predictive value, nine respondents view the disclosures accompanying good-
will impairment tests, especially about the underlying key assumptions, as addi-
tional useful information. 
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However, the most frequently used argument can be found in the Faithful Repre-
sentation category. 21% of the stakeholders argue that amortization is an arbitrary 
estimate of the consumption of acquired goodwill, an argument which was also a 
major point for the standard setter’s decision to introduce the IoA in 2004. Re-
markably, this argument has been mentioned more often by members of the ac-
counting profession, standard setters and regulators as compared to preparers and 
users. This indicates that the argument has a conceptual background with limited 
practical and economic impact for the latter groups. However, as with all argu-
ments in favor of the current provisions, one has to interpret the results with cau-
tion, since parties agreeing with the standard setter’s position tend to provide few-
er arguments than opponents. Moreover, the boundaries between the criteria are 
not always clear-cut. Thus, the perception that amortization is an arbitrary esti-
mate of goodwill consumption might also have been a reason for respondents 
claiming that the IoA provides more useful information than amortization. The 
idea that the reliability of information provided under an impairment-only regime 
can be ensured by adequate disclosures and guidance was also brought forward by 
the IASB when it introduced the IoA (IAS 36.BC198, BC201-202). Ten years 
later, 10 stakeholders join the standard setter in this argumentation. 
Moreover, 15 respondents, four of which stem from the UK, point out that im-
pairment tests ensure management’s accountability for investment decisions or 
provide insights into the views of the management. Interestingly, only four partic-
ipants of the PIR argue that the reintroduction of the amortization approach would 
not lead to high cost savings because firms would have to maintain impairment 
procedures and know-how to be able to conduct impairment tests when relevant 
indicators are identified. Irrespective of whether cost (and time) savings would be 
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material or not, the argument brought forward underlines the importance of a rig-
orous and operational impairment test. 
Arguments against the IoA in Comparison to Amortization 
Altogether, the respondents used 25 different arguments 501 times, thus, almost 
five times as many arguments as were used in favor of the IoA. In light of the 
mixed views on the usefulness of the current accounting model (see RQ1 above), 
this could be interpreted as support for the notion by Chatham et al. (2010, p. 102) 
that results about the agreement with the position of the standard setter should be 
interpreted with caution, since silence or no response “could be construed as 
agreement.”22 Again, the most arguments were mentioned by the accounting pro-
fession and standard setters (234) which we attribute to their relatively high repre-
sentation amongst respondents as well as to their knowledge about and interest in 
accounting provisions. However, preparers and users argue more actively against 
the IoA. In particular, non-financial corporations and their trade associations men-
tioned 124 arguments. The four financial institutions are similarly active citing 37 
single arguments against the IoA. 
The geographic analysis shows that the countries with the highest numbers of ar-
guments contra the IoA are France (44), Germany (52), and the UK (66). This 
shows that, although having a positive overall attitude towards the IoA, the British 
IFRS community actively discusses the pros and cons of the goodwill accounting 
methods. Again, the analysis regarding the background of respondents’ account-
ing systems reflects our results from the overall assessment of the comment letters 
regarding RQ1 and RQ2. While respondents from countries with British-American 
accounting systems cited far more arguments supporting the IoA than those from 
                                                 
22  Moreover, the explicit questions asked in the RfI could be read as emphasizing potential defi-
ciencies rather than strengths of the impairment test (see section 2.2). 
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countries with Continental systems, the latter mentioned more than 40% of all 
arguments used against the IoA (205). Respondents with a British-American in-
fluence cited only 143 arguments against their preferred method. This reinforces 
our interpretation that stakeholders’ accounting backgrounds are still reflected in 
their current views on international accounting topics. 
Arguments related to Relevance have been cited 133 times. 14% of the respond-
ents claim that the information provided by the IoA would not be used by the us-
ers of financial reporting. Similarly, 24% of the comment letters contain the com-
plaint that the IoA does not provide useful information, in particular because of 
impairment charges being recognized too late. Importantly, this argument has 
been used by all financial analysts that submitted a response. Although this does 
not necessarily mean that impairment information is not relevant at all, problems 
with the timeliness of goodwill impairments and the claim that share prices reflect 
the information before financial statements do are already acknowledged by the 
standard setter for some time (see IFRS Foundation, 2012). The arguments that 
the information is not useful and not used by users of financial reporting are con-
sistent with the weak interest in the subject expressed by the low participation of 
financial analysts. Moreover, they are in direct opposition to the arguments of 
some supporters of the IoA that claim that it provides more useful information 
than amortization which illustrates the controversial nature of the issue. 
The notion that the IoA leads, in fact, to the recognition of internally-generated 
goodwill and the resulting inconsistency with the provisions of IAS 38 Intangible 
Assets has been emphasized by 43% of the respondents. While the IASB was 
aware of this issue in 2004, the high number of mentions indicates that this incon-
sistency is still important to stakeholders. In particular, 71% of the members of 
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the accounting profession, 56% of the standard setters, and 75% of the financial 
institutions cited this argument (not tabulated). Another argument which has been 
discussed in 2004 refers to the high levels on which cash-generating units (CGUs) 
would be defined and, thus, would prevent impairments from being recognized. 
This argument has been brought forward by 15 respondents during the PIR. 
With regard to the relevance of disclosures, much criticism has been addressed. 
30% of the respondents complain about the current disclosure requirements ac-
companying the goodwill impairment test. This includes stakeholders that are not 
satisfied with the amount of disclosures required, whether insufficient or unneces-
sary, the non-entity-specific nature or the inappropriateness of the current re-
quirements. Thus, the criticism expressed about the relevance of the disclosure 
requirements clearly outweighs the perceived benefits. 
The arguments related to Faithful Representation contain conceptual and practical 
considerations as well as arguments related to the rigor and operability of the im-
pairment test. More than a fourth of the respondents (27%) argue generally that 
the amortization of goodwill over its useful life would reflect the consumption of 
goodwill more representationally faithful than the information provided by the 
IoA. Moreover, 10% of the stakeholders emphasize that amortization is well-
understood and well-established in practice and, thus, leading to more consistent 
application. From a conceptual viewpoint, a considerable number of stakeholders 
(23%) highlight the fact that goodwill is an asset with a limited useful life and 
should be amortized. These views include respondents that claim to be able to 
estimate the useful life of goodwill, e.g. because an acquirer should have expecta-
tions about over which horizon it would realize synergies, as well as stakeholders 
that point out that estimations are inherent to accounting and, thus, not limited to 
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the useful life of goodwill. In particular, those parties arguing that it is possible to 
estimate the useful life of goodwill are in direct opposition to one of the main ar-
guments for the IoA which is the notion that any amortization period and pattern 
would be arbitrary. Moreover, some stakeholders argue that the IoA reduces the 
comparability between firms growing organically and anorganically (8%). Few 
comment letters (7%), none of which stems from a preparer or user, contain com-
plaints about the compliance with the disclosure requirements, an argument which 
is not only related to the current provisions, but mainly to the institutional envi-
ronment. 
One third of all arguments (166) used against the IoA are assigned to the subcate-
gory Operational and rigour. Overall, this is consistent with our assessment re-
garding RQ2 above and shows the serious concerns about the current impairment 
test provisions. The most widely shared argument concerns the high judgment and 
managerial discretion that is involved in impairment testing, especially with re-
gard to estimates and assumptions, such as discount rates or cash flow forecasts. 
More than half of the respondents (55%) emphasize this issue and point to prob-
lems related to objectivity and verifiability, such as the opportunity to manage 
earnings via the delay of impairment charges. Moreover, the managerial discretion 
involved in the identification and restructuring of as well as the allocation of 
goodwill to CGUs is subject to criticism by 37% of the respondents. The two ar-
guments regarding the discretion involved have been used to a far larger extent by 
the accounting profession, standard setters and regulators than by preparers with 
the notable exception of financial institutions. For example, while 88% of the reg-
ulators, 78% of the standard setters, and 62% of the members of the accounting 
profession complain about the high judgment and managerial discretion that is 
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involved in impairment testing, only about 35% of all non-financial corporations 
including their trade associations do so (not tabulated). This indicates that external 
parties having to rely on or verify the information provided are more critical than 
preparers that are in the position to use discretion themselves. Additionally, 34% 
of the respondents acknowledge that the impairment test is a complex and chal-
lenging exercise which raises doubts about its operability. In addition, it is note-
worthy that the valuation concept ViU to measure the recoverable amount accord-
ing to IAS 36 has been criticized frequently (27%) and, thus, seems to be far less 
accepted than the “fair value less cost of disposal” (FVLCOD) (7%). Respondents 
complaining about the valuation concepts generally also view the respective con-
cept as a source of complexity. 
From a stewardship perspective, 9% of the stakeholders favor amortization. Con-
sidering the slightly larger number of 15% of the respondents that prefer the IoA 
regarding this discipline, the controversy becomes visible again. In accordance 
with the practical considerations described above, cost considerations play an im-
portant role in the argumentation against the IoA. 49% of the comment letters 
highlighted that the impairment test procedures are costly and time-consuming. 
Comparing the impairment test provisions to the requirements of the amortization 
approach, the higher level of efforts needed for the IoA are obvious. The high 
number of stakeholders mentioning cost and cost-benefit arguments is consistent 
with the high number of responses highlighting the complexity of the impairment 
test which can be assumed to be the source of the higher burden. The analysis by 
stakeholder interest group shows that especially non-financial corporations’ trade 
associations (91%) and financial institutions (100%) are critical of the cost of an-
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nual impairment testing, while no stakeholder from the classical user group of 
financial analysts cited cost arguments. 
Other arguments have been used 72 times against the IoA. The most cited argu-
ment in this category (15% of total responses) was the notion that the management 
of the reporting company would not use the information provided by the IoA for 
internal purposes and, consequently, the impairment test would be a mere ac-
counting exercise. Further, 12% of the respondents pointed out that regular amor-
tization would reduce the pressure on the identification of intangible assets during 
the initial purchase price allocation as well as on the differentiation between asset 
acquisitions and business combinations, two other topics the IASB considered 
during the PIR. The argument that the IoA would lead to a “negative spiral” when 
the performance of the reporting firm is low and the claim that the current provi-
sions increase the volatility of profit or loss have each been cited by 9% of the 
respondents. 4% of the respondents referred to other accounting regimes that al-
low goodwill to be amortized in order to argue that amortization is the desirable 
method. This also includes one reference to the IFRS for SMEs for which the 
IASB itself chose regular amortization rather than the IoA. 
Taking everything into consideration, it can be concluded that the views on the 
usefulness of the IoA compared to amortization are mixed (RQ1) and that both 
views are supported by a number of arguments that directly oppose each other in 
some areas. With regard to RQ2, the opinion that the impairment test is not rigor-
ous and operational devised prevails among constituents that expressed a clear 
view. With regard to the rigorousness and operability, arguments related to the 
discretion as well as the complexity involved in the impairment tests are used ex-
tensively. Slight differences in the use of arguments can be observed between in-
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terest groups while the differentiation by accounting system provides meaningful 
insights into differences between the perceptions of stakeholders from countries 
with a British-American accounting background and those from countries with a 
Continental background. It is further noteworthy, that academics provided the 
smallest number of arguments illustrating the low contribution of this group to the 
PIR via comment letters. 
Recommendations of Alternative Methods 
Regarding the way forward, some constituents also explicitly recommend an ac-
counting treatment for acquired goodwill. The majority of recommendations in-
clude the reintroduction of amortization (16 responses) and the implementation of 
an amortization approach with impairment tests whenever impairment indicators 
are present (13). Together, almost a third of the respondents recommended a re-
turn to the amortization regime. Only four preparers proposed other alternatives, 
such as the direct charging of goodwill to equity or amortization to other compre-
hensive income instead of profit or loss, while in 66% of the cases, no alternative 
was explicitly recommended. This indicates that, nowadays, the methods to be 
discussed seem to be reduced to the IoA and regular amortization (with indicator-
based impairment tests). As in our analyses above, the contrary opinions of stake-
holders with a British-American accounting background and those with a Conti-
nental background become obvious: The majority (52%) of the latter group advo-
cates a return to an amortization regime, while this is only recommended by 21% 
of the former group. Some constituents did not express strong views on the issues 
analyzed, but rather emphasized that the FASB is currently debating similar issues 
and any effort to enhance goodwill accounting should be conducted in collabora-
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tion between the IASB and the FASB in order to ensure international conver-
gence. 
4 Research Findings regarding the Impairment-only 
Approach 
4.1 Research Approach: Literature Review 
The IASB noted that research evidence supports its view taken when implement-
ing the IoA (IFRS 3 (2004).BC140). In the following, we review this assessment 
by considering the research conducted. We follow a twofold approach to identify 
empirical research that is relevant to our research question. First, we screen all 
individual issues of the highest-ranked academic accounting journals23 from 2000 
until August 2014.24 In a second step, we go through the references of the relevant 
articles identified. Overall, we identified 30 studies, mainly from academia, that 
are relevant to our research questions. Next, we arrange the literature around the 
arguments identified in our comment letter analysis above to validate the stake-
holders’ views and derive implications for the development of goodwill account-
ing. 
Although our focus is on goodwill accounting under IFRS, we also consider stud-
ies which are based on data from other accounting regimes, especially US GAAP 
settings, for the following reasons. First, there are only a limited number of IFRS-
studies available. Second, the information content provided by goodwill impair-
ments according to IAS 36 and SFAS 142, respectively, is similar. Importantly, 
                                                 
23  We are relying on the journal rankings of the Association of Business Schools (ABS) (2010) 
and the German Academic Association for Business Research (VHB) (2011) as well as on the 
Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) (2010) ranking and perform our detailed approach 
for all accounting-related journals that are ranked in the two highest categories, respectively 
(see also Appendix 2, Panel A). 
24  To complement the articles identified, we further use the search functions on the journals’ 
websites. We employ the following search terms: ‘Goodwill’, ‘Impairment’, ‘Impairment-
only’, ‘IFRS 3’, ‘IAS 36’, ‘SFAS 141’, ‘SFAS 142’, ‘SFAS 144’. 
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both regimes prescribe an IoA for subsequent goodwill accounting.25 Although we 
are not judging the accurateness of the research conducted but interested in what 
the authors infer from their research, the results presented below should be con-
sidered with caution due to several limitations: Most of the studies consider the 
capital markets of Australia, Europe and the US, while evidence from other re-
gions is rare. In addition, some studies use small sample sizes and/or out-dated 
data potentially limiting generalizability. Third, a comparison of an amortization 
regime and the IoA may be problematic especially in US or European settings 
where firms were allowed to set off goodwill against equity in the past (Boennen 
and Glaum, 2014). Finally, while we aim to provide a representative overview of 
the research evidence, we do not claim our findings to be the result of a full re-
view.26 
4.2 Results of Literature Review 
The research reviewed can be broadly distinguished into five areas that are linked 
to arguments mentioned by the stakeholders in their comment letter responses 
during the PIR. 
(1) Overall Usefulness of IoA in Comparison to Amortization 
Our first research question, RQ1, relates to the usefulness of the IoA. Moreover, 
we have allocated many arguments of the stakeholders to the category Usefulness 
Criteria (see Table 3) which, accordingly, can be linked to this research area. Our 
analysis above shows that stakeholders’ views about the usefulness of the IoA are 
                                                 
25  The proximity between IFRS and US GAAP regarding the accounting for goodwill is also 
expressed by the FASB which deferred further actions on its project on “Accounting for 
Goodwill for Public Business Entities and Not-for-Profits” until the IASB published its find-
ings on the PIR on IFRS 3 (FASB, 2014). 
26  For a comprehensive literature review on goodwill accounting beyond the subsequent meas-
urement of acquired goodwill we refer to Boennen and Glaum (2014). 
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mixed and that they mention arguments that are in stark contrast (especially ar-
guments 1, 2, 3, 12, 14). 
With regard to the overall usefulness of the IoA, researchers especially conducted 
value relevance studies which generally jointly test the relevance and reliability of 
the information (Barth et al., 2001).27 By investigating whether there is a signifi-
cant correlation between the goodwill recognized and share prices, value rele-
vance studies provide indirect evidence of the usefulness of goodwill information 
(Boennen and Glaum, 2014). All value relevance studies reviewed find an in-
crease in value relevance following the implementation of the IoA in comparison 
to amortization (Chalmers et al., 2008; Aharony et al., 2010; Horton and Serafeim, 
2010; Oliveira et al., 2010). Hence, the authors generally conclude that the IoA 
provides more useful information to users than amortization. 
Following a different approach, Moehrle et al. (2001) compare the information 
content of earnings before amortization and earnings before extraordinary items 
and find no significant difference. Accordingly, the authors conclude that good-
will amortization amounts are not decision-useful and, thus, provide support for 
the IoA. The results of the study by Chalmers et al. (2011) also support the propo-
nents of the IoA. Based on an Australian sample, the authors find that goodwill 
impairments according to IFRS (2006-2008) are more closely aligned with firms’ 
investment opportunities than amortization charges under Australian GAAP 
(1999-2005). Therefore, the authors state that “impairment charges better reflect 
the underlying economic attributes of goodwill than do amortization charges” 
(p. 634). Concluding, empirical research indicates that the implementation of the 
                                                 
27  We assume this observation to hold for relevance and faithful representation in the meaning of 
the current Conceptual Framework as well. 
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IoA for goodwill has enhanced the usefulness of financial reporting in comparison 
to amortization. For an overview of the studies see Appendix 2, Panel B. 
(2) Relevance of the Information provided by the IoA 
To be relevant, information has to have predictive or confirmatory value or both 
in order to be able to make a difference in economic decisions by users (Concep-
tual Framework, QC6-7). Few stakeholders argued that the IoA brings new infor-
mation to the market which has predictive value (Argument 4) and, thus, helps to 
predict future outcomes. The predictive value of goodwill information and, there-
by, the implementation of the IoA have been examined by several studies, espe-
cially with regard to the influence on earnings and cash flow forecasts. 
Hamberg et al. (2011) investigate the adoption of IFRS in Sweden and the stock 
market’s reaction to increased earnings following the abolishment of goodwill 
amortization (goodwill charges are lower under IFRS than under Swedish 
GAAP). The authors conclude that investors seem to view the increase in earnings 
as an indication of higher future cash flows. Chalmers et al. (2012) examine 
whether the adoption of IFRS has influenced the association between intangible 
assets, including goodwill, and the accuracy and dispersion of analysts’ earnings 
forecast. The authors find that the associations between the magnitude and the 
dispersion of analyst forecast errors and intangible assets have become more nega-
tive after the introduction of IFRS. According to the authors, this improvement 
could be traced back to the implementation of the IoA for goodwill which would, 
thus, provide more relevant information than amortization. 
In the context of US GAAP, Lee (2011, p. 236) finds that the ability of goodwill 
to predict future cash flows has improved after the introduction of SFAS 142 in 
2001 and concludes that “the results support the view taken by the FASB and pro-
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ponents of SFAS 142”. Moreover, Jarva (2009) finds that goodwill impairments 
under SFAS 142 are associated with future expected cash flows. The author 
shows that goodwill impairments “have significant predictive ability for one- and 
two-year-ahead cash flows” (Jarva, 2009, p. 1083). 
Documenting significant negative stock market returns as a consequence of unex-
pected goodwill impairments for the time before and after the implementation of 
SFAS 142, Bens et al. (2011) find indications that the information content of 
goodwill impairments decreased under the new provisions. However, Zang (2008, 
p. 63) concludes that SFAS 142 “appears to have made some improvement to 
goodwill accounting.” The author shows that a larger reported goodwill impair-
ment charge than expected provides value-relevant information and, thus, unex-
pected impairment charges signal negative future profit-making potential. Hence, 
stock prices are affected by material changes of the forecasts of future cash flows 
by investors and analysts revising earnings forecasts downwards. Similarly, Li et 
al. (2011) find that market participants revise their expectations about future earn-
ings downwards when a goodwill impairment loss is announced. In addition, the 
authors show that impairment charges are “negatively correlated with average 
sales growth and growth in operating profits of the subsequent 2 years” (Li et al., 
2011, p. 747) and, thus, seem to be a leading indicator with regard to future de-
clines in profitability. 
The argument that the results of the IoA are relevant and confirm economic phe-
nomena (Argument 1), i.e. the information provided has confirmatory value, has 
been brought forward by stakeholders more often than the claim that the IoA pro-
vides information that has predictive value. However, a related, frequently cited 
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counterargument is that impairment charges are delayed, provide little new infor-
mation and are already reflected in share prices (Argument 12). 
Hayn and Hughes (2006) conduct a study based on goodwill generated before the 
introduction of SFAS 142. They find that goodwill impairments lag, on average, 
three to four years behind the economic deterioration of goodwill and suggest that 
the results are also transferable to the accounting requirements of SFAS 142, i.e. 
the IoA. Although Jarva (2009) provides evidence that impairment charges ac-
cording to SFAS 142 are associated with future cash flows, the author also finds 
indications that goodwill impairment charges lag behind the economic deteriora-
tion of goodwill. Li and Sloan (2014) investigate the timeliness of goodwill im-
pairments in the periods before and after the introduction SFAS 142. Their find-
ings indicate that goodwill write-offs are relatively less timely after this change 
because managers would wait until there is convincing evidence that the fair value 
of goodwill is lower than its carrying amount. According to the authors, this result 
is not consistent with the FASB’s goal that the IoA provides more useful infor-
mation. In contrast, while emphasizing that there is still potential for improve-
ment, Chen et al. (2008) find that timeliness of goodwill impairments has been 
improved under SFAS 142. 
Overall, the empirical studies regarding relevance indicate that the predictive val-
ue and information content of goodwill accounting may have increased since the 
introduction of the IoA. Nevertheless, in line with the perceptions of stakeholders, 
there is evidence that goodwill impairment charges lag behind the economic phe-
nomena (see Appendix 2 – Panel C for an overview). However, a lag between the 
economic deterioration of goodwill and the recognition of impairment charges 
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may at least partly be attributed to the fact that financial statements are issued 
after the reporting period. 
(3) Faithful Representation 
Financial statements should faithfully (complete, neutral, and free from error) 
represent the phenomena that they purport to represent (see Conceptual Frame-
work, QC12). While some stakeholders claim that amortization is an arbitrary 
estimate of the consumption of acquired goodwill (Argument 6), others argue that 
amortization would more representationally faithful reflect the consumption of 
goodwill (Argument 17). Besides, many other arguments against the IoA have 
been assigned to the Faithful Representation category. The most cited arguments 
concern the fact that the IoA allows managers a wide scope for discretion (Argu-
ments 21 and 22). 
While managers could use the discretion inherent to the IoA to convey private 
information about future cash flows, they could also exercise the discretion oppor-
tunistically in order to mislead users of financial reporting about the performance 
of the firm or to achieve certain contractual outcomes which depend on account-
ing data, such as earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Ronen and Yaari, 2008). A 
number of ‘earnings management’ studies provide evidence in line with impair-
ment charges not only reflecting economic deterioration of goodwill but rather 
being related to managerial incentives arising from, in particular, income smooth-
ing/big bath accounting28, debt contracting concerns, management compensation, 
or management reputation (see Boennen and Glaum, 2014). 
                                                 
28  Income smoothing refers to recognizing impairment charges to reduce earnings fluctuation 
aiming to lower shareholders’ volatility estimates which is associated with reduced bankruptcy 
risk and higher stock prices (Trueman and Titman, 1988). Big bath accounting describes man-
agement’s decision to realize a huge one-time impairment charge in a period in which earnings 
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The study by Siggelkow and Zülch (2013) analyses the drivers of fixed assets 
write-off decisions and the respective magnitude of companies in the EU. The 
authors find that write-offs do not exclusively reflect economic declines in asset 
values, but are rather used to manage earnings, in particular with regard to incen-
tives for big bath accounting and income smoothing. Chao and Horng (2013) ex-
amine whether managers use discretionary write-offs and abnormal accruals joint-
ly in order to reach earnings targets. The authors observe that discretionary write-
offs and discretionary accruals are partial complements for earnings manipulation 
which is in contrast to managers using their discretion to signal economic reali-
ties.29 
Researchers also examined whether firms conduct earnings management if they 
may violate debt covenants in case they consider a material goodwill impairment 
charge. Beatty and Weber (2006) argue that companies have motives to delay 
goodwill impairments and show that debt-covenant concerns mitigate the likeli-
hood of goodwill impairments. For a sample of companies with market indica-
tions of goodwill impairment, Ramanna and Watts (2012) find that the frequency 
of goodwill not being impaired is 69%. The authors further provide some evi-
dence for an association between goodwill non-impairment and debt contracting 
concerns. 
In addition, studies examined whether managers avoid or delay goodwill impair-
ment charges in order to avoid a reduction of their remuneration. For example, 
Darrough et al. (2014) document that cash- and option-based CEO compensation 
                                                                                                                                                        
are unexpectedly low. Potential advantages of such a large write-off are to signal that past 
problems have been addressed and that a one-time impairment charge ensures high returns for 
future periods (Strong and Meyer, 1987). Moreover, a further worsening and current bad per-
formance may have only limited additional impact (Walsh et al., 1991). 
29  This study examines a setting in which the guidance for goodwill impairment is based on a 
Taiwanese standard (SFAS No. 35). 
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is significantly reduced after companies have recognized goodwill write-offs. 
Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) find that firms record lower impairment charges 
when top executives have large unrealized gains on their stock options. Further-
more, Beatty and Weber (2006) as well as Ramanna and Watts (2012) provide 
evidence for an association between CEO compensation concerns and goodwill 
non-impairment. Their findings indicate that the probability of firms to encounter 
goodwill impairments is reduced if a cash bonus is included in the compensation 
of the CEO. 
Similarly, managers may have incentives to use their discretion opportunistically 
if the impairment of goodwill could adversely affect their reputation. Masters-
Stout et al. (2008) hypothesize that new CEOs recognize impairment charges in 
the early years of their tenure since they were not involved in former acquisition 
decisions which reduces the risk of reputational costs. Furthermore, reducing the 
goodwill amounts early lowers the probability and magnitude of potential im-
pairments in the future which could potentially affect their own reputation nega-
tively. In fact, the authors find that “new CEOs impair more goodwill than their 
senior counterparts” (Masters-Stout et al., 2008, p. 1382). AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2011) also examine managers’ use of discretion in determining goodwill write-
offs. The authors find that goodwill impairment losses are more likely to be asso-
ciated with recent CEO changes and, thus, infer that managers use discretion in 
the course of goodwill impairment tests. Similarly, evidence for an association 
between CEO tenure and goodwill impairment charges has been provided by a 
number of other studies (Beatty and Weber, 2006; Zang, 2008; Hamberg et al., 
2011; Ramanna and Watts, 2012). 
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Contrary to the above, few studies find no evidence that firms opportunistically 
avoid impairments (Jarva, 2009; Lee, 2011). However, on balance, it can be con-
cluded that academic research provides convincing evidence that opportunistic 
earnings management in the course of goodwill accounting under the IoA is a se-
rious issue (see Appendix 2 – Panel D for an overview). 
(4) Cash-generating Units (CGUs) 
Stakeholders also complained about too much discretion regarding the identifica-
tion of CGUs and the allocation and reallocation of goodwill and, thus, the level 
(CGU) on which the impairment test will be carried out (Argument 22). In this 
sense, Ramanna and Watts (2012, p. 760) argue that managers could allocate 
goodwill “to units where subsequent impairment can be masked by the units’ in-
ternally generated unrealized gains or losses”, e.g. to accelerate or delay future 
impairments. According to the literature, there is a discussion on whether the allo-
cation of goodwill to a smaller or a larger number of CGUs helps to prevent im-
pairment charges (Boennen and Glaum, 2014). 
For example, Ramanna and Watts (2012) posit that a larger number of units would 
give managers more possibilities to allocate goodwill and, thus, discretion to pre-
vent impairment charges. They also find indications that a larger number of busi-
ness segments (as proxy for the number of reporting units/CGUs) is associated 
with a lower frequency of goodwill write-offs. On the other hand, one could argue 
that a smaller number of units implicates that each unit is larger and therefore the 
likelihood of an impairment charge decreases (Boennen and Glaum, 2014). The 
findings of Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) provide support for this reasoning and 
indicate a positive association between the number of segments and the probabil-
ity of goodwill write-offs. This indication is supported by studies which consider 
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the voluntary disclosures of companies or survey results. For example, Duff & 
Phelps (2013) conduct a survey study in the US among members of Financial Ex-
ecutives International, an organization for senior-level financial executives. The 
study reveals that two-thirds of the public companies have five or less reporting 
units, while only 20% of the public companies indicated that they have more than 
ten reporting units. Glaum and Wyrwa (2011) provide a detailed assessment of 
disclosures of IFRS financial statements with regard to the impairment of good-
will. Examining how goodwill is allocated to CGUs, the authors’ findings indicate 
that goodwill is concentrated in a small number of CGUs (see Appendix 2, Pan-
el E). 
Concluding, there is no consensus on the prevailing approach to allocate goodwill 
to CGUs, if the avoidance of goodwill impairments is the desired outcome. More-
over, academic research provides conflicting evidence on whether a larger or 
smaller number of CGUs helps to prevent impairment losses. Thus, evidence re-
garding an abuse of managerial discretion in the course of the identification of 
CGUs and the allocation of goodwill to influence the results of impairment tests is 
not yet conclusive. 
(5) Disclosures 
Proponents of the IoA contend that the information provided in the notes to finan-
cial statements is beneficial and relevant to users (Argument 5) and that the dis-
closures help to ensure the reliability of the information provided by the IoA (Ar-
gument 7). By contrast, the opponents of the current provisions argue that the dis-
closures are insufficient, inappropriate, non-entity-specific and therefore overall 
non-informative (Argument 17). Moreover, they criticize that preparers do not 
fulfil the disclosure requirements related to the impairment test (Argument 27). 
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The review team of the UK Financial Reporting Council (2008) examined the 
December 2007 annual reports of UK firms which had reported significant 
amounts of goodwill on their balance sheets. Regarding the disclosures presented 
by the 32 firms, the review team assessed 17 reports as “rather uninformative”, 9 
as “useful” and 6 as “very useful”. Similarly, the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) (2013) evaluated the disclosures in the 2011 IFRS financial 
statements of firms with significant amounts of goodwill. The regulator observed 
that disclosures were often not entity-specific and of a boilerplate nature. Only 
60% of the firms provided information regarding their key assumptions beyond 
the discount rate and the growth rate. Overall, the studies support the perceptions 
expressed by stakeholders that the disclosures are (partly) uninformative. 
With regard to compliance with the disclosure requirements, Glaum et al. (2013) 
examined a sample of firms from 17 European countries. The authors find sub-
stantial non-compliance with the disclosure requirements of the provisions of 
IAS 36 for the year 2005. They further provide evidence for the role of company- 
and country-specific factors in determining compliance levels under IFRS. In ad-
dition, Carlin and Finch (2010) investigate the goodwill reporting practices of 
Australian firms and find evidence of continued high levels of non-compliance 
with the accounting standard over the first two years of IFRS reporting (2006-
2007). Again, the perceptions of stakeholders are reflected in empirical research 
findings. Appendix 2, Panel F provides an overview of the research regarding 
disclosures. 
10 Years Impairment-only Approach – Stakeholder Perceptions and Research Findings 
220 
 
5 Main Findings, Discussion and Implications for 
Standard Setting 
Two Perspectives: Stakeholder Perceptions and Research Findings 
Overall, the perceptions of stakeholders regarding the usefulness of the IoA in 
comparison to amortization are balanced. In the light of these mixed views, our 
finding that academic research tends to support the assumption of a higher useful-
ness of the IoA is remarkable. In particular, the fact that no study reviewed argues 
for a higher usefulness of amortization suggests the introduction of the IoA im-
proved financial reporting quality. However, the majority of stakeholders that 
express a clear view on the matter argue that the impairment test is not rigorous 
and operational devised and research provides compelling evidence that managers 
use the discretion involved in impairment testing opportunistically. Accordingly, 
it seems that the condition for the IoA providing more useful information than 
amortization, i.e. an impairment test that is rigorous and operational devised, is 
not fulfilled. The fact that the results of academic research on the use of manage-
rial discretion in impairment testing are consistent with the perceptions of stake-
holders, mainly from practice, also indicates that current empirical research is (at 
least in this context) appropriately capturing reality. Thus, our results may also 
mitigate some of the concerns regarding the practical relevance of academic ac-
counting research. In a similar vein, the research conducted regarding CGUs and 
disclosures is largely consistent with the concerns expressed by stakeholders and 
addresses questions of high practical relevance demonstrating the potential contri-
bution of academic research to standard setting. On the basis of our comparison of 
current stakeholder perceptions to the literature, further research opportunities of 
practical relevance can be exploited especially regarding the cost of impairment 
testing and the effects of the IoA (versus amortization) on the stewardship func-
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tion of financial reporting. Arguments from both areas are often used by stake-
holders but rarely examined by academics. 
Recycling of Arguments Used in 2004 
Our content analysis sheds light on the reasons why stakeholders prefer either of 
the methods for subsequent goodwill accounting (RQ3), the IoA or amortization. 
Remarkably, many of the arguments brought forward when the IoA was intro-
duced in 2004 have been used by respondents during the PIR on IFRS 3 about ten 
years later (see Appendix 1). In particular, well-known conceptual arguments are 
cited frequently to support the IoA (“Amortization is an arbitrary estimate of 
goodwill”, Argument 6) as well as to argue against the IoA (“IoA leads to recog-
nition of internally generated goodwill”, Argument 11). In addition to the 12 ar-
guments that can specifically be linked to the Basis for Conclusions or Dissenting 
Opinions accompanying IFRS 3 (2004) and IAS 36 (2004) and account for about 
46% of the total arguments used, one could also view some of the arguments of 
the subcategory Operational and rigour as reflecting (and confirming) general 
concerns about an unreliable impairment test which were expressed in 2004 (see 
e.g. IFRS 3 (2004).DO12). Concluding, the frequent recycling of arguments used 
already in 2004 shows that some of the conceptual arguments are inherent to the 
respective methods and still considered as important (e.g. Arguments 6 and 11) 
and that practical arguments have materialized during the time when the IoA was 
applied (e.g. concerns about the cost of the IoA, Argument 29). 
British-American vs. Continental Stakeholder Perceptions 
Throughout our analyses, we observe that stakeholders from countries with a Brit-
ish-American accounting system are more positive towards the IoA and the im-
pairment test than stakeholders with a Continental accounting background. In par-
10 Years Impairment-only Approach – Stakeholder Perceptions and Research Findings 
222 
 
ticular, the majority of the respondents of the former group that express a clear 
view perceives the IoA as providing more useful information than amortization 
and the impairment test as rigorous and operational, while the latter group disa-
grees with these perceptions. Accordingly, ‘British-American stakeholders’ pre-
sent far more (less) arguments in favor of (against) the IoA than ‘Continental 
stakeholders’. In addition, more than half of the ‘Continental stakeholders’ explic-
itly recommend a return to an amortization regime. These results complement 
recent research which documents that international differences persist under the 
shared IFRS reporting regime with regard to accounting policy choices (e.g. Kvaal 
and Nobes, 2012) by highlighting differences about attitudes towards accounting 
methods that had to be applied mandatorily for a decade. Moreover, our findings 
support research that argues that the traditional dichotomy between British-
American and Continental European accounting practices can still be found de-
spite the widespread application of IFRS (Nobes, 2011). 
We interpret these findings as the persistence of the traditional accounting orienta-
tion in the current attitudes of accountants. Traditionally, British-American ac-
counting systems were oriented towards decision-usefulness as opposed to the 
conservative Continental accounting practices that served other purposes, espe-
cially government-imposed requirements (Mueller et al., 1997). Accordingly, the 
aim of the introduction of the IoA which was assumed to provide more useful 
information than amortization is likely to correspond better to the needs of Brit-
ish-American systems and may, thus, be more favorably perceived by ‘British-
American stakeholders’. Admittedly, financial reporting under IFRS also aims to 
provide information that is useful to economic decisions of investors and creditors 
(Conceptual Framework, OB2). Nevertheless, our observation that the background 
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of stakeholders still seems to be an important determinant of their opinion ex-
pressed in comment letters is of interest to the IASB that intends to develop glob-
ally accepted financial reporting standards (Preface to IFRSs, par. 6(a)). 
Implications for Standard Setting 
Considering the mixed views of stakeholders regarding the usefulness of the IoA 
and the fact that research evidence tends to support the usefulness of the IoA, a 
withdrawal of the current concept and a return to an amortization approach (as 
explicitly advocated by about 30% of the stakeholders) is not advisable in the 
short-term. In addition, consistent with research documenting that managers use 
the discretion provided by impairment tests opportunistically, stakeholders com-
plained about the rigorousness and operability of the impairment test as well as 
the procedures being complex, costly and time-consuming. On the basis of our 
analyses, the measures planned by the IASB seem appropriate. The upcoming 
research project on subsequent goodwill accounting including the relative ad-
vantages of the IoA and amortization plus impairment tests when indicators of 
impairment are identified addresses the fact that substantial parts of the IFRS 
community doubt the usefulness of the IoA. Moreover, it expresses that amortiza-
tion and the IoA are the two methods which are intensely discussed, to date. The 
project aiming to improve and simplify the impairment test addresses the respec-
tive demands identified above. 
On the basis of our results, the following improvements that could be introduced 
in a relatively timely manner could be discussed during the upcoming IASB pro-
jects. First, stakeholders often complained about the shortcomings of the valuation 
concept ViU, whereas only few stakeholders explicitly mentioned the flaws of the 
valuation concept FVLCOD. Although, the concept of recoverable amount is clear 
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and concise, after ten years of experience, the valuation concept ViU did especial-
ly not overcome difficulties related to (1) the lack of risk equivalence between the 
discount rate and cash flows (see also IAS 36.BCZ54), (2) being a pre-tax concept 
(see IAS 36.BC91) and (3) cash flow projections (see IAS 36.33, IAS 36.BCZ24). 
Accordingly, we question whether the concept of the recoverable amount is nec-
essary or a single valuation concept, i.e. the fair value as under US GAAP, could 
be sufficient. This would reduce complexity and cost, improve comparability due 
to a single valuation concept applied by all firms, enhance convergence with 
US GAAP, and align the valuation concepts applied in the course of the purchase 
price allocation and in the subsequent measurement on the basis of fair values. 
Second, to address the concerns about the costs of impairment testing, it may be 
worth to consider whether a calculation has to be performed in every case, espe-
cially when there is significant “headroom”. In some cases, a qualitative assess-
ment could be sufficient to ensure that the book value of goodwill is recoverable. 
The introduction of a qualitative step to be performed first would also enhance 
convergence with US GAAP since the FASB implemented a so-called “step zero” 
already in 2011. In fact, IAS 36.99 already contains certain rules allowing the 
most recent calculations made in former periods to be used in the current period, if 
specific conditions are met. Application of this paragraph could perhaps already 
provide improvements of the cost-benefit conflict. In addition, since many stake-
holders complained about the current disclosure requirements and research sup-
ports these views, the IASB could take a fresh look at which disclosures should be 
provided in order to balance the information needs of users with the refusal of 
preparers to disclose sensitive information. Finally, the need for further guidance 
regarding difficult aspects, e.g. the treatment of non-controlling interests or corpo-
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rate assets when testing goodwill for impairment, expressed by stakeholders could 
be addressed in the upcoming projects. 
6 Conclusion 
The subsequent accounting for goodwill has long been a topic of debate. The 
IASB has recently re-opened this debate during its PIR on IFRS 3 during which 
the effects of the introduction of the IoA for goodwill in 2004 were to be assessed. 
As a result of the PIR, the IASB decided to initiate research projects on the subse-
quent accounting for goodwill and the effectiveness and complexity of the im-
pairment test. Providing a detailed analysis which is not subject to self-evaluation 
concerns, we contribute to the current debate by examining the effects of the in-
troduction of the IoA from two perspectives, namely stakeholder perceptions and 
research findings. This is of particular interest since, when the IoA was intro-
duced, the IASB noted that the majority of respondents to the foregoing exposure 
draft that expressed a clear view generally supported an amortization approach 
complemented by impairment tests whenever an indicator for impairments is iden-
tified and, thus, did not support the IoA (see IFRS 3 (2004).BC137-139). 
Our content analysis of comment letters submitted during the PIR shows that 
stakeholders’ views on the usefulness of the IoA in comparison to amortization 
are mixed, whereas stakeholders that express a clear view by majority raise con-
cerns about the impairment test not being rigorous and operational devised. More-
over, we find that stakeholders frequently use arguments to support either the IoA 
or amortization that have already been used when the IoA was introduced which 
indicates that conceptual arguments are inherent to the respective approaches and 
practical concerns have materialized. Throughout our analyses, we find that 
stakeholders with a British-American accounting background are more positive 
10 Years Impairment-only Approach – Stakeholder Perceptions and Research Findings 
226 
 
towards the IoA and the impairment test than stakeholders with a Continental 
background which indicates the persistence of the traditional accounting orienta-
tion in the current attitudes of accountants. 
Our review of empirical research tends to support the assumption of the IASB that 
the IoA provides more useful information than amortization. However, academic 
research also provides compelling evidence for the opportunistic use of manageri-
al discretion in impairment testing which supports the concerns expressed by 
stakeholders about the impairment test. On the basis of our results, the measures 
planned by the IASB seem to be appropriate. The project on subsequent goodwill 
accounting acknowledges that much needs to be done to achieve a globally ac-
cepted goodwill accounting approach which satisfies the needs of users and is 
practically feasible and the project aiming to improve the impairment test ac-
counts for the widespread concerns. To address some of these concerns regarding 
the impairment test, one may discuss to eliminate the valuation concept ViU to 
reduce complexity and the room for discretion. In addition, the introduction of a 
qualitative assessment to be performed first to evaluate whether calculations have 
always to be performed, especially when there is significant “headroom” and little 
changes in the economic environment, may reduce costs. 
Our paper is subject to certain limitations. Content analysis, although done by two 
researchers independently, remains subjective. Thus, we do not claim our analysis 
to be the only defendable outcome of a content analysis. In addition, our analysis 
is limited to the comment letters publicly available and therefore does not repre-
sent the perceptions of the whole IFRS community. With regard to our literature 
review, we cannot claim our findings to be the result of a holistic review. Howev-
er, especially regarding the overall questions, we feel confident that we have re-
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viewed a sufficient volume of evidence to contrast the perceptions expressed by 
the comment letter responses. 
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Appendix 1: Description of Criteria used in Content Analysis 
In the following table (see next page), we explain the meaning of the arguments 
according to which the comment letters have been analyzed. Because of the high 
granularity and the large number of arguments, the lines between the arguments 
are not clear-cut in every case. Therefore, some of the potential interrelationships 
are addressed in the explanations. 
In the column “2004”, we mark arguments that have already been used as main 
arguments in the discussion upon the introduction of the IoA in 2004 as derived 
from the Basis for Conclusions and/or Dissenting Opinions on 
IFRS 3/IAS 36 (2004). 
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Arguments pro IoA/contra Amortization 
No. Argument 2004 Description 
1) Information provided 
by IoA is relevant/has 
confirmatory value 
 The Relevance arguments used in favor of the IoA include 
responses that claimed that (1) the information provided by 
IoA is relevant/has confirmatory value, (2) the IoA pro-
vides more useful information than amortization, (3) amor-
tization is not of significant value to users and (4) the in-
formation provided by IoA has predictive value. While 
argument (4) includes only respondents that view impair-
ment information as having predictive value, bringing new 
information to the market or being a signal, argument (1) 
includes comments that value the confirmatory nature of 
impairment information as well as general statements that 
information provided by the IoA is relevant. 
2) IoA provides more 






3) Amortization is not of 




4) Information provided 
by IoA has predictive 
value 
 





The subcategory Relevance: Disclosures contains the 
argument that disclosures provide useful additional infor-
mation. The main benefit is seen in the disclosure of key 
assumptions that have been used in the impairment test. 
6) Amortization is an 
arbitrary estimate of 
consumption of goodwill 
IFRS 3, 
BC140 
The underlying rationale of this Faithful Representation 
argument is that, generally, the useful life of acquired 
goodwill as well as the pattern in which it diminishes are 
not possible to predict. The argument also includes those 
respondents claiming conceptual superiority of the IoA 
compared to amortization. 
7) Disclosures/Guidance 




This argument claims that disclosure requirements and 
guidance (e.g. regarding the definition of CGUs) improve 
the reliability of the IoA and is used as a counterargument 
to those that argue that impairment tests are not reliable 
due to the high level of discretion. 
8) Impairment testing 
ensures accountability 
for investments made 
and provides insights 
into management views 
 The category Stewardship/Accountability includes re-
sponses that stated that impairment testing ensures ac-
countability for investments made and provides insights 
into management views. This criterion encompasses stew-
ardship and accountability aspects, e.g. a better assessment 
of the performance of the acquired business or the realiza-
tion of synergies, as well as the benefits of the IoA regard-
ing the provision of information about the views of the 
management about the acquired business. 
9) Amortization does not 
remove need to conduct 
impairment tests 
 The Cost argument used was the claim that a return to 
amortization would not remove the need to conduct im-
pairment tests, since indication-based tests would still be 
required. If impairment reviews would not be done regu-
larly costs would not be reduced substantially since firms 
still must be able to conduct the test in case of impairment 
indications, while the quality of the tests would suffer. 
10) Other  Other includes arguments that have seldomly been used or 
are hardly connected to the main categories. Examples 
include responses that due to the IoA, the acquirer better 
analyzes the transaction before the closure, e.g. through 
use of scenarios, or that many other aspects of accounting 
also involve judgment about estimates and assumptions 
and thus this would not be a particular problem of the IoA. 
  
10 Years Impairment-only Approach – Stakeholder Perceptions and Research Findings 
230 
 
Arguments contra IoA/pro Amortization 
No. Argument 2004 Description 
11) IoA leads to recogni-





Respondents explained that the recognition of internally-
generated goodwill is inconsistent with the principles of 
IAS 38, may provide a cushion against the recognition of 
impairment losses, and deteriorates comparability among 
companies growing organically/anorganically. 
12) IoA does not provide 
useful information - 
impairment charges 
come too late 
 This argument focuses on the aspect that impairment 
charges often come late and do not provide new infor-
mation. Respondents also stated that necessary impair-
ments are often delayed until a time when the impairment 
is already anticipated and reflected in share prices. 
13) No impairment loss-
es are recognized be-





This argument stems from the view that no impairment 
losses are recognized because of testing goodwill on a high 
CGU-level and, thus, is a source for interrelationships 
between arguments, since the claim that a cushion is built 
by internally-generated goodwill (argument 11) also points 
to the argument that no impairments will be charged, and 
argument 22 also addresses questions around the topic of 
CGUs including discretion in determining the test level. 
14) Information of IoA is 
not used by users 
 Such comments argued, for example, that analysts would 
eliminate impairment charges in order to enhance the 
comparability of information on profit or loss. 
15) Goodwill is tested on 
CGUs that are subject to 
restructuring - Discon-
nection between what 
has been bought and 
what is tested 
 This argument focuses on the fact that, after reorganiza-
tions, goodwill is tested on CGUs that might have little 
similarities to the originally acquired business. The argu-
ment further includes respondents that only complained 
about the disconnection between what is tested by impair-
ment tests and what has been bought originally without 






 This includes comments that the disclosure requirements 
regarding the impairment test are not sufficient, e.g. to 
understand the results and the level of judgment applied, 
too excessive or unnecessary, or conveying sensitive in-
formation. Respondents complaining about the disclosure 
requirements themselves (not about their application in 
practice, see argument 27) were assigned to this argument. 
17) Amortization over 
useful life reflects con-
sumption of goodwill 
more representationally 




This argument contains claims that amortization over use-
ful life reflects consumption of goodwill more representa-
tionally faithful than IoA, e.g. because, although amortiza-
tion may be arbitrary, the fact that the value of goodwill 
diminishes over its useful life cannot be ignored. 
18) Goodwill is an asset 
with limited useful life 
IFRS 3, 
BC139b 
This also includes statements claiming that the useful life 
of goodwill is predictable, because the acquirer has an 
expectation of how synergies are realized or, because of 
the experience gained since IFRS 3 is applied, firms de-
veloped professional judgment allowing the determination 
of an appropriate amortization period for each business 
acquired. Moreover, the argument that the useful life of 
goodwill is not predictable is claimed to be invalid since 
the same is true for other assets and estimations are inher-
ent in accounting. 
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19) Amortization is well-
understood and well-
established in practice 





This argument focuses on the practical benefits of amorti-
zation compared to the IoA including easy and more con-
sistent application expected to result in higher comparabil-
ity. 
20) IoA reduces compa-
rability between organi-
cally and anorganically 
grown companies 
 This argument also includes comments arguing that amor-
tization of goodwill would increase comparability between 
firms that grow organically and those growing primarily 
through acquisitions. 
21) High judgment and 
managerial discretion 
regarding estimates and 
assumptions 
 This argument includes comments criticizing the impair-
ment provisions and pointing out the potential for (oppor-
tunistic) earnings management reducing the reliability of 
impairment information. It encompasses complaints about 
the subjectivity and the resulting implications for auditors, 
i.e. audibility is problematic and audit risk increases. 
22) Managerial discre-
tion in identification and 
restructuring of and 
goodwill allocation to 
CGUs 
 This argument complains about the subjectivity inherent to 
the current impairment approach with regard to CGU-
related questions including the level of the impairment 
test. 
23) Impairment testing is 
a complex exercise 
 This argument encompasses general and specific com-
plaints about the complexity of the impairment test accord-
ing to IAS 36. 
24) Valuation concept 
value in use has short-
comings 
 This argument addresses problems with the value concept 
ViU. Difficulties include, for example, the projection of 
future cash flows or the determination of the discount rate. 
25) Goodwill impair-
ment is difficult in pres-
ence of non-controlling 
interests 
 This argument criticizes the complexity of the impairment 
test specifically arising from the presence of non-
controlling interests. 
26) Valuation concept 
fair value less costs of 
disposal has shortcom-
ings 
 This argument addresses problems with the value concept 
FVLCOD. Difficulties include, for example, the projection 
of future cash flows or the determination of the discount 
rate. 
27) Compliance with 
disclosure requirements 
is not fulfilled 
 This includes complaints about the application of the dis-
closure requirements (not with the requirements them-
selves, see argument 16). 




This argument includes claims that amortization charges to 
profit or loss mean greater accountability of management 
decisions, especially because this provides a link between 
income and costs from an acquisition. Other opinions 
expressed were that analysts are interested in the expected 
payback period and view amortization of goodwill over 
this period as useful information in terms of stewardship. 





This includes concerns about high costs and effort origi-
nating from the need to conduct annual reviews as well as 
comments referring to an unfavorable cost-benefit relation. 
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30) Information of IoA is 
not used by the pre-
parer's management 
 This argument is not directly linked to the goal of financial 
reporting according to the Conceptual Framework of the 
IASB and, thus, assigned to Other Criteria. 
31) Amortization reduc-
es pressure on identifi-
cation of intangibles in 
PPA and determination 
between asset acquisi-
tions and business 
 Respondents using this argument are concerned with the 
identification of intangibles in a purchase price allocation 
as well as with the differentiation between assets acquisi-
tions and business combinations. Both problems would be 
less important, if goodwill was amortized, i.e. treated as 
other intangibles. 
32) IoA is pro-cyclical 
when performance is low 
 This argument points to the negative spiral which firms 
may experience through additional impairment charges in 
times when their performance is low. 
33) IoA increases vola-
tility of profit and loss 
 This argument points to the less regular impact on profit or 
loss in comparison to annual amortization charges. 
34) Other reporting 
regimes allow amortiza-
tion 
 Respondents referred to other reporting regimes which 
allowed/required amortization instead of an IoA. 
35) Other  Arguments against the IoA that were not assigned to the 
arguments above. Examples include responses which refer 
to the IASB project related to loan-loss provisioning with 
which amortization is seen to be more consistent or a 
comment that the gearing ratio has lost its significance 
because of delayed impairments led to inflated equity. 
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Appendix 2: Overview of Notable Goodwill Accounting Studies 








Journal acronyms Journal name
ABS (2010) ARC (ERA 2010) VHB (2011)
ABACUS ABACUS: a Journal of Accounting and Business Studies 3 A B
ABR Accounting and Business Research 3 A B
A&F Accounting and Finance 2 B C
AAAJ Accounting Auditing and Accountability Journal 3 A* C
ABFH Accounting, Business and Financial History 2 A B
AF Accounting Forum 3 B -
AHi Accounting History 2 A -
AHo Accounting Horizons 3 A C
AOS Accounting, Organizations and Society 4 A* A
AR Accounting Review 4 A* A
AiA Advances in Accounting - A C
AJPT Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 2 A B
AAR Australian Accounting Review - B -
BRA Behavioral Research in Accounting 3 A B
BAR British Accounting Review 3 A C
CJAS Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences 2 - -
CAR Contemporary Accounting Research 3 A* A
CPA Critical Perspective on Accounting 3 A B
EAR European Accounting Review 3 A B
FAM Financial Accountability and Management 3 A C
JAEc Journal of Accounting and Economics 4 A* A
JAOC Journal of Accounting and Organizational Change 1 B B
JAPP Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 3 A B
JAAF Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 3 A B
JAEd Journal of Accounting Education 2 A D
JAL Journal of Accounting Literature 3 A B
JAR Journal of Accounting Research 4 A* A
JBFA Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 3 A B
JIAR Journal of International Accounting Research 2 B B
JIFMA Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting 2 - -
JMAR Journal of Management Accounting Research 2 A* B
MAR Management Accounting Research 3 A A
RAS Review of Accounting Studies 4 A A
RAF Review of Accounting and Finance - - -
RQFA Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 3 - B
IJA The International Journal of Accounting 3 A C
Interpretation of ranking: ERA/VHB: A* = Best or leading journal; A = a highly regarded journal; B = a well-regarded journal; 
C = a regarded Journal; D = modest standard; ABS: 4* = a world elite journal; 4 = a top journal; 3 = a highly regarded journal; 
2 = a well-regarded journal; 1 = modest standard; - = not ranked.
Searched Journals
Journal ranking by


















Chalmers et al. (2008) AAR 2005-2006 599 Australia IFRS
Goodwill amounts under IFRS are more value-
relevant (associated with share prices) than under 
Australian GAAP for the same year.




Adoption of IFRS has increased the value 
relevance of goodwill. 
Horton and Serafeim (2010) RAS 2006 297 UK IFRS
Stock prices react significantly to the publication of 
reconciliation documents regarding goodwill from 
UK GAAP to IFRS.
Oliveira et al. (2010) BAR 1998-2008 354 Portugal IFRS
Value relevance of goodwill increased under IFRS 
(impairment-only approach) compared to 
Portuguese GAAP (amortization).
Chalmers et al. (2011) A&F 1999-2008 4.310 Australia IFRS
Impairment is in comparison to amortisation a 
better method to capture the underlying economic 
attributes of goodwill. 
Moehrle et al. (2001) Aho 1988-1998 222 USA US-GAAP
Goodwill amortization disclosures are not decision 
useful.
Results of Empirical Studies Comparing the Usefulness of Non-amortization and Amortization









Hamberg et al. (2011) EAR 2001-2007 1.691 Sweden IFRS
Reported earnings increased as a consequence of 
implementation of impairment-only approach. 
Stock market revalued companies upwards 
following the IFRS adoption.
Chalmers et al. (2012) A&F 1993-2007 3.328 Australia IFRS
Analyst forecast errors decreased with introduction 
of IFRS. Impairment-only approach conveys 
more useful information than amortisation.
Jarva (2009) JBFA 2002-2005 327 USA US-GAAP
Goodwill write-offs of SFAS 142 are associated 
with future expected cash flows.
Lee (2011) JAPP 1995-2006 13.848 USA US-GAAP
Goodwill's ability to predict future cash flows has 
improved since the FASB adopted SFAS 142.
Zang (2008) RAF 2002 969 USA US-GAAP
Only unanticipated portions of goodwill 
impairments convey unfavorable news to the 
market, whereas the expected portions do not.
Li et al. (2011) RAS 1996-2006 1.584 USA US-GAAP
Investors and analysts revise their expectations 
downward on the announcement of an 
impairment charge. Goodwill impairment is a 
leading indicator of a decline in future profitability. 
Chen et al. (2008) AiA 2002 1.763 USA US-GAAP
Timeliness of impairments has been improved 
after adoption of SFAS 142, while there is still 
room for improvement. 
Bens et al. (2011) JAAF 1996-2006 388 USA US-GAAP
Reduction of information content of goodwill 
impairments after introduction of SFAS 142.
Hayn and Hughes (2006) JAAF 1988-1998 1.276 USA US-GAAP
Impairments lag behind the economic 
deterioration of goodwill for some years
Li and Sloan (2014) - 1996-2011 29.485 USA US-GAAP
Goodwill impairments in the period before 
implementation of SFAS 142 are timelier than 
after the introduction of the impairment-only 
approach.
Results of Empirical Studies regarding Relevance and Timeliness





















Smoothing / big bath







Study indicates support for big bath accounting 
and income smoothing. Write-off magnitude is 
used for earnings management. 
Chao and Horng (2013) RQFA 2005-2007 1.113 Taiwan
Taiwanese 
SFAS No. 35
Managers use discretionary write-offs and 
abnormal accruals jointly to reach earnings 
targets.
Debt contracting
Beatty and Weber (2006) JAR 2001 176 USA US-GAAP
Lower probability to consider impairment charges 
if companies face binding debt covenants. 
Ramanna and Watts (2012) RAS 2003-2006 124 USA US-GAAP
Association between goodwill non-impairment and 
debt-covenant violation concerns.
Management compensation
Beatty and Weber (2006) JAR 2001 176 USA US-GAAP
Lower probability of impairment charges if 
managers have bonus-based compensation plans 
that do not exclude special items. 
Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) CJAS 2002 331 Canada
US-GAAP /          
Canadian GAAP
Lower goodwill impairment charges for firms 
where top executives hold high proportions of in-
the-money stock options.
Ramanna and Watts (2012) RAS 2003-2006 124 USA US-GAAP
Association between goodwill non-impairment and 
CEO compensation concerns.
Reputation
Masters-Stout et al. (2007) CPA 2003-2005 990 USA US-GAAP
Evidence that new CEOs recognize impairments in 
the early years of their tenure.
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) JIFMA 2005-2006 528 UK IFRS
Goodwill impairment charges are more likely to be 
associated with recent CEO changes.
Results of Empirical Studies regarding Earnings Management









Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) CJAS 2002 331 Canada
US-GAAP /          
Canadian GAAP
Evidence for a positive association between the 
number of reporting units and the probability of 
goodwill write-offs.




Goodwill is concentrated in a small number of 
CGUs.
Ramanna and Watts (2012) RAS 2003-2006 124 USA US-GAAP
Evidence for a decrease of impairments with the 
number and size of reporting units.
Duff & Phelps (2013) - 2013 115 USA US-GAAP
Two-thirds of public companies have five or less 
reporting units.
Results of Empirical Studies regarding Managerial Discretion and Cash Generating Units









Financial Reporting Council 
(2008)
- 2007 32 UK IFRS
The disclosures of 17 companies regarding IAS 36 
as rather uninformative. 
Carlin and Finch (2010) JAOC 2006-2007 100 Australia IFRS
High level of non-compliance with goodwill 
accounting/disclosure requirements in the two 
years after adoption of IFRS.
European Securities and 
Markets Authority (2013) 
- 2011 235 Europe IFRS
The disclosures of IAS 36 are in many cases of a 
boilerplate nature and not entity-specific.
Glaum et al. (2013) ABR 2005 357
European       
(17 countries)
IFRS
Substantial non-compliance with disclosure 
requirements of IAS 36.
Results of Empirical Studies Regarding Disclosures
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This study investigates the effect of IFRS adoption on the transparency of finan-
cial reporting in Germany. For a sample period from 1995 to 2012, we analyze the 
development of the degree of earnings management and of disclosure quality us-
ing discretionary accruals and disclosure quality scores from an annual report 
‘beauty contest’ published by a German business journal as proxies. We find that 
IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in disclosure quality and with an 
initial increase in the extent of earnings management. We argue that the latter is 
driven by factors such as low compliance, lack of experience and weaker en-
forcement in the early years of IFRS accounting and show that the degree of earn-
ings management decreases from the ‘early’ to the ‘mature’ phase of IFRS ac-
counting. Finally, we provide evidence for a negative association between disclo-
sure quality and earnings management indicating that disclosures potentially con-
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Since 2005, European listed companies are required to prepare their consolidated 
financial statements according to International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS)1. This is the result of the so-called “IAS-Regulation” (Regulation (EC) No. 
1606/2002) which formulates two objectives directly related to financial report-
ing: (higher) comparability and transparency of financial statements. Although 
IFRS have been adopted in the European Union (EU) for some time, academics 
have failed to deliver compelling, unambiguous evidence for the effects of IFRS 
adoption on financial reporting quality, to date.2 
In this paper, we focus on the effects of IFRS adoption on the transparency of 
financial reporting which, in our perception, have mostly been evaluated by 
measures of the properties of earnings (“earnings transparency”).3 A large part of 
this research examines the effects on the extent of earnings management accom-
panying the regulatory change. However, evidence for a decrease of the degree of 
earnings management, and thus an increase in financial reporting transparency,4 is 
not yet conclusive. In particular, studies using discretionary accruals as a proxy 
for earnings management often do not support the general assumption that the 
adoption of IFRS leads to higher transparency (Ahmed et al., 2013). Instead, they 
often find an increase or no significant change rather than a decrease in the extent 
                                                 
1  In the following, we use the abbreviation IFRS when referring to the accounting standards 
issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) or its predecessor, the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). Standards issued by the IASC are called In-
ternational Accounting Standards (IAS). 
2  See the findings of Soderstrom and Sun (2007) and Brüggemann et al. (2013) who review the 
literature related to voluntary and mandatory adoption of IFRS, respectively. 
3  Similarly, Brüggemann et al. (2013) observe that IFRS adoption studies mostly use ‘earnings 
quality’ metrics. 
4  Being aware that earnings management can also be used to signal private information, we in-
terpret earnings management opportunistically which is in line with the majority of earnings 
management studies regarding IFRS adoption. For example, Barth et al. (2008) predict compa-
nies with earnings of higher quality to exhibit less earnings management and point out that this 
prediction is consistent with prior literature. 




of discretionary accruals studying the very first years after IFRS adoption (e.g. 
van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Callao and Jarne, 2010). 
Undoubtedly, users of financial reporting are interested beyond such aggregate 
measures of earnings quality (Brüggemann et al., 2013). Moreover, studies ana-
lyzing the effects on specific properties of accounting measures do not account for 
potential changes regarding the information content of annual reports published 
by firms applying IFRS (Daske and Gebhardt, 2006). Therefore, researchers have 
examined the effects of IFRS adoption on the quantity and the quality of disclo-
sures that typically accompany the primary financial statements (hereafter: disclo-
sure quality), a different dimension of transparency. Contrary to the results regard-
ing earnings management, research examining disclosure quality provides unani-
mous support for an increase in transparency in the course of the switch to inter-
national accounting standards (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Daske and Gebhardt, 
2006; Glaum et al., 2013). Since prior research indicates that disclosure quality 
and earnings management are negatively related (e.g. Lobo and Zhou, 2001; 
Shalev, 2009) and that disclosures facilitate the detection of earnings management 
(Hunton et al., 2006; Jo and Kim, 2007), enhanced disclosures under IFRS have 
been brought forward as one argument to expect a decrease in earnings manage-
ment after the switch to IFRS (see Doukakis, 2014). This argument and the differ-
ent effects of IFRS adoption on earnings management and disclosure quality doc-
umented in the literature make the association between these dimensions of trans-
parency around the regulatory change a matter of great interest that has not been 
addressed by prior literature. 
In our paper, we examine the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings management 
as well as disclosure quality. We focus on Germany which allows using a specific 




proxy for disclosure quality, namely the disclosure scores of the “Best Annual 
Report” ‘beauty contest’ of the German business journal manager magazin, which 
are publicly available from 1995 to 2012.5 Since prior research had to study some 
few years around the adoption of IFRS and the need to study longer time horizons 
has been explicitly emphasized (e.g. Callao and Jarne, 2010), we are particularly 
interested in the development of transparency from the first few years, the ‘early’ 
phase of IFRS accounting, to the ‘mature’ phase. Moreover, we examine the na-
ture of the relationship between disclosure quality and the degree of earnings 
management. 
Consistent with prior research, we find an increase in disclosure quality accompa-
nying the transition from German GAAP to IFRS. Contrary, we find a significant-
ly higher level of earnings management under IFRS compared to German GAAP. 
However, this seems to be driven by observations from the first few years of IFRS 
reporting, since our results indicate a significant decrease in the extent of earnings 
management from the ‘early’ phase of IFRS accounting to the ‘mature’ phase. 
Comparing the degree of earnings management under German GAAP to ‘mature’ 
IFRS observations, we do not find a significant difference indicating that the ex-
tent of earnings management does not increase under IFRS compared to German 
GAAP in the longer run. We interpret this as an improvement in transparency 
over time attributable to learning effects of preparers, users, and auditors, devel-
oping enforcement, diminishing effects resulting from the application of IFRS 1 
                                                 
5  There are three more reasons for our focus on Germany. First, the large differences between 
German GAAP and IFRS as well as relatively high compliance levels likely result in more 
powerful tests on the effects of IFRS adoption (Bartov et al., 2005; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). 
Second, since German firms account for a substantial part of the firms worldwide that reported 
under IFRS in the 1990s (see Daske and Gebhardt (2006) for an analysis of the number of 
firms adopting IFRS between 1996 and 2004), the effects of the regulatory change can be stud-
ied particularly well in the German setting (see also Glaum et al., 2013). Third, our focus on a 
single country removes the need to put emphasis on country-specific factors that are not related 
to the financial reporting system but could potentially be confounding (Barth et al., 2008). 




(First-time Adoption of IFRS), and emerging common guidelines and interpreta-
tions fostering more consistent application of the new standards. Finally, we show 
that disclosures have the potential to constrain earnings management, especially 
when accounting standards require comparatively few disclosures and/or when 
common guidelines and interpretations are not yet developed and financial state-
ments are influenced by low compliance, little experience or weak enforcement as 
in the ‘early’ phase of IFRS accounting. 
Our findings contribute to the widespread debate on the effects of IFRS adoption 
highlighting the importance to study time horizons beyond the few years around 
the regulatory change. Considering the dimension of the introduction of IFRS in 
the EU, regulators, standard setters and other financial reporting stakeholders 
should clearly be interested in the long-term effects rather than focused on short-
term outcomes. Thus, our results may mitigate concerns raised by prior ‘short 
horizon’ studies documenting increasing earnings management behavior under 
IFRS (e.g. Callao and Jarne, 2010). Our results regarding the negative association 
between disclosures and earnings management are of potential interest to both 
standard setters and analysts. The former should feel encouraged to demand high 
quality disclosures, especially with regard to management’s estimates and as-
sumptions, while the latter should be aware of the use of discretionary accounting 
in the absence of disclosures. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the insti-
tutional background by presenting the German accounting environment and its 
development towards IFRS. Section 3 reviews related literature and develops our 
hypotheses. Section 4 describes our research design, our data, and the measure-




ment of disclosure quality and earnings management. Section 5 presents our re-
sults next to robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Institutional Background: Development of the Ger-
man Accounting Environment 
For our study, we focus on Germany, a continental European country that has 
been characterized as a code-law country having had relatively weak investor pro-
tection rights (La Porta et al., 2000). Overviews of the German accounting system 
have been provided by several authors (e.g. Harris et al., 1994; van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen, 2005; Ferrari et al., 2012) which is why we limit our remarks to the 
fundamental characteristics and developments towards mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Traditionally, German accounting according to the German Commercial Code 
(“Handelsgesetzbuch”, HGB) mostly aims at protecting the interests of firms’ 
creditors and is heavily influenced by tax regulations (van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen, 2005; Glaum et al., 2013). While the dominant valuation principle is 
prudence (Harris et al., 1994; Ferrari et al., 2012), German GAAP has been char-
acterized as providing a multitude of options with regard to inclusion and valua-
tion of balance sheet items and opportunities to manage earnings (van Tendeloo 
and Vanstraelen, 2005). 
In the 1990s, the accounting rules of the German system were criticized by Anglo-
American investors and the financial press.6 Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) outline 
the main arguments as follows: German GAAP allows too much discretion, espe-
cially with regard to the management of income through the use of large hidden 
reserves; German GAAP financial statements are subject to tax optimization in-
centives to a large extent; and German GAAP has deficits regarding disclosure 
                                                 
6  See Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) who also provide some examples. 




requirements that are not sufficient to meet the demands of investors and analysts. 
Over the years, the financing as well as the ownership structure of German firms 
have changed since companies have been relying more and more on public equity 
markets. In the course of this development, the importance of (potential) investors 
as users of financial statements has risen (van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005). 
In response to the complaints about German GAAP and the increasing importance 
of capital markets, many German firms adjusted their financial reporting and dis-
closure strategies and published additional information according to US GAAP or 
IFRS (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).7 Nevertheless, German groups had to provide 
consolidated financial statements according to local GAAP until April 1998. At 
that time, the German Parliament and Federal Council decided to allow listed 
firms to issue consolidated financial statements that comply with either German 
GAAP or international accounting standards (either IFRS or US GAAP) by enact-
ing the “Law to Facilitate the Raising of Capital” (“Kapitalaufnahmeerleichter-
ungsgesetz”, KapAEG).8 The next important milestone in the development of the 
German financial reporting environment was the enactment of the so-called “IAS 
Regulation” in 2002 (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002). For fiscal years starting on 
or after 1 January 2005, the regulation requires European firms to prepare their 
consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS, if their securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market within the EU.9 
                                                 
7  Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) identify three different strategies to report (almost) in compliance 
with IFRS or US GAAP: 1. Preparation of financial statements as close as possible to interna-
tional standards while still complying with German GAAP; 2. Reconciliation of income and 
shareholder’s equity with international accounting standards while providing additional disclo-
sures required by international standards in the notes; 3. Provision of an additional separate set 
of financial statements in accordance with international standards. 
8  See Bundesgesetzblatt, 1998, pt. 1, no. 22, Bonn, April 23, 1998. 
9  See Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, Article 4. Firms that were preparing their statements in 
accordance with US GAAP were allowed to apply IFRS at latest for fiscal year 2007 (see Reg-
ulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, Article 9(b)). 




In the meantime, the German stock exchange Deutsche Börse AG had introduced 
the requirement of international financial reporting for selected segments, such as 
the New Market (Neuer Markt) which required listed firms to publish financial 
statements in accordance with internationally recognized standards already in 
1997. Similarly, companies seeking to comply with the listing requirements of the 
prime standard segment which was introduced in 2003 had to adopt international 
accounting standards prior to 2005, if they had not been listed before 1 January 
2003.10 Alongside the adoption of IFRS in the EU, the member states also intro-
duced the requirement to establish, on a national basis, mechanisms to ensure the 
appropriate and consistent application of the international accounting rules. In 
Germany, the DPR (“Deutsche Prüfstelle für Rechnungslegung” – German Finan-
cial Reporting Enforcement Panel, FREP) was established in 2004 and started 
assessing financial statements with respect to compliance with the relevant ac-
counting rules in 2005. Once a material error is detected, this finding has to be 
disclosed by the firm to the public, which may lead to negative capital market 
effects for the firm.11 
In contrast to traditional German GAAP, IFRS aim at providing information that 
is useful to investors and creditors in deciding about the provision of financial 
resources to the reporting firm.12 Consequently, IFRS differ substantially from 
German GAAP. Importantly, international accounting standards are said to require 
a greater amount of disclosures (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Ashbaugh, 2001) and 
provide fewer accounting choices than German GAAP (d’Arcy, 2000). These fea-
                                                 
10  See Daske and Gebhardt (2006) for a description of the transition process towards IFRS includ-
ing the role of listing requirements for Germany, Austria and Switzerland. 
11  For a good overview of the enforcement of IFRS in the EU in general and, in particular, the 
specific German two-tier enforcement system consisting of a private body (the DPR) and the 
securities regulator (the federal agency BaFin) see Hitz et al. (2012). 
12  See Conceptual Framework, OB2. 




tures potentially constrain earnings management and therefore might lead to the 
intended increase in transparency of financial reporting. In this paper, we analyze 
the effects of IFRS adoption on disclosure quality and earnings management sepa-
rately and asses the relationship between these dimensions of transparency to fur-
ther understand the consequences of the regulatory change. 
3 Prior Research and Hypotheses 
3.1 IFRS Adoption and Transparency 
The requirement for European listed firms to prepare their consolidated financial 
statements in accordance with IFRS is the result of the so-called “IAS Regula-
tion” in 2002. The stated objectives of the Regulation are ‘…the adoption and use 
of international accounting standards in the Community […] in order to ensure a 
high degree of transparency and comparability of financial statements and hence 
an efficient functioning of the Community capital market and of the Internal Mar-
ket’ (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, Article 1). Thus, with regard to financial 
reporting, two objectives can be identified, transparency and comparability, which 
should enhance the functioning of capital markets and, finally, foster macroeco-
nomic developments (Brüggemann et al., 2013). Assuming this causal chain, re-
search provides broad evidence for positive capital market and macroeconomic 
effects of IFRS adoption.13 
                                                 
13  Several studies investigate the effects of the adoption of international accounting standards on 
capital markets, such as changes in bid-ask spreads (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Muller et al., 
2011), stock market liquidity (Daske et al., 2008), cost of capital (Daske, 2006) or the accuracy 
of analysts’ forecasts (Glaum et al., 2013). Others have focused on macroeconomic effects, 
particularly on changes in foreign investment behavior (e.g. Beneish et al., 2015). Brüggemann 
et al. (2013) who review the literature on the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS adop-
tion observe that ‘there is plenty and almost unanimous evidence of positive capital market and 
macroeconomic effects’ (p. 29). 




Besides those indirect measures of financial reporting quality, research has also 
examined the impact of international accounting standards on financial reporting 
quality directly. Consistent with the notion that there is no consensus on the char-
acteristics of high quality financial reporting (see e.g. Daske and Gebhardt 2006; 
Glaum et al., 2013) studies have focused on different dimensions of comparability 
and transparency. First, the compliance of firms’ financial statements with IFRS 
has been questioned. Street and Gray (2002) provide evidence for substantial 
compliance problems in IFRS financial reports for the year 1998. Verriest et al. 
(2013) and Glaum et al. (2013b) also find a considerable degree of non-
compliance with regard to IFRS disclosures in the first year of IFRS application. 
Second, studies have investigated the effects of IFRS adoption on the comparabil-
ity of financial statements documenting substantial differences across countries 
with regard to accounting policy choices (e.g. Kvaal and Nobes, 2010 and 2012; 
Haller and Wehrfritz, 2013). 
Third, the quality of financial statements, especially regarding transparency, has 
been evaluated by measures of the properties of earnings but, to date, results have 
been inconclusive. For example, some researchers have addressed the value rele-
vance of IFRS financial statements in capital markets (e.g. Bartov et al., 2005; 
Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Jermakowicz et al., 2007; Aharony et al., 2010; 
Ahmed et al., 2013).14 A common approach to evaluate the quality of earnings is 
to measure the degree of earnings management whereby earnings management 
refers to corporate decision makers affecting the outcomes of financial reporting 
                                                 
14  With regard to Germany, results are mixed. Bartov et al. (2005) provide evidence for earnings 
computed according to US GAAP or IFRS being of higher value relevance than German 
GAAP earnings. For a DAX-30 sample of firms, Jermakowicz et al. (2007) also find support 
for higher value relevance as a result of the voluntary adoption of IFRS. However, Hung and 
Subramanyam (2007) find no evidence for an increase in value relevance from local GAAP 
numbers to those that are presented by German first-time adopters of international accounting 
standards. For a comprehensive overview of value relevance studies examining the effects of 
IFRS adoption see Ahmed et al. (2013) highlighting the mixed evidence delivered. 




by either structuring real transactions or using discretion over recognition or dis-
closure when preparing financial statements (see e.g. Healy and Wahlen, 1999; 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Ronen and Yaari, 2008). They may do so in order to 
achieve certain contractual outcomes that are dependent on accounting figures or 
to mislead users of financial reporting about the real performance of the company 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Besides such opportunistic reasons, discretionary ac-
counting choices can also be used as a means of signaling private information to 
outside investors or other external parties (Watts and Zimmermann, 1986; Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999). However, in most cases, higher quality earnings are assumed 
to exhibit less earnings management.15 
Prior research reveals inconsistent results. For example, the results of Barth et al. 
(2008) generally indicate less earnings management in terms of earnings smooth-
ing and earnings management towards positive earnings (“loss avoidance”) for 
firms that adopted international accounting standards compared to (matched) non-
adopters applying domestic GAAP in 21 countries. Contrarily, Jeanjean and 
Stolowy (2008) who examine the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
Australia, France, and the UK conclude that the pervasiveness of earnings man-
agement behavior has not been reduced by the introduction of the new standards. 
The most widespread approach to measuring the degree of earnings management 
is to determine discretionary accruals. Ahmed et al. (2013) provide a comprehen-
sive overview of research on the association between IFRS adoption and discre-
tionary accruals highlighting the inconsistency of prior findings. On the basis of a 
meta-analysis, they further conclude that the regulatory change towards IFRS did 
not lead to a decrease in discretionary accruals. 
                                                 
15  See footnote 4 again. 




For the German accounting environment, van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) 
provide evidence for a significant increase in earnings management measured by 
discretionary accruals following the voluntary adoption of international account-
ing standards for a sample period from 1999 to 2001. However, the authors find 
no significant differences between voluntary adopters of international standards 
and firms reporting under German GAAP after including hidden reserves into 
their analyses. Nevertheless, van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) conclude that 
the application of international accounting standards cannot be associated with a 
decrease in earnings management. These results are complemented by Callao and 
Jarne (2010) who examine the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption in 11 Europe-
an countries. Covering a period of two years before and two years after the regu-
latory change in 2005, the authors find an increase in earnings management as 
discretionary accruals increased immediately after the IFRS adoption in Europe. 
Meanwhile, the results for Germany reveal significant changes only with regard to 
long-term discretionary accruals, while there are no significant differences regard-
ing total and current accruals. 
As one potential explanation for such inconsistent results regarding the financial 
reporting effects of the adoption of IFRS, Brüggemann et al. (2013) suggest that 
the (earnings quality) metrics applied are not capturing what is relevant to users of 
financial reporting. In a similar vein, Daske and Gebhardt (2006) point out that 
studies examining the effects of IFRS adoption on specific properties of account-
ing measures, such as earnings, ‘by their design do not analyze the potential dif-
ferences and changes in the information provided in the actual annual reports of 
firms adopting IFRS’ (p. 462). Obviously, the primary contents of financial state-
ments, income statement and balance sheet, are not the only means by which 




firms communicate to external stakeholders. Accordingly, some researchers have 
examined the effects of the introduction of international accounting standards on 
disclosure quality, a different dimension of transparency. 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) examine the quality of disclosures for German 
DAX 100 firms by comparing ratings of an annual report ‘beauty contest’ pub-
lished in the business journal Capital. For the fiscal years ending between July 
1997 and June 1998, they find significantly higher mean and median ratings for 
firms that have adopted international reporting strategies16 compared to firms that 
report solely according to German GAAP. Daske and Gebhardt (2006) analyze 
the effects of the adoption of internationally recognized financial reporting stand-
ards, IFRS and US GAAP, on the quality of annual reports for firms from Austria, 
Switzerland, and Germany. Using disclosure quality scores based on ratings of 
yearly “Best Annual Report” ‘beauty contests’ published in business magazines 
between 1996 and 2004,17 they find a significant increase of disclosure quality in 
the course of the adoption of international standards, particularly IFRS. Im-
portantly, their results also hold in multivariate analyses controlling for individual 
reporting incentives.18 
For a sample of German listed firms from 1997 to 2005, Glaum et al. (2013) ex-
amine changes in the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts due to the introduc-
tion of international accounting standards and whether such changes can be at-
tributed to increased disclosure. Measuring disclosure quality with scores ob-
tained from a yearly “Best Annual Report” ‘beauty contest’ organized by the 
                                                 
16  See footnote 7 for a description of these strategies. 
17  The “Best Annual Report” ‘beauty contests’ are published by the business magazines Capital 
and Focus Money in Germany (1996-2003), Bilanz in Switzerland (2001-2004), and Trend in 
Austria (1997-2004). 
18  For a discussion of Daske and Gebhardt (2006) see Gallery (2006). 




German business journal manager magazin,19 they find that the quality of disclo-
sures in the notes to the financial statements as well as in management reports is 
significantly higher for firms reporting under IFRS or US GAAP compared to 
firms reporting under German GAAP. Overall, Glaum et al. (2013) conclude that 
the introduction of international standards improved disclosure quality and the 
accuracy of analysts’ forecasts, whereby the latter effect can, to some extent, be 
attributed to the former. 
The overview of prior research shows that results concerning the effect of the 
adoption of IFRS on the quality of financial reporting are not unambiguous. Re-
garding transparency, on the one hand, studies provide clear evidence for an in-
crease in disclosure quality under IFRS. This is in line with the notion that inter-
national accounting standards require more disclosures than German GAAP (Leuz 
and Verrecchia, 2000; Ashbaugh, 2001). On the other hand, research on the ef-
fects of IFRS adoption on earnings management is not unambiguous which re-
flects ambiguous theoretical reasoning.20 While some advocate that international 
standards limit accounting choices compared to German GAAP (d’Arcy, 2000) 
and, thus, might reduce the scope for earnings management (Barth et al., 2008), it 
has been acknowledged that there is a range of explicit and implicit options and 
vague criteria under IFRS, too (Nobes, 2006 and 2013), that offer opportunities to 
manage earnings (Callao and Jarne, 2010). Furthermore, the application of any set 
                                                 
19  These scores also form the basis for our analyses. For a description of the “Best Annual Re-
port” ‘beauty contest’ published by manager magazin see section 4.2. Please note that Glaum 
et al. (2013) have access to more detailed scores which is beyond what has been published in 
the business journal. This enables them to differentiate between the disclosure quality of notes 
and that of management reports. 
20  See Doukakis (2014) who describes various arguments regarding the effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on earnings management and does neither hypothesize nor find effects of the regula-
tory change on accrual-based and real earnings management for observations from 22 Europe-
an countries between 2000 and 2010. 




of accounting standards requires substantial judgment, estimates, and the use of 
private information (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). 
Following the assumption that IFRS are of higher quality than local GAAP within 
the EU on which the introduction of IFRS is based, the inconclusive research 
findings affirm the notion that high quality standards are not necessarily sufficient 
for providing high quality financial information (Ball et al., 2003). For example, 
Christensen et al. (2013) show that positive capital market effects of IFRS adop-
tion only materialized in countries that experienced concurrent changes in their 
accounting enforcement mechanisms. In fact, the accounting numbers observed 
are the result of the financial reporting system as a whole, including standards, 
their interpretation as well as enforcement and litigation (Barth et al., 2008). Thus, 
besides the use of a variety of metrics, different time periods, data sources, and 
diverse research designs (Barth et al., 2008), institutional factors such as varying 
degrees of investor protection or enforcement of accounting standards and the 
essential role of incentives for accounting decisions (see e.g. Ball et al., 2003) 
may have contributed to the inconclusiveness of prior research. 
Against this background, it is important to note that prior research inevitably had 
to study rather short-time horizons after the adoption of IFRS. This may have con-
tributed to understating positive effects on the transparency of financial reporting 
for several reasons. First, the initial years of IFRS application are likely to be in-
fluenced more heavily by the first-time adoption rules of the relevant standard 
IFRS 1 which includes several exceptions from retrospective application of IFRS. 
This can be seen as a ‘structural break in the time series of firms’ accounting 
numbers that will take several years to wash out’ (Brüggemann et al., 2013, 
p. 30). Second, the younger a standard-setting regime is, the more principle-based 




it likely is, since common guidelines and interpretations are developed over time 
(Nelson, 2003; Callao and Jarne, 2010). Assuming shared guidelines and interpre-
tations to enhance consistent application and to reduce the scope for discretionary 
accounting decisions,21 comparing GAAP that have been applied for decades to a 
recently adopted reporting regime leaves the latter with a ‘disadvantage’. 
Third, substantial non-compliance with the effective IFRS (Street and Gray, 2002; 
Verriest et al., 2013; Glaum et al., 2013b), especially in the early phase of IFRS 
accounting, could also adversely affect the quality of summary measures of the 
accounting process, such as earnings. We expect IFRS compliance to improve 
over time assuming that the more experienced accountants, auditors and users are, 
the better the quality of IFRS financial statements is. Fourth, Germany’s enforce-
ment institution, the German FREP, started to examine financial statements in 
2005. In addition to this important change, we also expect enforcement to undergo 
a learning curve as well as increasing awareness among preparers and auditors 
about the consequences of non-compliance.22 Since accounting enforcement is 
key to financial reporting quality (e.g. Hope, 2003; Christensen et al., 2013), we 
expect a decrease in earnings management as a result of these effects. 
Being interested in the effects of IFRS adoption on transparency in Germany, we 
assess the effects on both, the quality of corporate disclosures as well as on the 
degree of earnings management. While the literature does not provide unanimous 
support for the superiority of IFRS, we consider that the IASB intends IFRS to be 
‘high quality, understandable, enforceable and globally accepted financial re-
                                                 
21  The effect of common guidelines and interpretations on earnings management is not unambig-
uous. While the scope for accounting choices is probably reduced as standards become more 
rules-based, incentives for real activities management might increase concurrently. 
22  While negative capital market effects resulting from SEC error announcements are well docu-
mented (e.g. Dechow et al., 1996), Hitz et al. (2012) find first evidence for negative effects in 
terms of abnormal returns, abnormal trading volumes and abnormal bid-ask spreads of FREP 
error announcements in Germany as well. 




porting standards … [which] should require high quality, transparent and com-
parable information in financial statements and other financial reporting’ (Pref-
ace to IFRSs, par. 6(a)). Thus, the objectives of the IASB correspond to the objec-
tives regarding transparency and comparability formulated by the “IAS Regula-
tion”. Accordingly, we expect an increase of transparency in the course of the 
adoption of IFRS, i.e. an increase of disclosure quality and a decrease of the de-
gree of earnings management. Additionally, we follow our argumentation above 
and expect transparency under IFRS to increase over time as preparers, users, 
auditors and enforcers become more experienced and proficient in the application 
of IFRS, compliance improves, the effects of the first-time adoption rules dimin-
ish, and common guidelines and interpretations of the standards emerge. Hence, 
we formulate our first hypotheses as follows: 
H1: Transparency of financial reporting is higher under IFRS than under 
German GAAP. 
H2: Transparency of financial reporting under IFRS increases over time. 
3.2 Association between Disclosures and Earnings Management 
Next to the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings management and disclosure 
quality, we are interested in the relation between these two dimensions of trans-
parency. One motivation of the IASB to require financial statements to comprise 
disclosures is to ensure that financial reporting faithfully represents what it pur-
ports to represent, e.g. by enhancing the reliability of management’s estimates and 
assumptions (see e.g. IAS 1.BC81; IAS 36.BC199-.BC209). In support of this 




motivation, anecdotal evidence suggests that insufficient disclosures create oppor-
tunities to manage earnings through the use of biased estimates and assumptions.23 
Theoretically, both corporate disclosures as well as earnings management are as-
sociated with information asymmetry. Intuitively, the disclosure of private infor-
mation reduces information asymmetries between insiders, i.e. managers of the 
firm, and outsiders of the firm, particularly investors (Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). Empirical research provides support for a rela-
tion between disclosure and information asymmetry between investors and man-
agers as well as for the economic benefits resulting from the reduction of infor-
mation asymmetry (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993 and 1996; Botosan, 1997). 
Theoretical arguments also suggest a relation between information asymmetry and 
earnings management. In particular, analytical models assume information asym-
metry between managers and investors to be a precondition for earnings manage-
ment (Trueman and Titman, 1988; Dye, 1988). Richardson (2000) provides em-
pirical support for this notion and finds a positive association between the level of 
information asymmetry and earnings management. The author concludes that the 
higher the level of information asymmetry, the higher the degree of earnings man-
agement, suggesting that ‘information known about the firm and its earnings may 
limit the extent of earnings management performed by firm managers’ (p. 344). 
                                                 
23  See, for example, the following extracts from responses in relation to the impairment-only 
approach for goodwill accounting to the IASB’s request for information during the Post-
implementation Review on IFRS 3 “Business Combinations” in 2014. The European Securities 
and Markets Authority states (ESMA, 2014, p. 6): ‘ESMA identified shortcomings related to 
the description of the management approach to determining the value(s) assigned to each as-
sumption, whether those values(s) reflect past experience or, if appropriate, are consistent with 
external sources of information as required by paragraph 134(d)(ii) of IAS 36. The high level 
of subjectivity in determining many assumptions and estimates combined with disclosures re-
quirements that prove difficult to be enforced creates an incentive for earnings management.’ 
Similarly, the SIX Exchange Regulation recommends to require additional disclosures (e.g. 
‘Disclosure of the terminal value in percent of the total recoverable amount’) in its comment 
letter to the same IASB request and states (SIX Exchange Regulation, 2014, p. 4): ‘We believe 
that the disclosure of this information would not only be useful for investors, but might also 
mitigate the use of unrealistically optimistic assumptions.’ 




Drawing upon these relations, research also examined the link between disclosure 
quality and earnings management or, more generally, earnings quality. Lobo and 
Zhou (2001) infer from the above that ‘firms that disclose more information have 
less flexibility to manage earnings’ (p. 4) and, accordingly, disclosure quality is 
negatively related to the degree of earnings management. However, Francis et al. 
(2008) as well as Mouselli et al. (2012) point out that prior literature provides 
conflicting theoretical arguments regarding the nature of the relationship between 
disclosure quality and earnings quality. On the one hand, one could argue that 
firms with low earnings quality (high information asymmetry) have incentives to 
provide higher quality disclosures in order to reduce information asymmetry. On 
the other hand, one could view earnings quality and disclosure quality as comple-
ments and expect management’s incentives to disclose additional information to 
decrease with lower earnings quality, because external parties have stronger con-
cerns regarding the credibility of such disclosures, and vice versa.24 
Similar to this controversy about the nature of the relationship, theory predicting a 
negative (positive) relation between disclosures and earnings management (earn-
ings quality) is not conclusive about the direction of causality.25 As argued by 
Francis et al. (2008) and Blanco et al. (2014), causality might flow from earnings 
quality to disclosure quality, because firms that provide higher quality information 
via their earnings signal also have stronger incentives to provide additional infor-
mation that would further reduce information asymmetry and yield related bene-
fits (e.g. lower cost of capital). Additionally, improvements in the information 
environment (i.e. higher earnings quality) strengthen the incentives to provide 
                                                 
24  See Francis et al. (2008) and Mouselli et al. (2012) for this discussion. Since Mouselli et al. 
(2012) use classical earnings management proxies and refer explicitly to earnings management 
when interpreting their results, presumably the opposing theoretical views can be transferred to 
the relationship between disclosure quality and earnings management, in particular. 
25  See Blanco et al. (2014) for the following discussion. 




high quality disclosures, because non-disclosure would more likely be interpreted 
as bad news. 
Contrarily, experimental research indicates that users are more likely to see 
through earnings management practices when financial information is presented in 
a more transparent manner (e.g. Hirst and Hopkins, 1998) and that incentives to 
conduct earnings management are reduced as the likelihood of a detection in-
creases (Hunton et al., 2006). This is in line with the standard setter’s rationale 
that enhanced disclosure requirements limit management’s discretion over as-
sumptions and estimates thereby reducing the scope for earnings management. 
Shalev (2009) provides evidence for a negative association between the quality of 
business combinations disclosures and the degree of earnings management and 
adds a related perspective on causation arguing that ‘lower disclosure level in-
creases managers’ flexibility to manage earnings in the future’ (p. 245). 
Empirical evidence regarding the interaction between disclosures and earnings 
management is scarce, in particular for Continental European countries and the 
IFRS reporting regime. Francis et al. (2008) examine the relation between earn-
ings quality and voluntary disclosure for a sample of 677 US firms in 2001. They 
find a significant relation that is complementary in nature, i.e. the higher the quali-
ty of earnings the more voluntary disclosures are provided by the firm. For a US 
sample between 2001 and 2006, Blanco et al. (2014) examine the relation between 
the quantity of segment disclosures and earnings quality. Documenting a signifi-
cant positive association between current levels of the two constructs, they further 
examine the association between current (past) segment disclosure and past (cur-
rent) levels of earnings quality. Since only current segment disclosure is related to 
past earnings quality levels, Blanco et al. (2014) argue that earnings quality is 




more likely to be a determinant of segment disclosure than vice versa. However, 
Jo and Kim (2007) provide evidence for a negative association between the fre-
quency of disclosure and earnings management for SEO firms in the US and argue 
for the opposite direction of causality, i.e. increased disclosure lowers information 
asymmetry and facilitates the detection of earnings management which, accord-
ingly, reduces incentives for earnings management. 
Mouselli et al. (2012) examine the relationship between disclosure quality, de-
fined as the number of future-oriented earnings statements in the narrative sec-
tions of annual reports, and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. For a UK 
sample and a period from 1997 to 2004, the authors find a negative association 
and conclude ‘that firms with higher disclosure quality engage less in discretion-
ary accruals’ (p. 37). A second study with a focus on UK firms has been conduct-
ed by Iatridis (2011) for the years from 2005 to 2009. Using a checklist to meas-
ure the quality of annual reports, the author provides initial evidence for a nega-
tive association between disclosure quality and the degree of earnings manage-
ment under IFRS. These results are consistent with earlier findings of Lobo and 
Zhou (2001) who show that disclosure quality and earnings management are nega-
tively related for a sample of firms with disclosure ratings of the Association for 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR) during the period from 1990 to 
1995. Taken together, these findings suggest that firms that provide high (low) 
quality disclosures exhibit less (more) earnings management, i.e. the greater the 
amount and the higher the quality of disclosures, the smaller the room for (oppor-
tunistic) earnings management. In contrast, Shaw (2003) finds that ‘higher disclo-
sure quality is not always synonymous with less earnings management’ (p. 1050) 
when examining the association between financial analysts’ ratings of disclosure 




quality and discretionary accruals for an earlier period from 1985 to 1989. In par-
ticular, the author concludes that firms that provide higher quality disclosures en-
gage more aggressively in earnings smoothing than firms that provide lower 
quality disclosures. 
Building on extant literature, we expect disclosure quality and earnings manage-
ment to be related. In particular, since disclosures potentially facilitate the detec-
tion of earnings management by reducing information asymmetry, which has been 
described as a precondition to conduct earnings management, we expect a nega-
tive relation between these dimensions of transparency. Anecdotal evidence as 
well as the standard setter’s rationale for requiring disclosures further support the 
assumption that the greater the amount and the better the quality of firms’ disclo-
sures are, the tighter the constraint which they put on (opportunistic) earnings 
management behavior. This line of argumentation regarding the relationship is 
intuitive, especially from an intertemporal perspective as argued by Shalev 
(2009). Being aware of alternative views as presented above, we therefore formu-
late our hypothesis on the association of disclosure quality and earnings manage-
ment (H3) as follows: 
H3: Higher quality disclosures have a constraining effect on earnings 
management. 
4 Research Design 
4.1 Measurement of Earnings Management 
Following prior literature, we principally rely on the Jones (1991) model to obtain 
a proxy for the degree of earnings management. However, we use the perfor-
mance adjusted modified Jones model as in Kothari et al. (2005) and estimate the 




accrual process as a function of sales growth (adjusted for growth in credit sales), 
property, plant and equipment (PPE) and return on assets (ROA). Beginning of 




In this model, TAit is total accruals and is calculated as follows:
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We separately estimate this model for each industry in our sample.27 The residuals 
of this model serve as firm-year specific estimators for the degree of earnings 
management. As earnings management might be income-increasing or income-
decreasing, we analyze the absolute value of discretionary accruals. As robustness 
checks, we use the standard Jones (1991) model and the modified Jones model of 
Dechow et al. (1995) as well as the PM/ATO diagnostic of Jansen et al. (2012), an 
alternative earnings management measure that does not depend on estimates of 
accruals. 
4.2 Measurement of Disclosure Quality 
A variety of proxies have been used in prior research to assess the quality of dis-
closures including self-constructed disclosure indices, external disclosure ratings 
                                                 
26  Rephrased in Worldscope items total accruals is calculated as [∆ 02201-∆ 02003]-
[∆ 03051-∆ 18232- 04828]-	 01151. 
27  The industry classification is based on SIC codes (Ernstberger et al., 2013, and Frankel et al., 
2002). 




or disclosure scores from annual report ‘beauty contests’.28 Examples of research-
er-constructed indices include Botosan (1997) and Francis et al. (2008). This ap-
proach requires the researcher’s subjective assessment regarding the items to be 
included as well as their weighting. In addition to that, the coding is labor-
intensive. For these reasons, self-constructed indices are typically hard to replicate 
and often result in small sample sizes. On the other hand, these indices can be 
applied to any firm which disposes of one limitation of proxies derived from ex-
ternal ratings which only include firms covered by the rating agency. Examples of 
studies using such external ratings include Healy et al. (1999) and Botosan and 
Plumlee (2002). One concern with these external ratings is that they reflect ana-
lysts’ perceptions of disclosure quality rather than the firms’ actual disclosure 
quality (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). However, analysts are among the primary 
users of financial reporting and should be familiar with the individual firm and its 
industry. Moreover, the most widely used external rating, the disclosure ratings 
published in the CFA institute (former: Association for Investment Management 
and Research (AIMR)) reports, is not available for all time periods. Further, the 
committee evaluating disclosure quality differs by industry and time.29 
In this study, we follow a third approach by using scores extracted from an annual 
report ‘beauty contest’, namely the “Best Annual Report” (“Bester Geschäfts-
bericht”) ranking of the German business journal manager magazin. Similar rank-
ings have also been used in prior research (e.g. Daske and Gebhardt, 2006; Hail, 
2002; Glaum et al., 2013). Our measure provides a compromise solution to the 
trade-off between the advantages and disadvantages of researcher-constructed and 
externally provided scores. By using this measure we avoid some concerns with 
                                                 
28  See Artiach and Clarkson (2011) for a comprehensive discussion of the first two approaches. 
29  See Artiach and Clarkson (2011), pp. 24-32, for a more detailed discussion. 




regard to the self-constructed scores because we can neither influence the assess-
ment itself nor the weighting. As a matter of course, the score is still subject to 
judgment by the scholars who performed the ranking. As the “Best Annual Re-
port” ranking has been computed for a long time period and for a large number of 
firms, we have more than 1,500 firm-year observations in our sample which miti-
gates another concern with self-constructed disclosure indices. Furthermore, the 
time period from 1995 to 2012 is suitable for our research as it covers both Ger-
man GAAP requirement periods as well as a number of international GAAP re-
quirement periods. 
The “Best Annual Report” ranking has recently been used in a study of Glaum et 
al. (2013).30 As they provide an extensive description of the ranking, we focus on 
the main characteristics. The ‘beauty contest’ is conducted annually and includes 
mainly firms from the exchange indices DAX, MDAX, SDAX, TecDAX and 
Nemax-5031 of the German stock exchange as well as European firms included in 
the STOXX index. In each year, annual reports including financial statements are 
evaluated with regard to different categories, such as ‘language’ and ‘design’ of 
the report and, most importantly, regarding the ‘content’ of disclosures. To cap-
ture the development of accounting and regulation, rankings need to change over 
time (Daske and Gebhardt, 2006). In some years, the aforementioned categories 
were complemented by the categories ‘financial communication’ and ‘reporting 
efficiency’ and an additional expert jury evaluation. Furthermore, the weighting of 
the individual categories changed over time. Therefore, we focus solely on the 
‘content’ score as our measure for disclosure quality. 
                                                 
30  See Glaum et al. (2013), pp. 91-92. 
31  The Nemax-50 index included firms from sunrise industries such as IT, biotechnology and 
telecommunications. This index has been closed in 2003 as a result of the dot-com bubble. 




The ‘content’ category has been part of the ranking throughout the whole sample 
period from 1995 to 2012. For this score, each annual report is assessed by ana-
lysts of the University of Münster using a checklist of more than 300 items. The 
checklist covers the notes to financial statements, the management report as well 
as other disclosures that are provided additionally within the annual reports.32 The 
items reviewed are weighted based on surveys of financial experts (Armeloh, 
1998), resulting in a total disclosure score between 0 and 100. 
With regard to the notes to financial statements which contain information about 
accounting policies, individual balance sheet items as well as income and expense 
positions and additional supplementing information regarding the firm’s financial 
situation and performance, the evaluation considers whether and how detailed the 
information has been disclosed. Similarly, the management report which provides 
more future-oriented information, such as information about the firm’s risks and 
opportunities, is evaluated by assessing whether and in which form (e.g. general 
verbal or quantitative information) the information is reported (Glaum et al., 
2013). Thus, the checklist covers both the quantity and the quality of disclosures 
which is why the ‘content’ score of the “Best Annual Report” contest is a good 
approximation for disclosure quality as a measure of transparency. 
4.3 Research Approach 
Univariate analyses 
To test our hypotheses, we start by conducting several t-tests and Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon-tests for the differences in means and medians. First, we test the differ-
                                                 
32  The overall ‘content’ score of the annual report contest which forms our proxy for disclosure 
quality is derived from the weighted scores for the notes to financial statements (44.88%), 
management report (43.12%) and other disclosures (12.00%). For detailed information about 
the “Best Annual Report” contest and the ‘content’ score see Baetge et al. (2012), pp. 63-68 
and Oberdörster (2009), pp. 88-100. 




ences in means and medians of discretionary accruals and disclosure quality 
scores across the two reporting regimes. In line with our first hypothesis, we ex-
pect an increase of transparency in the course of the adoption of IFRS, i.e. an in-
crease of disclosure quality and a decrease of the degree of earnings management. 
In a second step, we analyze the differences across the early and mature phase of 
the individual firms’ IFRS accounting. For these analyses, we define ‘early’ as the 
first four years of the individual firms’ IFRS accounting, irrespective of whether 
the adoption was voluntary or not. We choose this cut-off point to obtain a bal-
anced sample size and period length across the two groups.33 The results are ro-
bust to other reasonable specifications of the phases, e.g. definition of the first 
three or the first five years of the individual firms’ IFRS application as ‘early’. 
Multivariate analyses – earnings management 
The univariate approach does not account for the effects of different firm charac-
teristics and incentives or for changes over time on our metrics of transparency. 
Therefore, we also conduct different sets of regression analyses. The first set is 
intended to test the effect of IFRS adoption on discretionary accruals, whilst the 
second set is intended to test the effect of IFRS adoption on disclosure quality. By 
combining both models, we aim to test the constraining effect of disclosures on 
earnings management. We construct the following model (I.) for earnings man-
agement analyses. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 





                                                 
33  For firms adopting IFRS mandatorily in 2005, the cut-off point chosen results in four “early 
IFRS years” and four “mature IFRS years”. 




The choice of control variables is based on prior literature and follows Houqe et 
al. (2012) and van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005). IFRS is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for firm-year observations with IFRS reporting.34 We include Total 
Assets to control for size-related incentives for earnings management because pri-
or research suggests that larger firms make more income-decreasing accounting 
choices in response to greater political and regulatory scrutiny (Watts and Zim-
merman, 1986). However, more recent studies predict that size is positively asso-
ciated with earnings quality because of relatively higher costs of internal control 
procedures for small firms.35 Given the fact that we analyze the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (|DA|) and interpret earnings management opportunistically, 
the latter would result in a negative association between |DA| and Total Assets. 
Next, we include Leverage to control for the leverage-related incentives for earn-
ings management. The direction of the effect of leverage on earnings manage-
ment, however, is not unambiguous. On the one hand, it is argued that higher lev-
eraged firms are closer to debt covenant violations and are therefore more willing 
to engage in (income-increasing) earnings management (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Houqe et al., 2012). On the other hand, it is 
argued that higher leveraged firms have incentives to engage in income-
decreasing earnings management activities for the sake of contractual renegotia-
tions (Becker et al., 1998; van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005). As we analyze 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals, this would result in a positive associa-
tion between |DA| and Leverage. Prior literature suggests a positive relation be-
tween the degree of earnings management and growth because growth companies 
have higher incentives to manage earnings opportunistically in order to attract 
                                                 
34  The distinction between IFRS and local GAAP preparers is based on the Datastream item ‘Ac-
counting Standards Followed’ (WC07536) using the coding of Daske et al. (2013). 
35  See Dechow et al. (2010) for a discussion of the determinants of earnings management. 




investors (Houqe et al., 2012). To capture this effect we include Sales Growth and 
the change in property, plant and equipment (Change PPE) in our model. Fur-
thermore, we include Cfo to control for the association between operating cash 
flow and accruals. Following van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), we expect a 
positive relation between Cfo and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
Additionally, we include the dummy variables CfoD and LossD which are intend-
ed to control for the higher incentives for firms making losses and experiencing 
negative operating cash flows to engage in earnings management. Next, we in-
clude the dummy variable Big4 to control for the constraining effect of larger au-
ditors on the degree of earnings management (Francis et al., 1999; Becker et al., 
1998). In Germany, there are firms which had to mandatorily adopt either IFRS or 
US GAAP prior to 2005 because Deutsche Börse AG required the financial state-
ments of firms listed on the New Market – a market segment for innovative and 
fast-growing firms – to be prepared in accordance with international standards. 
Therefore, we include the dummy New Market in our analyses. Finally, we in-
clude dummy variables for years and industries.36 We run the regressions with 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Pe-
tersen, 2009) and de-meaned variables. We hypothesize that the introduction of 
IFRS leads to a decrease in the degree of earnings management. Accordingly, we 
expect the coefficient β1 in the regression above to be negative and significant. 
To separately analyze the effect of the early and the mature phase of the individu-
al firms’ IFRS accounting on discretionary accruals, we construct model (II.) be-
low. Here, the dummy IFRS is replaced by the two dummy variables Early IFRS 
and Mature IFRS, which indicate whether the firm-year observation belongs to the 
                                                 
36  The industry classification is based on SIC codes (Ernstberger et al., 2013, and Frankel et al., 
2002). 




early or mature phase of IFRS reporting. In accordance with our hypotheses H1 
and H2, we expect that the coefficient for Mature IFRS is not only negatively sig-
nificant, but also indicates a stronger decrease of the level of earnings manage-
ment than the coefficient for Early IFRS. 





Multivariate analyses – disclosure quality 
We construct the following model (III.) to examine the effect of IFRS adoption on 
disclosure quality. In this equation, DQ is the score of the category ‘content’ of 
the “Best Annual Report” ‘beauty contest’ of manager magazin. For details about 
the calculation of all other variables please refer to Appendix 1. The selection of 
control variables is again based on prior literature and follows Glaum et al. 
(2013).37 In general, disclosure quality is associated with firm size, financing 
needs, and performance (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
Therefore, we include Total Assets to proxy for size, Leverage to capture the in-
centives of more highly leveraged firms, and ROA to control for firm perfor-
mance. 
Furthermore, the ratio of a firm’s foreign sales to its total sales (Foreign Sales) is 
included to proxy for the higher incentives for disclosure for more internationally 
active firms, whereas the percentage of closely held shares (Close) is included to 
proxy for ownership concentration. Beta is included to proxy for company risk. In 
addition, we include the dummy variables Big4 and US-Listing to control for the 
                                                 
37  In addition to the control variables used in our analysis, there are other candidate variables, e.g. 
number of analysts following or capital intensity (Daske and Gebhardt, 2006). We limit the 
control variables to those presented in this section to minimize the risk of multicollinearity. 




effects of two firm-specific choices, i.e. the choice of a large auditor and the 
choice to cross-list overseas, on disclosure quality. We expect that both decisions 
have a positive influence on disclosure quality. Finally, we also include the dum-
my New Market in these analyses. As in models (I.) and (II.), we include fixed 
effects for years and industries, employ heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust stand-
ard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen, 2009) and use de-meaned varia-
bles. In accordance with hypothesis H1, we expect the coefficient β1 for IFRS in 
the following model (III.) to be significantly positive. 
	
	 4
	 ∑ ∑   
(III.) 
As in our earnings management analyses, we analyze the effect of the early and 
mature phase of the individual firms’ IFRS accounting on disclosure quality by 





Multivariate analyses – effect of disclosures on earnings management 
To examine the relation between disclosure quality and earnings management, we 
include the variable DQ into our first model and estimate the following model 




4 	 ∑ ∑   
(V.) 




Following the reasoning of Shalev (2009) that disclosures limit managers’ flexi-
bility in subsequent periods, we also conduct this analysis using prior year disclo-
sure scores (DQt-1) to obtain deeper insights into the interplay between our dimen-
sions of transparency. Furthermore, we estimate equation (V.) replacing IFRS by 
the two dummy variables Early IFRS and Mature IFRS as well as the interaction 
terms Early IFRS*DQ and Mature IFRS*DQ to examine whether the relationship 
differs across reporting regimes and time. 
4.4 Data Description 
Our focus on Germany38 allows us to use a specific proxy for disclosure quality, 
the disclosure scores of the annual report ‘beauty contest’ of the German business 
journal manager magazin. Hence, our sample composition is based on the firms 
included in this annual report competition and covers a time period from 1995 to 
2012. The disclosure scores are merged with financial data taken from Thompson 
Reuters Datastream.39 In order to strengthen our database for the analyses of the 
degree of earnings management, we include information for the whole sample 
period for all companies that have been covered at least once by the contest, if 
available. Due to the fact that not all firms are continuously included in the rank-
ing published by manager magazin, the sample for the analyses of disclosure 
quality is smaller. We exclude firms from countries other than Germany, firms 
reporting in accordance with US GAAP40, banking institutions and insurance 
firms as well as observations with missing data for the prior year. In total, we end 
                                                 
38  See footnote 5 for further reasons for limiting our sample to Germany. 
39  All variables have been windsorized at the 0.5 percentile and the 99.5 percentile. 
40  Other researchers often treat IFRS and US GAAP equally and analyze the effect of the adop-
tion of ‘international standards’ (e.g. Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000, or Daske and Gebhardt, 
2006). We solely focus on the adoption of IFRS in our main analyses and use US GAAP ob-
servations for additional robustness checks. 




up with 2,590 firm-year observations for the earnings management analyses and 
1,502 firm-year observations for the analyses of disclosure quality. 
5 Results 
5.1 Univariate Analyses 
Panel A of table 1 shows the development of mean, median and standard devia-
tion of the disclosure score from 1995 to 2012 differentiated by the reporting re-
gime. Simple eyeball statistics show no clear trend for mean and median with lo-
cal peaks and local valleys. With regard to the two reporting regimes, IFRS state-
ments exhibit higher values in most years.41 Panel B of table 1 shows overall 
mean (median) values and the results of t-tests (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon-tests) 
for German GAAP compared to IFRS and for the early vs. mature phase of the 
individual firms’ IFRS accounting for the disclosure score as well as for the de-
gree of earnings management (|DA|). This analysis shows significantly higher 
means and medians under IFRS for disclosure quality and, remarkably, also high-
er values for the degree of earnings management. This result holds when German 
GAAP is compared to the early phase of the individual firms’ IFRS accounting. 
When comparing the early phase of the individual firms’ IFRS accounting to the 
mature phase, there is no statistically significant increase in the disclosure quality 
score, whereas the t-test shows a decrease significant at the 1%-level for the de-
gree of earnings management. 
In summary, these simple analyses provide first evidence that IFRS adoption leads 
to better disclosure quality in terms of the content of disclosures. Contrarily, our 
analyses show that the extent of discretionary earnings management increases as a 
                                                 
41  There are two companies in our sample which reported in accordance with German GAAP in 
the year 2005. 




result of the change in the reporting regime, but decreases afterwards. However, a 
comparison of mean and median values does not account for alternative determi-
nants of disclosure quality and the degree of earnings management, such as report-
ing incentives, firm characteristics and, most importantly, time effects. Therefore, 
the next subsection discusses our multivariate results. 
  

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2 Multivariate Analyses 
Panel A of table 2 exhibits summary statistics of the variables used in our multi-
variate analyses and panel B shows frequencies of the dummy variables used. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. For the majority (69%) of our firm-year ob-
servations, financial statements are prepared in accordance with IFRS, whereas 
31% are prepared under German GAAP. We differentiate between the early and 
the mature phase of the individual firms’ IFRS accounting by assuming that the 
mature phase of IFRS reporting begins in the fifth year after the adoption. By do-
ing so, we classify 45% of IFRS observations as early, and 55% as mature. Fur-
thermore, 64% of the financial reports are audited by a Big 4 auditor, while 15% 
of the firm-year observations stem from firms that are cross-listed in the US.42 
With regard to the degree of earnings management, average (median) absolute 
discretionary accruals are at 0.078 (0.044). This indicates that discretionary accru-
als make up 7.8% (4.4%) of beginning of period total assets. 
                                                 
42  Following Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), we include observations which are either listed in the 
US or are available on the US OTC market. 





Panel A: Descriptive statistics of variables used in multivariate analyses 
                                 
  Continuous 
Variables 
  Mean   
Std. 
Dev. 




                                 
                                 
  DQ   58.32   8.15   39.33  52.67  57.76  63.52  79.83  1,577   
  |DA|   0.078   0.107   0.000  0.015  0.044  0.094  0.614  3,095   
  Total Assets   2.39   2.57   0.18  0.97  1.67  2.89  39.86  2,594   
  Leverage   1.76   3.20   0.02  0.40  0.91  1.97  45.86  2,882   
  Sales growth   0.23   1.86   -0.91  -0.01  0.07  0.17  57.92  2,821   
  Cfo   0.14   0.22   -0.62  0.04  0.11  0.21  1.22  2,594   
  Foreign sales   39.84   30.45   0.00  7.96  40.45  67.28  94.60  3,095   
  ROA   0.02   0.12   -0.65  0.01  0.03  0.07  0.26  3,092   
  Close   32.43   30.59   0.00  0.00  28.80  56.76  98.74  3,095   
  Beta   0.60   0.49   -0.15  0.07  0.60  0.98  1.67  3,095   
  Change PPE   0.02   0.16   -0.76  -0.01  0.01  0.04  0.92  2,594   
                                 
Panel B: Frequencies of dummy variables 
                                 




Years 0   1  1 in %              
                                 
                                 
  IFRS   3,095   965   2,130  69%               
  Early IFRS   3,095   2,139   956  31%               
  Mature IFRS   3,095   1,921   1,174  38%               
  German GAAP  3,095   2,130   965  31%               
  US-Listing   3,095   2,631   464  15%               
  LossD   3,095   2,495   600  19%              
  CfoD   3,095   2,648   447  14%               
  Big4   3,095   1,118   1,977  64%              
  New Market   3,095   3,053   42  1%              
                                 
Panel A of Table 2 exhibits the summary statistics of the main variables used in our analysis, Panel B 
summarizes the frequencies of dummy variables. Data for the disclosure quality score has been extracted 
from the annual report 'beauty contest' of manager magazin. The data for all other variables is based on 
the Thomson Reuters Worldscope database. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and frequencies of dummy variables 
The lower (upper) triangle of table 3 presents Pearson (Spearman) correlations of 
the variables used in our analyses. The correlation between the degree of earnings 
management and the disclosure score is significantly negative. This is a first indi-
cation in support of our hypothesis of a constraining effect of disclosures on earn-
ings management. With regard to the dummy variable IFRS, we see a significantly 




positive correlation with the disclosure score which strengthens the results from 
the univariate analyses. However, the correlation between IFRS and |DA| is insig-
nificant (Spearman) or significantly positive (Pearson), respectively. As the latter 
result seems to be driven by the early phase of the individual firms’ IFRS account-
ing, the correlation matrix provides some support for our hypothesis H2. 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4 shows the results of estimating equations (I.) and (II.) with discretionary 
accruals as the dependent variable.43 First, when we solely compare IFRS report-
ing observations to German GAAP observations, the estimation of equation (I.) 
shows that discretionary accruals are higher under IFRS even when controlling for 
firm characteristics, reporting incentives and time, as the coefficient for IFRS is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. As was the case in our univariate results, 
this is contrary to our hypothesis H1 but consistent with prior short-term studies 
that document that IFRS observations exhibit more earnings management than 
German GAAP observations (van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Callao and 
Jarne, 2010). 
With regard to the distinction between the early phase of IFRS reporting and the 
mature phase, the estimation of equation (II.) shows that the early phase exhibits 
significantly higher discretionary accruals as compared to German GAAP, where-
as the mature phase does not. This result holds, when we estimate the equation 
without the early phase observations, which leads us to conclude that there is no 
significant change in the earnings management behavior of firms in the long run 
as the increase in earnings management through discretionary accruals in the first 
years of IFRS application ceases to exist. We suggest that this results from im-
proving compliance, learning curves of preparers and auditors, decreasing effects 
of the first-time adoption rules of IFRS 1, emerging common guidelines and in-
terpretations as well as the increased effectiveness of enforcement. 
 
                                                 
43  With regard to our control variables, the insignificance of Leverage and Sales Growth is sur-
prising. We attribute this to collinearity, which, however, should not cause trouble here be-
cause variance inflation factors are smaller than 3 for all control variables (except industry and 
year dummies). 





Results for the effect of IFRS adoption on the degree of earnings management 
Equation No. (I.) (II.) 
                        
 
Dependent Variable     |DA|  |DA| 
                        
  Variables       Coefficient   t-statistic    Coefficient   t-statistic 
                        
  IFRS       0.017 ** 2.25       
  Early IFRS            0.018 ** 2.35 
  Mature IFRS            0.012   1.23 
  Total Assets       -0.004 ** -2.02  -0.004 *** -2.03 
  Leverage       0.001   0.30  0.001   0.30 
  Sales growth       0.005   1.38  0.005   1.38 
  Cfo       0.028 *** 2.75  0.028 *** 2.73 
  Change PPE       0.035 *** 3.01  0.035 *** 3.01 
  CfoD       0.063 *** 8.55  0.063 *** 8.56 
  LossD       0.011   1.48  0.011   1.51 
  Big4       -0.013 ** -2.37  -0.014 ** -2.38 
  New Market       0.028   1.01  0.028   1.03 
  Industry dummys       Included  Included 
  Year dummys       Included  Included 
                        
  Firm Years       2,590  2,590 




  R2       0.1481  0.1486 
  Adj. R2       0.1361  0.1362 
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating equations (I.) and (II.) as an OLS regression 
that includes fixed effects for fiscal year and industry (not tabulated). The analysis employs heteroskedastic-
ity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)). The regression is estimat-
ed with an intercept included (not tabulated).  ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, with two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Table 4: Multivariate results for the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings manage-
ment 
  




In a next step, we investigate the effect of IFRS adoption on disclosure quality by 
estimating equation (III.) as presented in table 5.44 As the coefficient for IFRS is 
positive and significant, we conclude that IFRS adoption has a positive effect on 
the quality of disclosures. Together with our univariate results, this supports our 
hypothesis H1 and is in line with prior research (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; 
Daske and Gebhardt, 2006; Glaum et al., 2013). 
Table 5 further shows the results of estimating equation (IV.) which differentiates 
between the early and the mature phase of the individual firms’ IFRS accounting. 
This analysis shows that both the firms’ early phase and the firms’ mature phase 
exhibit significantly higher disclosure quality scores as compared to German 
GAAP. Moreover, the coefficient for Mature IFRS is significantly higher than the 
coefficient for Early IFRS at the 5% level, indicating that disclosure quality not 
only increases as a result of IFRS adoption but continues to increase in the more 
mature phase of IFRS reporting. Since our results suggest a concurrent decrease in 
the level of earnings management, hypothesis H2 is supported by both of our 
transparency metrics. 
                                                 
44  Again, the insignificance of Total Assets, Leverage and ROA is surprising. However, Leverage 
is significantly correlated with Total Assets (ρ = 0.665) and ROA (ρ = -0.266). Without control-
ling for Leverage, the coefficients for Total Assets and ROA become significant, while our 
overall results remain unchanged. Furthermore, variance inflation factors are smaller than 3 for 
all control variables (except for the industry and year dummies). Therefore, we are not con-
cerned about collinearity in the data. The coefficients for Close and US-Listing are insignifi-
cant. Exclusion of these variables does not change the results either. 





Results for the effect of IFRS adoption on disclosure quality 
                        
Equation No. (III.) (IV.) 
                        
 
Dependent Variable     DQ  DQ 
                        
                        
  Variables       Coefficient   t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
                      
                        
  IFRS       2.381 ** 2.00       
  Early IFRS            2.025 * 1.71 
  Mature IFRS            3.608 ** 2.32 
  Total Assets       0.100   0.50  0.077   0.41 
  Leverage       0.121   1.41  0.119   1.40 
  ROA       4.959   1.22  5.145   1.30 
  Foreign sales       0.034 ** 2.44  0.035 ** 2.47 
  Close       -0.012   -0.78  -0.013   -0.86 
  Beta       2.675 *** 3.32  2.683 *** 3.34 
  Big4       1.672 ** 2.07  1.694 ** 2.14 
  US-Listing       1.253   1.05  1.335   1.14 
  New Market       -4.839 ** -2.13  -4.81 ** -2.31 
  Industry dummys       Included  Included 
  Year dummys       Included  Included 
                        
Firm Years 1,502 1,502 




                       
  R2       0.2153  0.2199 
  Adj. R2       0.1965  0.2008 
                        
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating Equations (III.) and (IV.) as OLS regres-
sions that include fixed effects for fiscal year and industry (not tabulated). The analysis employs het-
eroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)). The 
regression is estimated with an intercept included (not tabulated).  ***, **, and * denote p-value signif-
icance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, with two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Table 5: Multivariate results for the effect of IFRS adoption on disclosure quality 
The finding of increased earnings management under IFRS while, concurrently, 
the quality of disclosures provided increased significantly is remarkable, especial-
ly in the light of our expectation of a negative relation between the two dimen-
sions of transparency. Table 6 shows the results of estimating equation (V.) with 
discretionary accruals as the dependent variable. In these regressions, the disclo-
sure quality score serves as an additional explanatory variable. 




While the coefficient for IFRS is still significant but only at the 10%-level, the 
coefficient for DQ is significantly negative at the 1% level, indicating that disclo-
sures limit the scope for earnings management. This is in line with prior research 
which generally finds a negative (positive) association between disclosure quality 
and earnings management (quality). Similarly, replacing DQ by prior year disclo-
sure scores (DQt-1) reveals a significantly negative association between past dis-
closures and the degree of earnings management at the 5% level (not tabulated). 
This provides empirical support for the notion that disclosures limit earnings 
management opportunities in future periods. Together with our univariate results, 
these results support our hypothesis H3 that higher quality disclosures have a con-
straining effect on earnings management. 
However, when estimating equation (V.) with the dummy variables Early IFRS 
and Mature IFRS as well as the interaction terms Early IFRS*DQ and Mature 
IFRS*DQ, the results show the following patterns: Compared to German GAAP, 
early IFRS observations show significantly higher discretionary accruals which is 
in line with our results above. Remarkably, this effect is partly offset by the level 
of disclosures, i.e. there is a constraining effect of disclosures on the association 
between earnings management and IFRS adoption (significantly negative coeffi-
cient for Early IFRS*DQ). With regard to the mature IFRS observations, both the 
impact of IFRS adoption on the level of earnings management (see results above) 
and the constraining effect cease to exist. 
We interpret this as follows: When accounting standards require a comparatively 
low level of disclosures (as under German GAAP) and/or when financial state-
ments are influenced by low compliance, little experience, weak enforcement, 
and, importantly, lack of common guidelines and interpretations requiring judg-




mental decisions (as in the early IFRS phase), disclosures help to limit earnings 
management. When compliance, experience and enforcement improve and com-
mon guidelines and interpretations develop in the course of IFRS application, 
these factors likely help to limit earnings management so that the marginal effect 
of more disclosures is reduced. 
Further, the fact that we find a negative association for the early phase of the indi-
vidual firms’ IFRS accounting strengthens our interpretation that disclosures have 
the potential to limit the scope for earnings management. Since IFRS require more 
disclosures and, as shown above, disclosure quality increases as a result of the 
adoption of IFRS, our setting offers a strengthening of disclosure regulation which 
makes disclosure quality more likely to be determined exogenously in the initial 
years of IFRS accounting. 





Results for the relationship between disclosure quality and earnings management 
                        
Equation No. (V.) (V.) modified 
                        
  
Dependent Variable      |DA|  |DA| 
                       
                        
  Variables       Coefficient   t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
                        
  DQ       -0.001 *** -2.73  -0.001 * -1.79 
  IFRS       0.014 * 1.75       
  Early IFRS            0.103 * 1.78 
  Early IFRS * DQ            -0.001 * -1.65 
  Mature IFRS            0.003   0.09 
  Mature IFRS * DQ           0.000   0.41 
  Total Assets       -0.002   -1.27  -0.002   -1.19 
  Leverage       -0.002 * -1.71  -0.002 * -1.76 
  Sales growth       0.042 *** 5.37  0.041 *** 5.60 
  Cfo       0.028 *** 2.56  0.026 ** 2.36 
  Change PPE       0.009   0.65  0.009   0.63 
  CfoD       0.046 *** 5.05  0.044 *** 4.91 
  LossD       0.015 ** 1.97  0.014 ** 1.96 
  Big4       -0.013 * -1.71  -0.013   -1.59 
  New Market       -0.019   -0.79  -0.023   -1.04 
  Industry dummys       Included  Included 
  Year dummys       Included  Included 
                        
  Firm Years       1,502  1,502 




  R2       0.1877  0.1926 
  Adj. R2       0.1677  0.1711 
                        
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating Equation (V.) as an OLS regression that 
includes fixed effects for fiscal year and industry (not tabulated) as well as for estimating Equation (V.) 
including dummy variables for the early and mature phase of the individual firms' IFRS accounting and 
interaction terms for these dummy variables and the disclosure quality score. The analysis employs heter-
oscedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)). The regres-
sion is estimated with an intercept included (not tabulated).  ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, with two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Table 6: Multivariate results for the relationship between disclosure quality and 
earnings management 
  




5.3 Robustness Checks 
Alternative discretionary accruals models and alternative sample compositions 
We conduct various robustness checks to validate our results. First, we use alter-
native models of discretionary accruals, namely the standard Jones (1991) model 
and the modified Jones model from Dechow et al. (1995). All discretionary accru-
als models show similar results (not tabulated). Second, we check the robustness 
of our results for alternative sample compositions. To this end, we run our anal-
yses only with firm-year observations which are included in the annual report 
ranking and without the individual adoption year, respectively. The latter is based 
on the notion that the adoption year is likely to be influenced by one-off effects 
which may influence our results. Both approaches show results similar to our 
main analyses (not tabulated). 
Alternative indicator for earnings management – PM/ATO diagnostic of Jansen et 
al. (2012) 
Third, we take into account that discretionary accruals, despite their widespread 
use, are only one possible approach to proxy for earnings management and that 
this methodology has well-known shortcomings. To mitigate concerns regarding 
our main proxies, we use the PM/ATO diagnostic of Jansen et al. (2012) as an 
alternative earnings management measure. This diagnostic is based on the notion 
that contemporaneous changes of profit margin (PM) and asset turnover (ATO) in 
opposite directions could signal earnings management. For example, if a firm 
manages earnings downwards by overstating bad debt allowance, both net income 
and accounts receivable on the balance sheet will decrease. For a given level of 
sales, this results in a decreasing profit margin and in an increasing asset turnover. 




Therefore, we construct a dummy variable PM/ATO equal to 1 if ΔPM > 0 and 
ΔATO < 0 or ΔPM < 0 and ΔATO > 0 and zero otherwise.45 Table 7 shows uni-
variate and multivariate results with regard to this measure. In general, the mean 
of PM/ATO increases significantly from 0.34 to 0.37 as a result of IFRS adoption. 
When comparing the mean for early and mature IFRS accounting, we see a further 
increase which is, however, statistically not different from zero. 
In panel B of table 7, PM/ATO serves as dependent variable of logistic regressions 
with fixed effects for industries and years. Although the pseudo R2 is low, the 
goodness of fit measures of Pearson and Hosmer-Lemeshow indicate that our 
model fits reasonably well. In general, our results above are supported by this 
analysis. The IFRS dummy is positively significant in equation (I.) which seems 
to be driven by the early IFRS observations as indicated in equation (II.). Fur-
thermore, we also find a negative coefficient for the disclosure quality score in 
equation (V.) which supports our notion of a constraining effect of disclosures on 
earnings management. 
                                                 
45  To prevent cases where the diagnostic is likely to detect only the reversal of earnings manage-
ment, we require that upward earnings management is not followed by downward earnings 
management in the subsequent period and vice versa. 





Panel A: Robustness of earnings management results: PM/ATO-diagnostic based on Jansen et al. (2012) - 
Comparison of means 




















                           
  PM/ATO   0.34   0.37   0.03 * 0.36   0.39  0.02 * 0.03 
                            
Panel B: Robustness of earnings management results: PM/ATO-diagnostic based on Jansen et al. (2012) - 
Multivariate analysis 
Equation No. (I.) (II.) (V.) 
                                
                                
Dependent Variable   PM/ATO   PM/ATO  PM/ATO 
                        
  
      
 Variables  Coefficient   t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic 
                                
IFRS 0.204 * 1.73        0.525 *** 3.84 
Early IFRS        0.239 ** 2.14       
Mature IFRS        0.067   0.48       
DQ             -0.012 ** -2.17 
Total assets 0.019   0.88   0.020   0.91  0.061   1.31 
Leverage -0.002   -0.12   -0.002   -0.13  -0.025   -0.97 
Sales growth -0.150   -1.23   -0.152   -1.23  -0.098   -0.81 
CFO -0.328   -1.24   -0.331   -1.24  -0.483   -1.15 
Change PPE 0.054   0.23   0.051   0.22  -0.225   -0.85 
CfoD -0.168 ** -2.19   -0.170 ** -2.22  -0.416 *** -3.19 
LossD 0.001   0.02   0.006   0.07  -0.068   -0.39 
Big4 0.013   0.18   0.009   0.13  -0.048   -0.74 
New market -0.850 ** -2.26   -0.849 ** -2.27  -0.517   -1.06 
Industry dummys Included   Included  Included 
Year dummys Included   Included  Included 
                        
  
      
  Firm Years      2,590   2,590  1,502 







p-value for Pearson 
goodness of fit Chi2 0.2739 0.2683 0.2320 
  
p-value for Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness of 
fit Chi2 using 10 groups 0.8668 0.9546 0.6312 
  
Percent correctly 
predicted   0.6042 0.6062 0.6172 
  
McFadden's Pseudo R2  0.0145 0.0151 0.0271 
                               
Panel A of this table shows mean values for another indicator for earnings management: The PM/ATO diagnostic 
based on Jansen et al. (2012). This measure is based on the notion that contemporaneous increases (decreases) in 
profit margin and decreases (increases) in asset turnover are a potential indicator for earnings management. ***, ** 
and * indicate that the means are significantly different at the 1%-level, 5%-level and 10%-level, respectively, using a 
two tailed t-test with Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom. Panel B presents regression results with the PM/ATO diag-
nostic as dependent variable. The regressions have been run as logistic regressions that include fixed effects for fiscal 
year and industry and an intercept (not tabulated). The analysis employs heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard 
errors clustered by industry. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Table 7: Results for robustness checks using the PM/ATO diagnostic of Jansen et 
al. (2012) as an alternative earnings management measure  




Adoption of international standards – inclusion of US GAAP observations 
Fourth, there are several firms which adopted US GAAP prior to 2005. To focus 
on IFRS, we exclude these observations in our main analyses. Table 8 presents the 
results of estimating equations (I.), (II.) and (V.) for the entire sample including 
US GAAP observations.46 To this end, we construct the dummy variables Interna-
tional, Early International and Mature International which follow the same logic 
as before but consist of both IFRS and US GAAP observations. 
For equation (I.), International is significantly positive though this association 
seems to be driven by the early phase of the individual firms’ adoption of interna-
tional standards as indicated in the results for equation (II.). As the coefficient for 
Mature International is not significant, we conclude that there is no statistically 
significant difference in discretionary accruals between German GAAP and the 
mature phase of accounting under internationally recognized standards.47 Thus, 
our results for the effect of international standards on earnings management are 
robust to the inclusion of US GAAP observations. 
With regard to equation (V.), we again see a significantly negative coefficient for 
the disclosure quality score, which underpins our notion of a constraining effect of 
disclosures on earnings management. In this equation, however, the coefficient for 
International becomes insignificant. As the correlation between International and 
DQ is low (ρ = 0.059), we do not attribute the loss of significance to collinearity. 
Rather, a possible explanation is the following: When controlling for disclosure 
quality, the effect of the accounting regime on the degree of earnings management 
                                                 
46  Univariate results and results of the estimation of the disclosure models do not change due to 
the inclusion of US GAAP observations. Therefore, these results are not tabulated. 
47  Note that the proportion of IFRS observations as compared to US GAAP observations espe-
cially within the Mature International dummy increases over time as a result of the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS. 




is reduced. This is also in line with our results above where the significance of the 
IFRS dummy drops from the 5% level to the 10% level once the disclosure quality 
score is included. Another possible explanation lies in the lower number of obser-
vations in equation (V.) as compared to equation (I.). 
Table 8 
Robustness of earnings management results:  
The effect of the adoption of international standards 
                                  
                                  
Equation No. (I.) (II.) (V.) 
                                  
  Dependent 
Variable       |DA|  |DA|   |DA| 
                                  
 Variables   Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
                                  
International 0.017 * 1.90        0.013   1.57 
Early International       0.025 *** 3.60        
Mature International       0.010   1.31        
DQ             -0.001 *** -3.17 
Total Assets -0.004 ** -2.30  -0.004 ** -2.38   -0.002   -1.53 
Leverage 0.000   0.26  0.000   0.25   -0.001 * -0.76 
Sales growth 0.007 * 1.65  0.007 * 1.67   0.039 *** 5.52 
Cfo 0.028 ** 2.40  0.028 ** 2.33   0.038 *** 4.28 
Change PPE 0.034 *** 3.49  0.032 *** 3.38   0.015   1.11 
CfoD 0.063 *** 9.30  0.063 *** 9.14   0.063 *** 9.14 
LossD 0.010 * 1.73  0.011 * 1.84   0.008   1.30 
Big4 -0.013 ** -2.28  -0.012 ** -2.15   -0.012 * -1.87 
New Market 0.043   1.31  0.044   1.35   0.049   1.39 
Industry dummys Included  Included   Included 
Year dummys Included  Included   Included 
                                  
  Firm Years       2,913  2,913   1,698 




    
  
  R2       0.1692  0.1729   0.1964 
  Adj. R2       0.1588  0.1623   0.1790 
                                  
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating equations (I.), (II.) and (V.) as an OLS regression that 
includes fixed effects for fiscal year and industry (not tabulated). The analysis employs heteroskedasticity-adjusted 
robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)). The regression is estimated with an intercept 
included (not tabulated).  ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, with two-tailed tests. 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Table 8: Results for robustness checks including US GAAP observations 




Distinction between mandatory and voluntary adoption of IFRS 
Fifth, we run further analyses with regard to the distinction between voluntary and 
mandatory adoption, since prior research has shown that the effects of IFRS adop-
tion may differ (see e.g. Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). For this reason, table 9 re-
peats our univariate analyses for voluntary and mandatory adopters. In this analy-
sis, we define ‘early’ voluntary (mandatory) as the first four years of the individu-
al firms’ IFRS reporting as long as this period has been entirely voluntary (man-
datory). For example, if a firm voluntarily adopted IFRS in the year 1997, the 
years 1997-2000 are defined as early voluntary, whereas the years 2000-2004 are 
defined as mature voluntary. In case the firm adopted IFRS in 2003, this firm is 
excluded from this analysis as we do not have sufficient mature voluntary obser-
vations.48 
In general, both voluntary and mandatory IFRS accounting years exhibit (signifi-
cantly) higher means and medians for the disclosure quality score and for discre-
tionary accruals as compared to German GAAP. When comparing the early and 
the mature phase of IFRS reporting, this analysis shows a significant increase in 
the disclosure quality score and a significant decrease in discretionary accruals for 
both voluntary and mandatory adoption years.49 Hence, we conclude that our 
overall results regarding the development of disclosure quality and earnings man-
agement do not differ substantially between voluntary and mandatory adopters. 
Moreover, since mandatory IFRS reporting and accounting enforcement by the 
German FREP have been introduced contemporaneously, this analysis suggests 
that our results are not primarily driven by the mere introduction of enforcement. 
                                                 
48  The same logic applies for mandatory adopters, e.g. for firms which mandatorily adopted IFRS 
in 2005, the early phase is defined as the years 2005-2008 and the mature phase as 2009-2012. 
49  With regard to discretionary accruals, only the mean values decrease significantly (at the 1%-
level). 





Panel A: Distinction between German GAAP and voluntary / mandatory IFRS adoption 
                        
  

















                        
    Mean 57.47 60.18 58.14 2.71 *** 0.67       
  DQ Median 56.33 60.75 57.63 4.42 *** 1.31 **     
                      
    Mean 0.062 0.099 0.081 0.038 *** 0.020 ***     
  |DA| Median 0.034 0.048 0.048 0.013 *** 0.013 ***     
                        
Panel B: Distinction between early and mature voluntary adoption and between early and mature mandatory adoption 
  
















/ Mature  
Mandatory 
                        
    Mean 59.44 61.84 2.40 **   56.92 58.57 1.65 ** 
  DQ Median 60.02 62.96 2.94 **   56.39 58.41 2.02 *** 
                       
    Mean 0.107 0.067 -0.039 ***   0.094 0.075 -0.019 *** 
  |DA| Median 0.048 0.049 0.001     0.050 0.047 -0.003   
                        
Panel A of this table shows mean and median values of disclosure quality scores and discretionary accruals for German 
GAAP as compared to voluntary and mandatory IFRS adoption. Panel B shows means and medians for early voluntary / 
mandatory versus mature voluntary / mandatory IFRS adoption. In this analysis, 'early' is defined as the first four years of 
the individual firms' IFRS adoption as long as this has been entirely voluntary or entirely mandatory. Data for the disclo-
sure quality scores has been extracted from the annual report 'beauty contest' of manager magazin.  ***, ** and * indi-
cate that the means (medians) are significantly different at the 1%-level, 5%-level and 10%-level, respectively, using a two 
tailed t-test with Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). All variables are defined in Appen-
dix 1. 
Table 9: Analysis differentiating with regard to voluntary and mandatory adoption 
of IFRS 
6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of IFRS adoption on two dif-
ferent but related measures of the transparency of financial reporting, namely the 
degree of earnings management and disclosure quality. Based on a German sam-
ple ranging from 1995 to 2012, we not only investigate whether transparency in-
creased in the course of IFRS adoption, but also whether there is a difference be-
tween the early and the mature phase of IFRS reporting. Furthermore, we assess 
the relation between disclosure quality and earnings management. Since IFRS 




require more disclosures than German GAAP, the regulatory change from national 
to international accounting standards offers a setting in which the tightening of 
disclosure requirements allows deeper insights into the constraining effect of dis-
closures on earnings management. Moreover, enhanced disclosures under IFRS 
have been brought forward as one argument to expect a decrease in earnings man-
agement as a consequence of the adoption of IFRS (see Doukakis, 2014) which 
makes the association between disclosure quality and earnings management 
around the regulatory change a matter of great interest. 
Prior results for the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management are mixed 
(e.g. Ahmed et al., 2013). For Germany, van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) 
and Callao and Jarne (2010) find no decrease of discretionary accruals studying 
some few years around voluntary and mandatory adoption of IFRS, respectively. 
We attempt to provide an alternative explanation to conflicting findings of prior 
research by studying a longer time period. Our results indicate that IFRS adoption 
initially leads to an increase in earnings management through discretionary accru-
als which is reduced in the mature phase of IFRS reporting. We attribute this to 
the following: In the early phase of IFRS accounting, compliance was lower as the 
parties involved (preparers, auditors, and users) were in the process of accumulat-
ing the necessary experience. Moreover, the extraordinary effects of the first-time 
adoption rules of IFRS 1 diminish over time. Further, both emerging guidelines 
and common interpretations and the creation and development of the German 
FREP are likely to have contributed to a stepwise increase in accounting quality 
and, thus, a reduction of earnings management. Considering the dimension of the 
IFRS adoption, financial reporting stakeholders should clearly be interested in the 
long-term development rather than in short-term, transitory effects. Thus, our 




study may mitigate concerns raised by prior studies examining short time hori-
zons. 
With regard to the quality of disclosures, we find a positive effect of IFRS adop-
tion which is in line with the notion of enhanced disclosure requirements under 
IFRS as compared to German GAAP and supplements prior research (Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000; Daske and Gebhardt, 2006; Glaum et al., 2013). Moreover, our 
findings indicate that disclosure quality continues to improve under IFRS over 
time. Having documented these effects of IFRS adoption on our transparency met-
rics, we further show that disclosure quality and earnings management are signifi-
cantly negatively related. This is in line with most prior studies which, however, 
focused on US and UK settings and therefore, only provide limited evidence for 
the IFRS reporting regime. Thus, we are among the first who consider a Continen-
tal European country and deliver evidence for a negative association between dis-
closures and the degree of earnings management under IFRS. 
The negative relation holds for German GAAP and early IFRS observations. 
When compliance, experience and enforcement improve and guidelines and inter-
pretations develop in the mature phase of IFRS application, these factors likely 
mitigate earnings management so that the marginal effect of better disclosures is 
reduced. Since we also find evidence for a negative association using prior year’s 
disclosure levels and current year’s earnings management levels and the switch to 
IFRS can be interpreted as an increase in disclosure quality that is more likely to 
be exogenous, our results support the notion that the greater the amount and the 
higher the quality of disclosures are, the smaller the room for earnings manage-
ment is. This is in line with one of the IASB’s intentions for disclosure require-
ments, i.e. to ensure that financial statements faithfully represent what they pur-




port to represent. These findings are of interest to standard setters as well as users 
of financial reporting. The former should feel encouraged to demand high quality 
disclosures, especially with regard to management’s estimates and assumptions, 
while the latter should be aware of the use of discretionary accounting in the ab-
sence of disclosures. 
Our results are robust to various specifications of discretionary accruals, the alter-
native earnings management diagnostic developed by Jansen et al. (2012) and to 
other reasonable specifications of the early and the mature phase of IFRS account-
ing. Furthermore, we show that our results do not differ substantially for voluntary 
and mandatory adopters of IFRS and for the broader application of ‘international 
standards’ (IFRS and US GAAP). 
However, the accounting numbers and disclosures observed are the results of not 
only accounting standards, but the whole financial reporting system, including 
accounting standards, their interpretation as well as enforcement and litigation 
(Barth et al., 2008) making it impossible to attribute any effects solely to changes 
in the standards applied. Furthermore, although we only study a single country 
and control for a range of firm characteristics and incentives, we cannot be sure 
that our findings can solely be attributed to changes in the financial reporting sys-
tem. Though, of course, we explicitly address factors which we suggest to con-
tribute to the results observed, especially regarding the improvements over time. 
Moreover, since our sample is based on the firms covered by the “Best Annual 
Report” competition published in the manager magazin it is biased towards larger 
firms which may limit the generalizability of our findings. Nonetheless, bigger 
firms account for a large share of IFRS applicants and, in our view, there are no 




obvious reasons for contrary expectations regarding the development of financial 
reporting quality of smaller firms under IFRS. 
With our study, we respond to the demand for studying a longer time horizon after 
IFRS adoption (Callao and Jarne, 2010) which might help to reconcile conflicting 
results of prior research and the underlying assumption of the European regulators 
introducing IFRS to improve comparability and transparency of financial state-
ments. However, future research should study longer time series for countries oth-
er than Germany and different proxies for financial reporting quality. Additional-
ly, further research needs to be done to disentangle the effects of different factors 
that are contributing to changes in financial reporting quality after the adoption of 
IFRS. Moreover, by showing that disclosures can have a constraining effect on 
earnings management, we shed light on the apparent association between these 
two constructs. This association and how standard setters and regulators can bene-
fit from it could also be a worthwhile area for future research. 
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TA Total accruals used for the estimation of discretionary accurals. 
Calculated as change in current assets adjusted for change in cash 
less change in current liabilities adjusted for change in current por-
tion of long term debt and change in income tax payable less depre-
ciation and amortization expense. 
A Total assets used as denominator for the estimation of discretionary 
accruals. 
Δ Sales Change in sales used for the estimation of discretionary accruals. 
Δ Receivables Change in receivables used for the estimation of discretionary accru-
als. 
DQ Disclosure quality score from the best annual report 'beauty contest' 
of the German business journal manager magazin. 
|DA| Absolute value of discretionary accruals from the Kothari (2005) 
model as described in section 4.1. 
   
Total Assets Total assets scaled by beginning of period market value of equity. 
Leverage Total liabilities divided by beginning of period market value of equi-
ty. 
Sales growth Change in sales divided by beginning of period sales. 
Cfo Cash from operations divided by beginning of period market value 
of equity. 
Change PPE Change in property, plant and equipment divided by beginning of 
period market value of equity. 
Foreign sales Ratio of foreign sales to total sales. 
ROA Return on assets calculated as net income before extraordinary items 
plus interest expenses divided by total assets. 
Close Percentage of closely held shares. 
Beta Measure of systematic risk based on how returns co-move with the 
market. 
IFRS Dummy variable equal to 1 if the financial statements are prepared 
in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) and 0 otherwise. 
Early IFRS Dummy variable equal to 1 if IFRS is applied and the observation 
belongs to the first four years of the individual firms IFRS reporting 
and 0 otherwise. 
  






Mature IFRS Dummy variable equal to 1 if IFRS is applied and the observation 
does not belong to the first four years of the individual firms IFRS 
reporting and 0 otherwise. 
US-Listing Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is cross-listed (either directly 
or OTC) in the United States and 0 otherwise. 
LossD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm encounters losses and 0 oth-
erwise. 
CfoD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm encounters negative operating 
cash flows and 0 otherwise. 
Big4 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's financial statements are 
audited by a Big4 auditor (Ernst & Young, PriceWaterhouseCoop-
ers, KPMG, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, (Arthur Andersen)) and 0 
otherwise. 
New Market Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed at the German New 
Market and 0 otherwise. 
International Dummy variable equal to 1 if the financial statements are prepared 
in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) or US GAAP and 0 otherwise. 
Early International Dummy variable equal to 1 if IFRS or US GAAP is applied and the 
observation belongs to the first four years of the individual firms 
IFRS/US GAAP reporting and 0 otherwise. 
Mature International Dummy variable equal to 1 if IFRS or US GAAP is applied and the 
observation does not belong to the first four years of the individual 
firms IFRS/US GAAP reporting and 0 otherwise. 
PM/ATO Earnings management diagnostic based on profit margin and asset 
turnover (Jansen et al., 2012) 
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